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2009,? BBC? News? Special? reports),? it? took? nearly? everyone? –? from?





In? fact,? the? region? of? South? Ossetia,? which? is? currently? internationally?
recognized? as? part? of? Georgia’s? territory,? has? undergone? a? continuous?
history? of? violence? since? the? break?up? of? the? Soviet?Union.? In? 1989,? the?
Ossetian? and? Georgian? independence?movements? escalated? the? conflict?
between? the? two?groups? for? the? first? time.?Subsequently,? the? leaderships?
engaged?in?a?war?that?was?ended?by?a?Georgian?Russian?peace?agreement?
in?1992?and? that? left?South?Ossetia?de? facto? independent? from?Georgian?
central?rule? (HRW?1992,? ICG?2004).?Meanwhile,?Georgia? itself?had?gained?
independence?from?the?Soviet?Union?and?prepared?to?align?itself?with?the?
West.?Whereas? the?conflict? in?South?Ossetia? seemed?under?control,?with?
the? OSCE? facilitating? political? talks? and? monitoring? the? ceasefire?
agreement,?Georgia?endured?a? civil?war,? a? severe?economic? crisis,? and? a?
war?in?Abkhazia,?which?ended?in?1994?(Coppieters?and?Legvold?2005).?
?
When? Georgia’s? leadership? changed? for? the? third? time? in? 2003? from?
Shevardnadze? to? the? Western?oriented? leader? Saakashvili,? the? country?
finally?seemed?on?track?toward?stability?(i.a.?Stewart?et?al.?2012).?However,?
four?months?after?the?new?government?had?taken?power,?in?May?2004,?the?
conflict? in? South? Ossetia? escalated? again? due? to? anti?smuggling? raids.?
Subsequently?and?despite? intense?domestic?and? international?efforts,? the?
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?
situation? in? the?deteriorated? year? after? year? through? increasing? violence?
and? radicalizing? rhetoric? (Asmus?2010,?Garthon?2010).?The?wide? range?of?
efforts?to?resolve?the?conflict?included?peace?plans?promoted?at?the?United?
Nations? (UN)? and? the? Council? of? Europe? and? widely? supported? by? the?
United? States? of? America? (US)? and? European? leaders? of? the? European?
Union? (EU)? and? EU? member? states;? enormous? reform? efforts? curbing?
corruption? on? the?Georgian? side? and? progress?within? the?North? Atlantic?
Treaty? Organization? (NATO)? framework;? ongoing? political,? negotiations?
facilitated? through? the? Organization? for? Security? and? Cooperation? in?
Europe? (OSCE)?with? the?Russian? and?Ossetian? sides?of? the? South?Ossetia?
conflict;?and?a?joint?Georgian?Ossetian?economic?rehabilitation?program.??
?
Nevertheless,? the? conflict? escalated? into? a? short?but?devastating?war? for?
the?second?time? in?August?2008.?This?time,?the?end?of?the?war?cemented?
South? Ossetia’s? separation? from? Georgia? even? more,? with? the? Russian?
Federation?recognizing?South?Ossetian?independence?and?the?OSCE?ending?




Considering? the? dynamic? state? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict,? this?
dissertation? attempts? to? propose? a? plausible? explanation? as? to?why? the?
conflict? recurrently? escalates.? In? face?of? the? extensive? settlement? efforts?
undertaken? by? Georgian,? Ossetian,? Russian? and? Western? actors,? the?
conflict?could?have?been?expected?to?be?resolved?by?one?plan?or?another,?
be? it?annexation?by?the?Russian?Federation,?re?establishment?of?Georgian?
central? control,? or? international? recognition? of? Ossetian? independence.?
Instead,? the? conflict? remains? an? impediment? to? Georgian? statehood,? a?






Importantly,? the? setting? of? the? conflict? exhibits? persistent? key?
characteristics? over? time:? Russia? and? Georgia? struggle? over? control? of?
Georgia’s? unaccomplished? statehood,?Western?Georgian? ties? increasingly?
intensify? in? the?post?Soviet?period,? and? control? in? the? conflict? remains? a?
beacon?of?power? to?nationalist?Georgian? leaders.? Simultaneously,? ready?
made? arguments? as? to? why? the? conflict? persists? dominate? the? general?
debate,? among? them? Russia’s? assumed? political? aim? to? regain? influence?
over? its?neighbors,?Georgian?nationalist?ambitions? to?reunify? the? territory?





This? introduction?approaches? the? research? interest? from? two?angles,? first?
discussing?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?in?the?post?Soviet?context?and?then?in?




The? factors? contributing? to? the? continuous? re?escalation? of? the? South?
Ossetia? conflict? are? not? unique? as? to? this? particular? case? but? pertain? a?
variety?of?conflicts? in? the?post?Soviet?space,? including?Nagorno?Karabakh,?




Chechnya? and? Circassia,? or? the? Ingush?Ossetian? conflict,? reveal? similar?
patterns? such? as? Russia’s? claim? to? regional? power? spots,? post?Soviet?
strongmen’s?and?elites’?grip?on?power,? the? rise?of?nationalisms?based?on?









Markedonov? 2008).? The? fact? that? these? characteristics? are? pervasive?
throughout? the? post?Soviet? space? points? to? the? decisive? and? sustained?




The? case? of? Georgia? and? the? South? Ossetian? conflict? varies? in? specific?
aspects? from? similar? cases? in? the?post?Soviet?area.?A?brief?discussion?will?
show? why? outcomes? are? expected? to? be? influenced? considerably? by? a?
number?of? factors? that? set? the?South?Ossetian?case?apart? from? the?post?
Soviet?setting.?First,?Georgia’s?relations?with?Russia?during?the?Soviet?Union?
were?close?in?terms?of?economy?and?culture?(De?Waal?2010).1?The?break?of?
this? link,?and? the? shift? to?adversarial?policies,?exposed? conflicting? lines? in?
Georgian?society?that?had?been?suppressed?for?decades.?Parts?of?Georgian?
society? had? benefitted? from? close? ties? with?Moscow? during? the? Soviet?
period,? whereas? other? groups? were? persecuted? or? disregarded? by? the?
Soviet?bureaucracy.?A?bitter? sense?of? competition? took?hold? in?Georgia’s?
political? environment.2? Therefore,? issues? of? redistribution? between?
formerly? advantaged? Soviet? elites? and? newly? emerging? elites,? as?well? as?





The? Georgian? communist? elite? received? enormous? endowments? over? the? decades? to?




previous?president?Gamsakhurdia’s?Zviadist?groups.?The? struggle?was?carried? forward? in?









bolster?Georgian? self?determination?was?an?attempt? to?push?Russia? from?
South?Ossetia?and?bring? the? region?back?under?Georgian? rule.?When? the?
conflict? in? South?Ossetia? turned? into?war? in? 1990,? this? contributed?most?
strongly? to? the? falling?out? between? Georgia? and? Russia.? Crucially? for?
Gamsakhurdia,? losing? South? Ossetia? meant? losing? power,? and? he? was?
subsequently?ousted?and?in?1992?replaced?by?the?second?president,?Eduard?
Shevardnadze.?Therefore,?the?conflict?over?South?Ossetia?holds?a?particular?




Third,?Georgians’? relations?with?Ossetians?during? the? Soviet? period?were?
culturally? closer? than?with? the?Abkhaz?minority.?Ossetian?communities? in?
the? oblast? of? South? Ossetia? and? in? villages? in? central? Georgia? were?
geographically? closer? to? Georgians? than? Abkhazian? communities,? and?
infrastructural? and? social? links? through? marriages? and? trade? were?





depending? on? one’s? point? of? view)? the? largest? amount? of? international?
engagement,? with? the? highest? level? of? US? financial? support,? two?
international?missions?–?UN?and?OSCE?–?deployed?on?its?territory,?and?the?
most? institutionalized? ties?with?European? structures?within?EU?and?NATO?





International? engagement? included? the? conflict? in? South?Ossetia? (Koenig?
2005,?Jawad?2008)?but?also?and?in?particular?focused?on?the?liberal?project?
of?building?the?Georgian?state?and?democracy?(Lazarus?2010,?Broers?2005).??
Fifth,? South?Ossetia? is,? in? stark? contrast? to?other?post?Soviet? secessionist?
territories,? extremely? secluded? from? the? outside?world,?with? little? or? no?
access? to? international? organizations,? and?mostly? dependent? on? Russian?
assistance?and? illicit? trade? (US?Department?of?State?Report?2011).?Within?
this? context,? the? dynamics? of? the? conflict? are? significantly? swayed? by?
regional? stakeholders’? policies? and? generally? external? influence? in? the?
dynamics?of?the?conflict.??
?
Sixth,? among? the? former? Soviet? republics,?Georgia?experienced? the?most?
severe?outbursts?of?violence?after?the?split?from?the?Soviet?Union,?with?the?
two?wars?in?South?Ossetia?in?1992?and?2008,?one?in?Abkhazia,?one?civil?war,?




Seventh,? the?conflict? in?South?Ossetia? is?nourished?considerably?by?South?
Ossetian? links?with? its?adjacent?“brother?nation”?North?Ossetia,? located? in?
the?Russian?Federation?(see?for?North?South?Ossetian?history?for?example:?




on? as? strong? a? cross?border? diaspora? as? the?Ossetians? in? South?Ossetia.?
Claims?of?self?determination?and?territorial?separation?from?Georgia?stress?








bolster? political? rule.? This? not? only? provides? Russia? the? opportunity? to?
influence? South? Ossetia? and? Georgia? via? North? Ossetian? politics? and?
territory,? but? also? puts?Moscow? in? a? state? of? alert? as? to? international?





the? key? factors? that? reinforce? conflict? dynamics,? such? as? territorial?
proximity,?Western?and?Russian? interests,?and?Georgia’s?historically?close?
Soviet? ties.?Moreover,? these? factors?emphasize? that?1)? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict?impacts?local?power?politics?in?post?Soviet?Georgia,?and?2)?Western?
external? influence? plays? a? key? role? in? Georgia? and? the? South? Ossetia?
conflict.?As?will?be?shown,?the?discussion?will?establish?these?two?factors?as?




The? puzzle? of? recurring? violence? in? South? Ossetia,? however,? is? not?
exclusively? relevant? to? the? post?Soviet? context.? Recurring? violence? is? an?
issue? of? wider? importance? beyond? this? particular? case,? as? even? upon?
superficial?examination?we?can? find?examples?of? re?escalating?conflicts? in?
similar?settings,?such?as? in?Kashmir,?Sri?Lanka,?Lebanon?or?East?Timor?(see?
i.a.?Habibullah?2004,? Shastri?2005,?Cederman?et? al.?2010,?Wimmer?et? al.?











the? seminal?work? of? Kalyvas? 2006).? In? this? respect,? the? re?escalation? of?
violence?differs? from?violence? that?emerges?out?of?previously?non?violent?
contexts? (Cederman?et?al.?2010,?Eck?2009,?Zartman?2002).? In?an?ongoing?
conflict,? a? system? of? patterns? and?mechanisms? has? evolved? and? can? be?
expected? to? have? a? determining? and? even? intensifying? effect? on? the?
occurrence?of?events? (Cederman?et?al.?2010:?1).?Therefore,? in?systems?of?
recurring? violence,? these? factors? are?held? to? explain? re?escalation?only? if?
examined? at? different? points? throughout? the? process? as? they? can? be?
expected? 1)? to? be? part? of? the? explanation? why? violence? recurs? and? 2)?





largely? overlap,? as? Western? countries? mostly? dedicate? their? efforts? to?




efforts? to?Westernize? the?political?system? in?Georgia?after? the?end?of? the?
Soviet?Union?(Lazarus?2010,?Fairbanks?2012).?In?this?respect,?Georgia?is?one?
of?Western?states’?post?Cold?War? ‘projects’?of? liberal?governance? (see? for?
example? Anderson? 2012).? However,? little? is? known? about? the? specific?
effects?of?Western?engagement? in?the?context?of? local?violence,?and?even?
less? is?known?about? its?effects?on?re?escalation?as?Goodhand?and?Walton?
(2010)? show? this? in? ? the? case? study?on? Sri? Lanka.?Moreover,? the? specific?
policies?Western?actors?utilize? and? their? impact?on?particular?events? is?a?









The? above?listed? characteristics? of? the? dynamics? of? recurring? violence? in?
South?Ossetia,?both? in? the? global? and? the? regional? context,?highlight? the?
importance?of?external?Western?engagement,?the?domestic?power?setting,?
and? historical? relations?with? Russia.? However,? none? of? these? arguments?
provides?an?explanation?as? to?why?escalations?occur?at? specific?points? in?
time? and? why? they? recur.? Escalations? do? not? necessarily? coincide? with?
agency? of? the? Russian? Federation? or? shifts? in? power.? Those? factors? only?
explain? that? the? context? deteriorated? in? favor? of? escalation,? but? do? not?
explain?or?provide?credible? links?why?and?how?escalations?occurred?at?the?
points? in?time?observed.?Therefore,?these?studies?refrain? from?addressing?
the? specific? conditions? of? the? South? Ossetia? case? and? link? secession? to?
exogenous? factors.? This? view? represents? the? dominating? perspective? of?
scholars,? politicians? and? the? public? in? European? states? and? the?U.S.,? but?
clouds?the?view?to?the?actual,?powerful?triggers?of?violence?in?the?conflict.?
As? a? result,? no? systematic? study? on? violence? in? South?Ossetia? has? been?
done.?
This?dissertation?will?argue?that?the?policies?of?Western?external?actors?at?
specific? points? in? time? repeatedly? encouraged? or? allowed? local? state?







Western?policies? thereby? trigger? shifts? in? the?behavior?of?Georgian? state?
leadership?and? in? this?way? create? the? context? for? repeated? shifts? toward?
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escalation.? On? this? basis,? the? study? further? contends? that? recurring?
patterns?of?external? influence?can?be?seen?prior?to?more?than?one? instant?
of? escalation.? These? patterns? are? chains? of? actions?which?work? through?









The?dissertation?begins?with? the? review?of?existing?arguments?as? to?why?




sustains? the?argument? through? theoretical?considerations?and?establishes?
working?hypotheses? to? guide? the? empirical? analysis.? Then? the? discussion?
addressed? the?methodological?considerations?of?conducting? the?empirical?
analysis? and? concludes? the? introductory? chapter? with? the? model? of?
analysis.??
?
Thereafter,? the? second? chapter? covers? the? empirical? analysis? of? the?
influence?of?Western?policies?on? the?power?politics?of? local? leadership? in?
Georgia? prior? to? escalations? in? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008.? The? chapter?
comprises?two?parts:?First,?the?text?gives?an?overview?of?the?background?of?
political? development? in? Georgia? and? the? events? of? violence? in? South?
Ossetia? between? 1989? and? 2008.? This? part? reflects? the? local? context? of?
events?and?agency?related?to?the?three?points?of?escalation? in?2002,?2004?


















for? violence? re?escalation? between? 1989? and? 2008? in? the? South?Ossetia?
context.?
?
The? third? and? final? chapter? discusses? the? theoretical? and? empirical?
applicability? of? the? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? case,? first? in? light? of?
existing? theories? of? violence? in? ethnic? conflicts,? and? second? in? light? of?
violence? in?the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?conflicts.?The?discussion?specifically?
turns?to?the?enhancement?of?existing?mechanisms?of?violence,?pointing?out?
their? specific? functions?under? given? circumstances,? and? concludes?with? a?





depends? largely?on?Georgian?Western? relations.?The? study,? in?a?nutshell,?
finds?that?Western?policies?repeatedly?trigger?escalations? in?South?Ossetia?
by? providing? strong? incentives? for?Georgian? leaderships? to? enact? power?
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?
consolidation? policies? in? the? context? of? the? conflict.? Therefore,?Western?








of? the? conflict.? European? agencies? appear? to? rather? take? effect? through?
institutional? frameworks? that? then? seem? to? shape? Georgian? leaderships?




In? this? respect,? the? findings? suggest? that? in? order? to? help? overcome? the?
deep?set?patterns?of?conflict?and?violence? in?the?Georgian/South?Ossetian?
context,? the? European? Union? should? decentralize? competencies? and?
strengthen? its? locally? based? institutions,? namely? the? EU? Delegation? to?
Georgia?and? the?EU?Special?Representative? to? the?South?Caucasus.?These?
institutions? should? be? given?more? responsibility? for? decision?making? and?
policy?formation? vis?à?vis? Georgian? actors.? Greater? efficiency? and?
consistency? of? EU? policies? through? a? clear? separation? of? competences?
between?EU?agencies?would?greatly?enhance?the?effect?of?such?policies,?as?
1)?the?same?actors?would?act?at?one?level?and?be?a?consistent?addressee?for?


















review?of? literature?on?ethnic?violence?and?a? critique? thereof,? the?causal?
argument?of?the?study,?and?theoretical?and?methodological?considerations?





The? existing? literature? on? ethnic? violence? differs? mainly? as? to? where?
explanations?identify?the?“culprit”?to?which?the?occurrence?of?violence?can?




as? regime? change,? resources,? and? external? influence.? However,? most?
studies?dealing?with?explaining?ethnic?violence?include?both?structural?and?
agency?based?features?and?rather?lean?to?one?side?or?the?other?(see?for?this?
argument? for?example?Brass?1996).?Even? if?we? identify?who? is?pulling? the?
trigger,? the? “culprit”? of? emerging? violence? is? not? easily? located? if? we?
consider? the? dynamics? and? interactions? prior? to? outbreaks? of? violence.?
Whereas?the?existing?literature?seems?to?widely?acknowledge?this,?this?is?at?
the? same? time? not? reflected? in? the? research? agenda? of?most? studies? on?
ethnically?based?violence,?as?will?be?discussed?below.?
The? following? literature? review? discusses? existing? arguments? aiming? to?
explain? violence? in? ethnic? conflicts.? The? review? identifies? four? core?
arguments:?1)?Democratization?and?elections? leading? to?violence,?2)? Illicit?
economies? leading? to? violence,?3)?Grievances? leading? to? violence,?and?4)?
Involvement? of? external? actors? leading? to? violence.? The? discussion? will?
review? how? those? arguments?may? help? to? explain? recurring? violence? in?
25?
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political? context? and? including? South? Ossetia? merely? as? a? marker? of?




The? first? field?highlights? the?conflict?as?a? result?of? local?and? international?
efforts? in?the?realms?of?state?building?and?democratization.?State?building?
policies? thereafter? fuel? the? conflict?by?pushing? territorial? integration? (see?
Mitchell? 2009? and? Lazarus? 2010).? Democratization,? on? the? other? hand,?
might? deteriorate? the? conflict? if? key? reforms? such? as? integration? of?
minorities?and?institutional?rights?fail?(see?Huber?2004?and?Broers?2005).?
The?second?field?stressing?ethnic?groups?and?nationalism?in?relation?to?the?
conflict?more? specifically?discusses?causes?of?South?Ossetian? secession? in?
light? of? post?Soviet? nationalisms7,? as? a? by?product? of? Western?Russian?
                                                          
3? For? literature?encompassing?different? instants?of? the? conflict? in? South?Ossetia? see? for?
example:?English?2008,?Birch?1996?and?1999,? ICG?2004,?HRW?1992,?Mayorov?2002,?Kolst?
and? Blakkisrud? 2008,? Higgins? and? O’Reilly? 2009,? Saparov? 2010,?Welt? 2010,? Cheterian?
2008a,?also?see?Fuller?2005,?Peuch?2005.?
4?For?literature?dealing?with?the?conflict?in?or?history?of?specifically?South?Ossetia?see:?Suny?















factors?only? explain? that? the? context?deteriorated? in? favor?of? escalation,?
but? do? not? explain? or? provide? credible? links? why? and? how? escalations?
occurred?at? the?points? in? time?observed.?Therefore,? these? studies? refrain?
from?addressing?the?specific?conditions?of?the?South?Ossetia?case?and? link?





Studies?on? corruption?and? smuggling? in? the?context?of? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict?reflect?stability?and?forms?of?political?rule?in?post?Soviet?Georgia10,?
holding? that? corruption? triggers? escalation? or? protracts? violence.11? These?
studies?provide?solid? insight? into?domestic?power?functions?that?trigger?or?
alleviate? violence? through? corruption,? however? neglect? to? systematically?
encompass? external? influence? on? violence?triggering? policies.? Studies? on?
Western? influence? in? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? rarely? move? beyond?
specific? sectors? of? engagement,? performance? of? individual? actors,? or?
specific?events?such?as?the?2008?war12,?with?the?noteworthy?exception?of?
Lazarus’?paper?(Lazarus?2010)?that?will?help?to?frame?the?findings.??
                                                          




Mayorov? 2002,? Olcott? Brill? et? al.? 1999,? Cummings? 2001,? Gower? and? Timmins? 2009,?
Haukkala?2008,?Sikorski?2009.?
10?See?for?example:?Easter?1996,?Holmes?1997,?Gordadze?2003,?Hensell?2009,?Christophe?
2005,? ICG? 2004,?Vilanishvili? 2005,? Chkhartishvili? et? al.? 2004,? Timm? 2012,?Hensell? 2012,?
Gordadze?2003,?Turmanidze?2001,?Cheterian?2008b.?
11? For? literature?on? this? specific?argument? ?George?2009,?Baev?2003,?Wennmann?2004,?
Kukhianidze?et?al.?2006;?Kukhianidze?2003,?2004?and?2007.?
12?For? literature?encompassing?the?South?Ossetia?within?these?confined?aspects?see:?King?





The? dissertation? will? selectively? draw? on? these? studies? to? support? the?
causal? argument? by? sustaining? the? statements? over? the? course? of? the?
discussion,?particularly?in?the?theoretical?discussion?of?the?argument?and?in?
the?empirical?chapter.?Given?that?for?the?purposes?of?this?study?there?is?an?
insufficient? scope? of? literature?which? focuses? on? the? case,? the? following?
discussion?will?draw?on?main?arguments?in? literature?that?seeks?to?explain?
ethnic?violence?and?will?critically?reflect?on?their?usefulness?for?studying?re?
escalation? in? South?Ossetia.?At? the? end? of? the? discussion,? the? study?will?
present?a?causal?argument? for?re?escalating?violence? in? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict.?
1) Argument? 1:? Democratization? and? elections? leading? to? violence? –?
“Playing?the?ethnic?card”?(Mansfield?and?Snyder?2005:?70)?
With? the? Soviet? Union? disintegrating? and? post?colonial? processes? taking?
effect,? newly? formed? states? emerged? and? endeavored? to? establish?
democratic?systems.?Considered?a?pillar?of?democracy,?elections?were?held?
in? these? new? entities? to? choose? new? leaders? to? these? states.? However,?
many? of? the? electoral? processes? proved? not? only? to? lack? democratic?
standards? of? being? free? and? fair,? but? also? coincided? with? outbreaks? of?
violence.?Moreover,?violence?often?seemed?to?occur?along?ethnic?lines.?
Subsequently,?a? large?strand?of?studies? took? to?explain? the?occurrence?of?
violence? in? these? newly? emerging? contexts? examining? the? link? between?
democratization?and?ethnic?violence?(see?above?all:?Snyder?and?Mansfield?
1995,? Snyder? 1993? and? 2000,? Brubaker? 1996,?Woodward? 2003,?Walter?
1999):?Is?there?any?link,?or?are?the?factors?leading?to?violence?hidden?to?the?
eye,?and?not?necessarily?related?to?democratization?itself??Who?is?involved?
with? violence,? and? does? this? explain? why? violence? breaks? out? and? why?
violence? coincides? precisely? with? periods? of? elections?? Does? ethnicity?
actually?play?the?key?role?it?seemingly?has??







as? media,? resentments? toward? minorities,? unequal? distribution? of?






The? link? between? the? democratization? processes? and? violence? does? not?
become?clear?immediately.?In?the?beginning?of?the?1990s?when?new?states?
started? to? establish? democratic? systems,? democracy?was?widely? held? to?
foster?peace?(for?studies?discussing?this?argument?see:?Kaldor?and?Vejvoda?
1997,?Russett?1995).?But? the?paradigm?of?“democratic?peace”? took? inter?
state? relations? into? focus,? without? taking? into? consideration? internal?
conditions? of? democratizing? states? that? had? not? yet? been? enshrined? in?
theory.? Social? research? throughout? the?1990s? came? to?acknowledge? that?
transitional?phases?of?political?systems?are?predominantly?characterized?by?
instability,? regularly? involving? outbreaks? of? violence? (see? for? a? seminal?
study? on? this? argument:? Snyder? 1998).? Hence,? the? context? in? which?
democratizations?take?place?is?highly?volatile,?as?new?groups?emerge?out?of?
the? fading?order,?often? through? forming?new?alliances?which? struggle? for?
power? in?the?emerging?order? (see? for? literature?discussing?this?argument:?
Snyder? and? Ballantine? 1996;?Wucherpfennig,? Cederman,?Metternich? and?
Gleditsch?2010:?3;?Gagnon?1995?and?2007).??
Gaining? power? in? democratizing? orders? largely? hinges? on? securing?
resources? which? groups? can? make? use? of? in? political? competition?
(Cederman,?Wimmer? and?Min? 2010:? 106;? also? see:? Brubaker? and? Laitin?
1998).?Here,? a? key? resource? is? support? of? respective? constituencies? (see?





2005:?70).? If?a?group? striving? for?power?can?unify?a?constituency?over?an?
identity?forming?claim?under?its?banner?a?powerful?resource?is?at?the?hands?
of? the? power? elite.? Thereby,? ethnicity? functions? as? a? group?constituting?
force? when? promoted? against? an? adversary,? an? ethnic? “other”? in?
competitive?contexts?(see?above?all:?Anderson?1991,?Ignatieff?1993).?
?
Social? sciences?widely? accept? the? perception? of? identities? to? be? part? of?
group? membership? processes? (see? the? study? of? Berger? and? Luckmann?
1987).? Particularly? David? Laitin? has? specified? that?mechanisms? of? inter?
group? conflict? promoted? by? elites? tie? groups? internally? together,? or?
respectively,?that? intra?group?policing?by?vilifying?competing?elites,?ethnic?
groups?or?any?oppositional?forces?and?“enemies?of?the?nation”?(Laitin?1995?
in? Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998:? 433)? can? play? a? crucial? role? for? securing?
support? of? constituencies.? Hence,? if? leaders? succeed? in? forging? strong?
group? identification? among? the? respective? members? and? if? they?
successfully? link? these? categories? to? a?power? bid,? constituencies? tend? to?
provide? support? (Walter? 2009:? 71,? also? see?Mansfield? and? Snyder? 2005,?
Goemans? 2000).? Further,? if? leaders? make? use? of? “elite? manipulation”?
(Ballantine?and?Snyder?1996:?22)?by?staging?a?threat?to?the?group?through?a?
second?group?under?the?claim?to?be?able?to?protect?their?peer?group?from?
harm,? constituencies? tend? to? provide? even? stronger? support? (on? this?
argument? see? for? example:? Toft? 2003,? Figueiredo? and? Weingast? 1997,?
Brown?1996).?Other?manipulative?mechanisms?in?the?electoral?process?may?
be? the?misrepresentation?of?one’s?own?players?and?capacities? in?order?to?
gain? support? (Snyder?2000:?67,?also? see?Walter?2003,? Fearon?1995),? and?
the?weak?brokerage?of?political?bargains?(Mansfield?and?Snyder?2005:?67).??
?
Therefore,? the? debate? on? democratization? and? elections? sees? ethnicity?
through?the?creation?of? identities?as?a?strategic?power?resource? for?those?
competing?at? the?core?of?power?struggles.?Ethnicity? is?viewed?as?but?one?





to? violence?? Studies? explore? which? mechanisms? work? through? political?
actors?that?then?lead?to?mobilization?and?escalation.??
Characteristically,?actors? competing? for?power? strategically?work? through?
ethnic? entrepreneurs? fomenting? sentiments? among? constituencies? (Brass?
1997:?31,?Brubaker?and?Laitin?1998:?440),?for?example?introducing?“ethnic?
wedges”? into? public? debate? to? stress? the? salience? of? ethnic? issues?
(Wilkinson? 2006:? 23,? Gagnon? 1998),? or? utilize? media? to? direct? public?
awareness? in? their? favor? (Snyder?and?Ballantine?1996:?14).?Political?elites?
make?use?of? institutions?established?during?democratization,? such?as? the?
electoral? or? constitutional? system? or,? political? parties.? A? well?studied?
example? of? institutional? manipulation? of? the? electoral? process? is? vote?
pooling?through?ethnic?outbidding?(on?this?mechanism?see:?Horowitz?1985:?
chapter?8,?Brubaker?and?Laitin?1998:?434)?or?inbidding?(Wilkinson?2004:?4)?
by? overstating? claims? of? liberalism,? or? logrolling? with? minority? parties?
(Snyder? 2000:? 67).? Furthermore,? the? debate? identifies?mechanisms? not?





usually? precipitated? by? a? combination? of? several? of? these? mechanisms?
(Mansfield? and? Snyder? 2005:? 67? and? 169ff.).? The? debate? does? not?
systematically?examine? re?escalation?of?violence,?but? juxtaposes? that? the?
potential? for? violence? to? escalate? recurs?with? each? election? cycle? unless?
gains?of?the?use?of?violence?for?power?elites?becomes?obsolete.??
?
2)?Argument?2:? Illicit?economies? leading?to?violence?–?“Ethnic?warfare? is?
simply?a?cover?story?for?criminal?violence?and?predation”?(Brubaker?2004:?
19)?









1998? and? the? instrumentalist? approaches? of? Brubaker? 2004? and? Keen?
1998).?A?new?strand?of?debate?took?to?defending?the?so?called?“new?wars”?
of?the?1990s?not?to?be?the?result?of?ethnic?and?cultural?differences,?but?to?
be? the? result? of? strife? over? newly? accessible? resources? serving? groups’?
power? claims? (Kalyvas? 2001:? 103,? also? see? Kalyvas? 2008,? Sinno? 2008,?
Cunningham?et?al.?2009?and?Sambanis?2000).?
Similar?to?the?ethnicity?argument,?the?violent?potential?of?illicit?economies?
is? rooted? in? the?existence?of? resources? that?can?be?exploited? for?political?
gains.? Competing? groups? predate? resources? through? diasporas,? state?
capture,? and? smuggling? as? these? supply? lines? bypass? controlled?markets?
(for? this?argument? see? the?excellent? study?on? Sarajevo?of?Andreas?2008,?
also? see?Wennmann? 2004,?Demmers? 2007).?Hence,? the? illicit? economies?
argument? contends? that? it? is? not? perceptions? of? social? inequality? arising?
from?ethnic?diversity?that?trigger?conflict?(Wilkinson?2006:?32,?Cederman?et?
al.? 2010:? 92),? but? rather? the? goal? of? financing? inter?group? warfare? of?






to?state? resources? through?office,? to?access? local?constituencies,?or? to?be?
entitled? to?use? violence? for? these?purposes? (Schlichte? 2009,? first? version?
2007:?7).??
?






(for? this? strand? of? debate? see? above? all:? Elwert? 1997? and? 1999;? Jung,?
Schlichte? and? Siegelberg;? Schlichte?2005;? Zuercher?and?Koehler?2003).? In?
markets? of? violence,? violence? becomes? both? a? resource? to? extract?more?
resources?and?a?currency?that?can?be?used?by?actors?to?pursue?their?goals?
and?simultaneously?perpetuates?the?instable?context?necessary?to?maintain?
shadow? economies.? Weinstein? points? out? that? violence? from? rebel?
organizations?tends?to?recur? if?resources?become?available?(see?Weinstein?
2007).??
The? tipping? moment? of? a? system? skipping? from? armed? conflict? into? a?





Snyder? 2005:? 43,? Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998:? 434,? also? see?Walter? 2003).?
Process?centered?perspectives?argue?that?violence?starts?out?as?motivated?
by?greed,?but?transgresses?over?time? into?a?self?reinforcing?mechanism?of?
needs? and? thus?perpetuate? violence? (Kalyvas? and?Balcell?2010:?416,? also?
see?Berdal?and?Malone?2000,?Arnson?and?Zartman?2005).?A? few?valuable?
studies? on? international? engagement? in? conflicts? with? illicit? economies?
show?how?external?engagement?tends?to?aggravate?the?level?or? likelihood?
of?violence?and?often?maintains?predatory?elites? in?specific?cases? (see? for?
example:?Andreas?2008,?Cockayne?and?Lupell?2009).?
?




                                                          




result? of? more? assertive,? nationalist? policies? of? the? new? Georgian?
leadership?striving? for? territorial? reintegration? (see? for?example?Wheatley?
2005).?The?newly?emerging?elite?announced?a?plan?to?establish?Georgia?as?
a? viable?member?of? the?Western? community,?making? the? country? fit? for?
NATO?and?EU? integration,?and? claiming? to?wrestle? it? from? the?paralyzing?
grip? of? the? status? quo? imposed? by? Russia? throughout? the? 1990s? (Nodia?
2000).? Because? settlement? prospects? were? dim? and? there? was? time?
pressure?to?keep?up?with?the?population’s?and? international?expectations,?
it?was?understood?that?the?Georgian?government?took?an?impatient?course?
that? led? to? hawkish? policies? and? engaged? in? a? cycle? of? armed? atrocities?
involving?Russian?and?Ossetian?forces?(see?for?example:?Jones?2009).?After?
2004,?illicit?practices?deteriorated?the?balance?of?interests?in?the?conflict,?as?
Georgian? and? Ossetian? groups? aimed? to? gain? control? over? smuggling?
through?the?South?Ossetia?region.?
?
There? is? an? appealing? scope? of? explaining? escalation? through? predatory?
power?policies:?Many?observers?hold?that?the?Georgian?government?made?
the? situation? in? the? conflict?worse?by? atrocious?policies,?with? the? aim? to?
prove? themselves? in? their? new? positions? of? power.? In? addition,? it? was?




The? explanation? is? however? flawed? as? it? does? not? grasp? why? Georgian?
politics? under? the? second? president? Shevardnadze? were? more? peaceful?
than?under?the?third?president?Saakashvili’s?rule.?Both?presidencies?ranked?
territorial? re?integration? and? integration? into?Western? structures?high?on?
their?agendas?and?both?administrations?included?members?who?personally?
gained? from? the? conflict? (see? for? this? view? for? example?Wheatly? 2005,?
George?2009).?When?the?power?shift?to?Saakashvili?took?place?in?2004,?the?
                                                                                                                                                                                     
key?events?and?trajectories?between?1989?and?2009.?The?account?given?here?serves?solely?





international? community? and? even? far? more? from? the? population? than?
Shevardnadze’s? administration? had? at? its? peak.? Why? then? did? the?






control?over? smuggling? activities? in? the? contested? areas?bordering? South?
Ossetia.??
In? this? instant,? the? argument? cannot? explain? why? the? 2008? escalation?
occurred:?Smuggling?margins?explicitly?depended?on?uncontrolled?borders?
provided?by?the?status?quo?of?the?conflict?and?a?low?level?of?violence.?The?
escalation? in? 2008? created? disorder,? which? undermined? smuggling?
activities,?harmed?and?business?relations?with?partners?on?the?other?side?of?







case.? The? core? aspect? of? this? argument? contends? that? violence? emerges?
prior? to? or? in? the? context? of? elections.?Most? of? the? studies? concur? that?
election?cycles?coinciding?with?mobilization?cycles?can?result? in?violence.14?
What? if? escalation? occurs?without? elections? in? temporal? proximity?? The?
recurrence?of?violence?in?the?South?Ossetia?case?is?not?always?or?often?not?
clearly?linked?to?election?periods:?Violence?in?the?conflict?peaked?after?the?
new?post?Soviet? elite?had? taken?power? after?1989? (see? the?discussion? in?
chapter?2).?Also,?violence? re?intensified?after?elections?were?held? in?2000?
                                                          




and? escalated? only? after? the? regime? change?was? settled? in? 2004.?Many?




produces? violence?or?not?depends? in? large?part?on? the? intensity?of? the?
emotion”?(Petersen?2002:?256)?
The? debate? on? grievances? emerging? from? political? inequalities? gained?
influence?when?at?the?start?of?the?1990s?atrocities?between?ethnic?groups?
broke?out?across?the?world,?such?as?prominently? in?the?former?Yugoslavia?
(for? this?argument? see? for?example:?Kaufman?1996?and?2001;?Gurr?1970?
and?2000;?Kaldor?1999;?Westley?1966).? Strong?emotions?based?on?group?
identity?were?held? to? trigger? acts?of? violence?by? group?members? in? case?
their? peer? group? is? –? real? or? perceived? –? subject? to? an? outside? threat,?
mostly? from? a? second? ethnic? group.15? Ethnicity? is? held? to? be? a? naturally?
inherited? type? of? affection? to? the? kin? or? cultural? group? into? which? an?
individual? is?born,?and?thus?endows?especially?strong?emotional?bonds?on?
its?members? (see? for?example:?Huntington?1996,? Ignatieff?1993,?Westley?
1966).?To?this?end,?notions?of?ethnicity?are?held?to?intensify?emotions?and?
thus? the? likelihood? of? the? use? of? violence?when? group?members? act? on?
their?emotions?to?protect?the?group.?
Also,?after? the?debate? turned? to?seeking?explanations? for?ethnic?violence?
not? in? identity?based? approaches,? but? in? political? or? private? interests? of?
actors?or?at? least?a?nexus?of?private?gains?and?political?goals? (for?some?of?
these?critical?views?see:?Kalyvas?2001;?Collier?and?Hoeffler?2001;?Korf?2005;?
Regan? and? Norton? 2005),? studies? often? have? drawn? on? emotion?based?
explanations? (Jeffrey? 2007,? Dion? 1996).? Proponents? of? this? approach?
suggest? that? grievances? take? hold? over? time? if? volatile? inter?group?
relationships? are? protracted? through? continuous? –? real? or? perceived? –?
                                                          




subjugation? of? one? group,? for? instance? through? unequal? distribution? of?
power? or? goods? or? direct? acts? of? physical? violence? (see? for? example:?
Petersen?2002,?Wood?2003).?The? longer?and? the?more?gravely?one?group?
sees? itself? oppressed? by? another,? the? higher? the? likelihood? of? violence.?
‘Ancient?hatreds’?between?groups,?based?on?narratives?often?dating?back?
centuries,? motivate? patterns? of? grievances? that? then? lead? to? acts? of?
violence.??
?
Thereby,? the? argument? focuses? on? social? inequalities,? often? within? the?
boundaries?of?a? state? that?cause?violence? in? the? long? run.? In?many?cases?
those?–?perceived?or?real?–?inequalities?are?held?to?follow?ethnic?lines,?and?
can? be? reinforced? through? strategic? state? policies.?Wucherpfennig? et? al.?
point? out? that? “Ethnicity? can? indeed? prolong? civil? wars.? This? effect? is?
entirely? driven? by? conflicts? with? state?induced? grievances,? in? cases? of?
systematically?excluding?specific?ethnic?groups?from?access?to?state?power”?
(Wucherpfennig? et? al.? 2010:? 3).? Institutional? approaches? hold? that?





point? and? when? context? provides? the? opportunity? (Petersen? 2002:? 18).?




system?during? the?Cold?War? as?having? given? rise? to? inter?group? conflicts?
within? new? states? through? the? absence? of? a? sovereign.? The? Security?
Dilemma?argument?holds? that? fear? triggers?armed?group?conflict? (for? this?
argument? see? above? all:? Figueiredo? and?Weingast? 1997).? Strands? of? this?
approach?points? to? the?use?of? ethnicity?by? political? elites,?which? lead? to?









Similar? to? the? illicit?economy?argument,?once?grievance?induced?violence?
has?started? it? introduces?a?deterministic?self?reinforcing?cycle?of?atrocities?
based? on? revenge.? The? longer? the? process? drags? on,? the? higher? the?
likelihood? of? an? order? of? violence? to? take? hold:? the? more? incidents? of?





Russia’s? role? in? the? Caucasus? has? been? contested? latest? since? resistance?
against?Russian?led?rule?started?north?and?south?of?the?Greater?Caucasus?in?
the?18th?century.16?The?common?explanation?for?recurring?violence?in?South?
Ossetia? centers?on?Russian?historical? influence? fuelling?ethnic? tensions? in?
the?Caucasus?(Popescu?2007:?6,?also?see?Markedonov?2008,?Tishkov?2002,?
Blank? 1995).? Russia? holds? a? tight? political,? economic? and? occasionally?
military?grip?on?the?former?Soviet?republics?(see?for?example:?Fischer?2010)?
as? it? sees? its? influence? threatened? by? Westernizing? efforts? in? its? near?
abroad.?To?maintain? influence?over?Georgia’s?course,?Russia?supports? the?
breakaway? entities? of? South? Ossetia? and? Abkhazia,? a? divide?and?rule?
strategy? supporting? titular? nations? over? others.? Russia’s? meddling,?
according? to? this?argument,?destabilizes? the? context,?or?prevents? it? from?
stabilizing? in? the? first? place,? to? the? extent? that? re?escalation? of? violence?
became?imminent?(Nichol?2008:?9?and?27).?







The?historical? legacies?of?grievances?experienced?an? important? shift?after?
the? disintegration? of? the? Soviet? Union.? Soviet? institutions? fuelled?
competition? among? titular?nations? in? the?Caucasus,? and? led? to? territorial?
claims? based? on? self?determination? after? the? patronage? of?Moscow? had?
ended?(see?for?example:?De?Waal?2010,?Shatirishvili?2009).?To?this?end,?the?
Soviet? period? laid? the? foundations? for? inter?group? relations? that? were?
deeply?entrenched?with?real?and?perceived?inequalities.?The?South?Ossetia?
conflict? entails? a? compelling? history? of? grievances? of? Georgians? and?
Ossetians,? including? narratives? of? the? right? to? live? in? a? certain? place,?




The? debate? offers? an? explanation? of? how? emotions? that? turn? into?
grievances?over?extended?periods?of?time?can?then?cause?violence.? In?this?
respect,? Jeffrey? brings? up? for? debate? the? representative? argument? that?
“reescalation?of?conflict?and?failure?of?post?settlement?democratization?are?
more?likely?when?there?are?incompatible?national?identities”?(Jeffrey?2007:?
679).? However,? the? above? discussed? widespread? argument? of? assertive?
Russia? triggering?domestic?and?external?conditions?of? (re?)escalation?does?
not?provide?an?explanation?as? to?why?escalations?occur?at? those? specific?
points?in?time?and?why?they?recur.?Russian,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?policies?
have? been? assertive? ever? since? the? breakup? of? the? Soviet? Union.? The?






why? the? conflict? never? escalated? after? changes? in? power? among?
stakeholders?between?1992?and?2002.? In?addition,? this?only?explains? that?
the? context? deteriorated? in? favor? of? escalation,? but? does? not? explain? or?
39?
?
provide?credible? links?why?and?how?escalations?occurred?at? the?points? in?
time?observed.?
?
Yet?another?weakness?shows? in? the?grievance?argument?when? looking?at?
South?Ossetia?in?its?regional?context:?Historical?legacies?of?Russian?regional?
dominance? relate? to? all? regional? conflicts? such? as? in? Nagorno?Karabakh,?
Transnistria?and?Abkhazia.?However?as?pointed?out?in?the?introduction,?the?
South?Ossetia?conflict?proves?to?be?the?most?dynamic?and? intense?among?
its? siblings? and? the? grievance? argument? does? not? help? explain? how? this?
came?about.?Therefore,? the?discussion? turns? to? the?external? influence?of?
international? actors? as? a? possible? explanation? for? re?escalation? in? South?
Ossetia.?
4) Argument?4:? Involvement?of?external?actors? leading? to?violence?–?
“The?West?did?not?do?enough”?(Asmus?2010)?
The? impact? of? external? influence? on? domestic? events? is? a? rarely? studied?
subject.?Theories?of?external?influence?in?the?post?Cold?war?period?discuss?
rapid?diversification?of?foreign?relations?of?post?Soviet?successor?state?after?
they? lose? Moscow? as? their? external? patron? (for? this? approach? see? for?
example:?Stein?and?Lobell?1997,?Wallensteen?and?Axell?1993,?Byman?et?al.?
2001).?With? regard? to?external?engagement? in? internal?armed?conflicts? in?
the?post?Soviet?area?and?beyond,?studies?deal?with?forms?of?influence?such?
as? outside? military? intervention? (see? for? example? Zuercher? 2007,?
Markedonov? 2008),? international? assistance? through? financing? or?
humanitarian? aid? (Crawford? 1997? and? 2000),? peace?keeping? missions?
(Koenig? 2005,? Jawad? 2005),? diaspora? support? (Cederman,? Girardin? and?




of? interest? for? the? West? and? Russia? (for? example? see:? Blank? 1995,?
Markedonov? 2008).? The? debates? differ? in?which? forms? of? influence? they?
40?
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assign? to? both? the? West? and? Russia? in? pursuing? their? political? goals.?
Western? agency? is? said? to? rely? on? conditionality? policy? that? ties? the?
implementation?of?stability?enhancing?measures?to?political,?economic?and?
financial? support? for? state? elites? (Sasse? 2008,? Levitsky? and? Way? 2007,?
Schimmelfennig?2005,?Crawford?2000,?Milcher?and?Slay?2005).?The?US?and?
EU’s? focus? their?global?efforts?on?a?state?building?agenda? (Jung,?Schlichte?
and? Siegelberg? 2003;? Schlichte? 2005)? through? which? integration? into?
Western?structures?such?as?NATO?or?EU?depends?on?territorial?integration.?
Although?Western?policies?of?the?U.S.,?EU?and?individual?EU?member?states?
differ?at?great? length,?Western?conditional?policy? in?the? field?of?territorial?
integration? largely? focuses? on? enhancing? stability? through? strengthening?
central?state?power.?
?
Altogether,? the? scope? of? external? impact? on? internal? violence? is? not?
systematically?explored?beyond,?either,?specific?forms?of?action?or?agendas?
of? interests,?or? structural? influence?on?domestic?politics? (Carment,? James?
and?Taydas?2009:?72).?International?Relations?theory?was?the?first?strand?of?
debate? to? theoretically? grasp? the? role? of? external? influence? in? changing?
domestic? landscapes? (see? above? all:? Putnam? 1990,? Gourevitch? 1978,?
Suhrke? and? Noble? 1977).? Studies? focus? on? the? proximity? of? military?
competition?or?democratic?states?that?can?result?in?diffusion?of?norms?and?
values? through? ‘spill? over’? or? ‘contagion’? effects? enhancing? trends? in?




James? and? Taydas? 2009:? 70;? also? see:? Heraclides? 1991;? Zartman? 1992;?
Saideman?1997;?Keohane?and?Milner?1996)?or?provide?weak?explanations?
for? the? influence?of? external? policies?on? internal? conflicts? as? opposed? to?
triggering? inter?state?strife? (Carment,? James?and?Taydas?2009:?72).? In?this?





(Sorli,? Gleditsch? and? Strand? 2005;? Korf? 2005;? Sanchez? R.? 2006;? Bohara,?
Mitchell? and? Nepal? 2006).? However,? they? remain? confined? in? their?
conclusions? to? individual? contexts,? or? respectively? explore? how? external?
Western? influence? affects? failed? democratization? and? authoritarian?
regimes,? but? do? not? systematically? focus? on? the? effects? of? external?
engagement? on? the? processes? of? violence? (for? example? see:? Crawford?
2005,? Olsen? 1998,? Presnall? 2009,? Lewis? 1996).? Therefore,? even? when?
employing?an?explorative?approach,?studies?refrain?from?generalizing?their?
findings? across? cases? (Sambanis? 2004b,? Lawson? 2006:? 409).? Here,? these?
studies? mostly? confine? themselves? to? testing? or? confirming? existing?





are? usually? two? sets? of? opposing? opinions.? The? first? holds? that? external?




2004),? holding? that? if?Western? actors? had? put?more? and? different? effort?
into?resolving?the?conflict,?the?situation?could?have?remained?calm?and?the?
conflict?could?have?been?settled?after? the? first?war? in?1992.?Nonetheless,?
international?and?local?actors?engaged?in?the?conflict?on?an?intense?level?all?
through? the? period? since? 1992,? through? negotiations,? monitoring? the?
peace?keeping? force,? and? initiating? conflict?related? institutions? and?
roadmaps.? The? second? perspective? criticizes? overly? intense? engagement?
aiming? at? realizing? geopolitical? interests?by?Russia? and? the?U.S.?with? the?
result? of? fuelling? the? conflict? in? South? Ossetia? (for? this? view? see:?
MacFarlane?1999,?Cornell?and?Starr?2009).?Thereby,?the?territory?of?South?
Ossetia? serves? as? a? proxy? for? underlying? superpower? interests? of?
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hegemonic? claims? to? the? Caucasus? region.? In? addition,? the? secessionist?







Existing? studies? largely? focus? on? the? likelihood? of? outcomes? through?
specific? factors,? as? well? across? cases,? and? not? on? particular? policies?
initiating?processes? in?a?recurring?manner?(see?above?all:?Crawford?2000).?
As?a? result,? the?mechanisms? these? studies?offer? remain?highly?opaque? in?
their?functioning,?offering?diffuse?causal?links?between?external?actors?and?
violent? outcomes? (Bader? 2010:? 22).? How? specifically? external? influence?
plays? out? in? different? arenas? to? lay? open? causal? links? should? be?
systematically? embraced.? Studies? usually? do? not? focus? on? external?
engagement?as?such,?but?on? individual?events?such?as?one?group?rising?to?
power?or?a?decision?to?go?to?war,?and?also?do?not?embrace?why?patterns?
recur?persistently.?The? studies?of? Levitsky?and?Way? (2010),?Bader? (2010)?
and?Goodhand? and?Walton? (2009)? for? the? Sri? Lanka? case? form?welcome?
exceptions.?Levitsky?and?Way?focus?on?mechanisms?of?influence?of?external?
policies? that? are? used? by? local? state? elites? in? transitional? states? in? their?






The? arguments? in? the? existing? literature? give? a? fair? picture? of? the?
predominant? reasoning? on? escalations? in? ethnically? framed,? internal?
conflicts.? However,? they? are? not? able? to? adequately? address? why? the?




to? analyzing? the? political? factors,? and? treat? violence? as? an? outcome? of?
conflict,?but?not?as?a?subject?of?study.? In?the?same?vein,?arguments? loose?
themselves?at?a?merely?situational?or?psychological? level,?holding?that?the?
conflict? escalated? because? individuals? acted? irrationally.?Also,? arguments?
crumble? at? the? macro? level? holding? powers? responsible? with? barely? a?





of? ethnic? violence? (for? studies? raising? this? critique? see? for? example:? Eck?
2009,? Zartman? 2004? and? 2007,? Kalyvas? 2006,? Balcell? and? Kalyvas? 2010,?
Walter? 2003? and? 2009,? Schlichte? 2005)? and? also? will? enhance? existing?
theories?with?generalized?hypotheses?about?the?triggers?of?ethnic?violence.??





singular?events,? isolated?or?exogenous? factors?or?decisions? taken,?or?very?
specific? forms?of? violence.?Accordingly,?Capoccia? and?Keleman? stress? the?
importance?of? longitudinal?comparison?of? two?or?more?events?within? the?
same?unit?of?analysis?(Capoccia?and?Kelemen?2007:?360).??
As? a? result,? the? seemingly?differently? vectored? explanations? for?Western?
behavior? in? the? South?Ossetia? context? all? rely? on? a?hypothetically? stable?








The?discussion? reveals? that? recurring?violence? in? stalemated?conflicts? is?a?
very?rarely?studied?subject?and?requires?the?input?of?an?in?depth?empirical?
inquiry? into? political? agency.?Also? very? little? research? has? been? done? on?
how? international? influence?affects?dynamics?of?violence,?considering? the?
key? role?of?external? actors? in? internal? conflicts?over?extended?periods?of?
time.? The? extent? to?which? external?policies? frame? local?developments? in?






conflict? in? South? Ossetia,? such? as? continuous? re?escalation? in? a? highly?
intense? setting.? The? larger? bulk? of? studies? on? violence? in? stalemated?
conflicts?does?not?embrace?these?characteristics?of?the?South?Ossetia?case.?
In?this?respect,?the?debate? is?not?clear?about?when?violence?happens?and?




Altogether,? the? literature? offers? a? rich? debate? on? factors,? causal? chains,?
history,?and? context? influencing?violence? in?ethnic? conflicts.?Nonetheless,?
the? previous? discussion? tried? to? show? why? those? arguments? do? not?
adequately?address?the?dynamics?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict.?Therefore,?




time? provided? for? behavior? of? local? state? elites? in? Georgia? to? shift? to?
assertive? policies? with? the? result? of? escalation.? External? policies?




political? support? and? financial? assets? at? stake.? Thereby,? external? policies?
incentivize? Georgian? state? elites? to? utilize? and? to? comply? with? external?
influence? in? the? context? of? the? conflict.? The? argument? holds? that? this?
scheme?repeatedly?provides?for?escalation?throughout?the?process.?On?this?
basis,?the?study?further?contends?that?patterns?of?external?influence?show?
prior? to? escalations.? These? patterns? are? chains? of? actions? which? work?
through? local? state? policies? and? translate? into? mechanisms? of? external?
influence?that?enable?dynamics?of?re?escalation?in?the?conflict.?
?
The?purpose?of? the? following? study? is? to?plausibly? sustain? the?argument.?
Therefore,? I? would? like? to? conclude? the? presentation? of? the? argument?
based?on?an?extensive? literature?review?and? its?critique?and? introduce?the?






I?will? discuss? and? present? the?working? hypotheses? that? derive? from? the?
causal? argument.? Further,? I?will?present? a? theoretical? foundation? for? the?
causal?link?that?ties?agency?recurrently?to?its?violent?outcome.?This?includes?
a? discussion? of? identifying? shifts? in? dynamics,? defining? the? causal? link,?
locating? the? causal? link,? presenting? analytical? tools? and,? finally,? ascribing?
meaning?to?causal?links?through?the?concept?of?social?mechanisms?that?will?








The? debate? on? armed? conflict? explores? the? issue? from? various? analytical?
angles,? such? as?why? violence? occurs? in? a? particular? location,? but? not? in?
another?(Wilkinson?2004:?20?and?58,?also?see:?Kalyvas?2006),?why?violence?
occurs?within?the?same?conflict?at?a?particular?point? in?time?and?not?at?an?
earlier? or? later? point? in? the? process? (Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998:? 432,?
Beissinger? 1998:? 39,?Wilkinson? 2004:? 26),? why? violence? occurs? in? some?




and? Weinstein? 2008,? Walter? 2006,? Brubaker? and? Laitin? 1998),?
intensification? of? armed? conflict? in? ethnic? contexts? (Ben?Yehuda? and?
Mishali?Ram? 2003;? Brecher? and? Wilkenfeld? 1997;? Bueno? de? Mesquita,?
Morrow,? and? Zorick? 1997;? Eberwein? 1981;? Fearon? 1994;?Morgan? 1994;?
Reed?2000;?Senese?1997),?and?why? in?particular?conflicts?particular? forms?
of?violence?occur?(Beissinger?1998:?8,?also?see:?Fearon?and?Laitin?1996).??
Fundamentally,? this? study? examines? violence,? not? war? or? conflict.? The?
violence? that? is? subject? to? the? study? is? carried? out? by? state? actors? and?
occurs? in? the? context? of? armed? inter?group? conflict.? The? debate? likes? to?
distinguish? between? types? of?warfare,? and? the?more? recent? discussions?
center? on? organized? violence? often?within? state? boundaries? including? at?
least?one?non?state?party?(Kalyvas?2001:?102?103,?also?see:?Sambanis?2000?
and? 2004,? Kaldor? 1999).? Older? definitions? focus? on? conventional? wars?
involving? state? actors? engaging? in? armed? action? across? international?








However,? this? definition? excludes? three? important? features? worthy? of?
study:? First,? it? excludes? violent? incidents? that? can? trigger? (re)escalation?
prior? to?war? or? other? forms? of? escalations? of? violence.? These? categories?




of? conventional?war? omits? the? politics? of? domestic? power? consolidation?
leading?to?violence.??
That?said,?violence?seems?to?be?likely?to?occur?under?certain?circumstances.?
As? discussed? above,? recurring? violence? is? a? powerful? characteristic? of?
ethnonationalist?conflicts?and,?conversely,?ethnonationalist?contexts?make?
for? protracted,? highly? dynamic? and? intense? contexts? for? violence.? The?
debate? is?most? vivid? in? the? attempts? at?making? a? legitimate? distinction?
between?ethnic?and?non?ethnic?wars.?If?we?assume?ethnicity?not?as?located?
within? individuals,?but?within? issues?over?which?actors?struggle? (above?all?
see:?Brubaker?2004?and?2009),?we?can?come?to?an?empirical?definition?of?




that? determines? dynamics? and? motivations,? but? as? a? claim? that? is?
instrumentalized?by?actors? to?pursue? their?private?and?political?goals?and?




Therefore,? ethnically? framed? conflicts? exhibit? characteristics? that? other?
types?of?armed?struggles?do?not?exhibit:?1)?Ethnic?claims?can?prolong?civil?





motivations?of?actors? in?the?process?of?a?conflict?and?can? lead?to?shifts? in?
dynamics?(see?the?seminal?study?of?Kalyvas?2008),?3)?Violence?in?ethnically?
framed?conflicts? is?more? intense?as?various? forms?of?violence?can?concur,?
including? riots,? looting,?and?genocide,?and? fighters?are? found? to?be?more?
committed? (see?above?all:?Eck?2009),?4)?The?process?of?violence? in?ethnic?
conflicts? is? dynamic? and? not? linear:?As? ethnic? claims? can? be? deliberately?
manipulated? by? political? elites,? historical? path?dependencies? sustain? the?
spoilers? of? violence? that? act? as? sleeper? agents? continuously? enabling?
breakouts? of? violence? (Cederman? et? al.? 2010:? 97,? also? see:? Snyder? and?
Ballentine?1996,?Wimmer?and?Min?2006).??
?
To? this? end,? the? study? conceives? of? the? emergence? of? violence? 1)? as? an?
indicator? in? the? process? leading? to? re?escalation,? 2)? as? including? triggers?
external?and? internal?to?state?boundaries,?and?3)?as?relevant?to?explaining?
re?escalation? independent? from? whether? violence? takes? place? as? an?
incident?of?war,?civil?uprising,?insurgency?etc.?Further,?this?study?centers?on?
re?escalation? of? violence,? and? accordingly? assumes? violence? to? recur,?
because?the?causes?of?violence?protract?and?prolong? legacies?that?sustain?
the?permanent?possibility?of?re?escalation,?taking?effect?over?periods?of?low?
intensity? or? absence? of? violence? (Wucherpfennig? et? al.? 2010:? 5).? To?
conclude,? the? study? centers? on? violence? carried? out? by? state? actors? in?




Two? recent? and? seminal? papers? by? Cederman? et? al.? (2010)? and?
Wucherpfenning?et?al.?(2010)?complain?that?the?debate?on?ethnic?violence?
largely? neglects? the? role? of? state? actors? in? fuelling? ethnic? violence? both?
strategically?and? indirectly? (Cederman?et?al.?2010:?88,?Wucherpfenning?et?









proposes? the? concept? of? empirical? statehood? to? analytically? grasp?
processes? in? the?newly? forming?states?of? the?1990s.?Schlichte?applies? the?
concept?of?“empirical?stateness”?in?order?to?analytically?grasp?and?identify?
practices? emerging? from? purposeful? action? in? violence?prone? state?
formation?processes? (Schlichte?1998:?107? ff.,?also? see?Migdal?1988).?This?





over? the? territory? of? South?Ossetia? came? to? pose? a? direct? threat? to? the?
authority?of? the?central?state? in?Georgia? (e.g.?Nodia?1989?and?2000).?The?
claim? to? the?Georgian? state? showed? in? several? instances:?First,? it? showed?
the? importance?of?control?over? the? territory.?For? the?new?Georgian?state?
elite,?control?of?the?territory?acted?as?a?marker?of?Georgian?independence?
from?Russian?domination;?for?South?Ossetian?leaders?the?territory?enabled?
claims? of? political? self?determination? vis?a?vis? Georgian? rule;? for? Russian?




In? Georgia,? each? of? the? three? post?independence? presidents? put? the?
territorial? re?integration?of? South?Ossetia? at? the? top?of?his? agenda? in? an?
attempt? to? legitimize? rule.?The? three?post?independence?governments?all?
relied?on?an? internal? circle,?a? leadership?or?elite?within? the?executive,?of?
hand?picked? personalities? at? the? core? of? presidential? power? (Christophe?
2005,? draft? version? 2003:? 74ff.).? The? key? ministries? occupied? by? the?
50?
?
leadership?were? in? all? three?presidencies? specifically? tasked? to? attend? to?
operations? in? the? conflict? area,? negotiations? with? Russia? or? Western?
engagement?(Sigwart?2006).?
Second,? state? actors?had? the?most? effective? influence?over? the? conflict’s?
dynamics? and? outcomes.? Formal? entitlement? via? state? institutions? gave?
military? and? police? actors? varying? degrees? of? legitimacy.? International?
actors? endowed? far? more? legitimacy? to? official? actors? than? to? the?
mercenaries,? militias,? political? representatives? or? other? forces? of? the?
separatist? leaderships.?In?addition,?material?and?symbolic?resources?of?the?
state?enabled?the?efficiency?of?state?agency.17?
Third,? control? over? the? territory? of? and? around? South? Ossetia? gave?
economic? advantages? to? the? state? and? its? actors.? In?Georgia? as? in? other?
post?communist?countries?the?main?source?of?state?income,?together?with?
externally?driven?financing?were?shadow?economies?(see?Gordadze?2003).?
Until? 2004,? smuggling? was? the? largest? source? of? income? of? the? South?
Ossetian? leadership? and? a? big? asset? of? Shevardnadze’s? state? employees?
(Christophe?2005,?draft? version?2003:?85?87;? also? see:?Kuhkianidze?et? al.?




Fourth,? the? conflict?gave? the?Georgian? state? international? leverage.?Post?
Soviet?Georgia?came?under?pressure?to?reintegrate?territorially?in?order?to?
form?a?Western?style?state.?However,?Georgia?received?enormous?amounts?




                                                          
17? The? aftermath? of? the? 2008? war? provided? a? salient? example? of? yhis? inadvertent?
legitimization?of?state?actions?at?an?international?level:?Both?Russian?and?Georgian?actions?





As?a? result,? the? state,?as?a?normative? factor?and?pro?active?organization,?
relates? in?an? intense?manner? to? the?South?Ossetia? conflict:?Territory?and?
ethnic?claims?served?as?hinge?categories?of?self?determination?in?Georgian?
recent?history,?new? leaders?put? the? conflict? at? the? top?of? their?domestic?
and? international? agendas,? and? state?related? resources? were? most?
effective? for?gaining? control? in? the? conflict?and? for?private?gains? through?
the? conflict.? Therefore,? state? leaderships? as? elites? within? the? executive?




Prior? to? 1991,?Georgia?had?been? embedded? into? the? Soviet?order?which?
entailed? a? rigid? dependence? of? domestic? policy? on?Moscow’s? patronage?
(see?Suny?1994,?De?Waal?2010).?After? independence,?rapid?diversification?
of? foreign?relations?of?post?Soviet?successor?states?set? in? (on? this?process?
see:?Stein?and?Lobell?1997,?Wallensteen?and?Axell?1993).?This?radical?shift?
to? an? internationalized? agenda? had? important? implications? for?Georgia’s?
domestic? context.? First,? the? external? context? of? Georgia? diversified? on?
various? levels.? The? highly? bureaucratized? Georgian? Soviet? Republic?
operating?on?family?relations?and?other?patrimonial?structures?turned?into?
a? privatizing? state? with? developing? foreign? relations? and? international?
activity?on?the?ground.?Hence,?the?field?in?which?Georgian?politics?unfolded?
heterogenized? to? an? enormous? extent,? offering? new? partnerships? and?
alliances?for?local?elites.?
Second,? after? the? shift? in? Georgia’s? external? context,? internal? and? to? a?
lesser?extent?external?patronage?persisted.?Whereas?the?external?and?the?
internal?patrons?had?changed,?the?patrimonial?structures?that?had?provided?
for?power? resources? continued? to?determine?domestic?politics? (on? these?
continuities? see? above? all:? Christophe? 2001? and? 2005,? Stefes? 2008,?
Zuercher?and?Koehler?2004).?Western?support?of?a?single?Western?leaning?






organizations? demanded?measures? to? stabilize? the? rule? of? law? through?
cracking?down?on?corruption?and?smuggling.?International?funds?were?tied?
to?providing? incentives? for?domestic? state?actors? to? implement?Western?
style? reforms.? As? a? result,? the? state? was? massively? boosted? from? the?




directed? and? created? incentives? for? power? consolidation? of? local? state?
agency.?External?actors?enabled?local?elites?to?utilize?resources?provided?by?
them? such? as? funds,? political? support? and? outside? leverage.? As? the?
empirical?analysis?will?show,?these?intensifying?ties?created?a?complex?field?
of?interaction?in?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?conflict.?In?this?respect,?it?
is? important? to? reiterate? that? the? argument? of? the? study? holds? Russian?
influence,? first,? not? to? be? fully? external? to? the? context? as? the? Russian?
Federation?and?Russian?actors?are? immediate?stakeholders? in? the?conflict?
and,? second,? to? be? a? key? component? of? the? escalation? process? in?
reinforcing?conflict?dynamics.?Particularly,?as?will?be?shown,?the?interaction?
of?Russian?and?Western? state?actors?at? the? international? level?of? conflict?
reinforces?local?escalation?dynamics.?However,?as?argued?earlier,?change?in?
local?behavior? is?held? to?be? induced?by?Western?policies.? Therefore,? the?
empirical?analysis?will?account?for?the?reinforcing?effect?of?Russian?policies?
                                                          
18?At? least?until?2004?Russia? remained? the? largest? trade?partner?and?economic? factor? in?
Georgia?after? the?break?down?of? the?Soviet?Union.?After? the?Georgian?Russian? fallout? in?
2004,? the? import? volume? shifted? to?Turkey,?also?as?a? result?of? the?Russian?blockade?of?
Georgian? import?goods.?Remittances?of? the?Georgian?diaspora? in?Russia? remain?a? large?
economic?factor?in?Georgia.?However,?although?strongly?influenced?by?state?politics,?trade?
relations?between? the? two? states?build?only?a?minor?part?of? the?economic?activity?after?
2004,?whereas?private?business?relations,?also?in?the?banking?sector,?build?the?major?part?
(EBRD?Transition?reports).?




at? various? levels? in? the? context? of? determining? Western?domestic?
interaction.?
?
Against? these? considerations,? the? study? reads? external? influence? in? two?
ways:?On? the?one? hand,? external? engagement? relates? to? actors?who? are?
closely? involved? in? the? conflict’s? affairs,? but? are? not? immediate?
stakeholders? in?the?conflict?with?territorial?properties,?which?are?Western?




assists? this?approach? in?his? study?of?external?party?assistance? in?Georgia:?
"The? distinction? between? U.S.? and? European? [actors]? masks? striking?
similarities? in? approaches? and? conceptual?underpinnings.? (…)? [P]rograms,?
whether?by?U.S.?or?by?European?actors,?are?shaped?by?a?shared?underlying?
norm?about?the?type?of?organization?that?recipient[s]?(…)?transform? into."?
(Bader? 2010:? 20).? In? this? respect,? the? study? encompasses? boundaries? of?
individual? actors? and? addresses? the? agenda? of? “Western? policies”? as? a?
common?ground?regarding?state?building?and?conflict?management?issues.?







The? dissertation? argues? that? repeated? escalation? is? brought? about? by?
specific?mechanisms?of?external?policies?working?through?domestic?agency?
to? the? effect? of? recurrently? shifting? the? context? towards? escalation.? This?









setting? makes? state? resources? attractive,? vulnerable? and? significant? for?
local?elites?to?consolidate?power.? In?this?context,?the?success? in?territorial?
integration?of?South?Ossetia? is?a?big?power? resource? for? local?state?elites?
and? is? shaped? through? the? influence? of? external? policies? of? Western?
agency.?Therefore,?the?study?holds?that?external? influence?on? local?power?
consolidation? in? the? context? of? the? conflict? has? to? be? observed? at? the?
central? state? level,?directing? the?analytical? focus? to?external? influence?on?
capital?politics?in?Georgia.??
WHY2:? External? policies? in? the? conflict? context? affect? power? resources.?
The?analysis?holds? that? the? conflict? is? relevant? to?power? consolidation?at?
particular?points? in? time? that? seem? to? strongly? correlate?with?policies?of?
Western?agency,?mainly?at?the?national,?but?also?the?international?and?local?
level?of? the?conflict.?Hence,? the?study?contends? that? the?domestic?power?
claim? is?decisively?shaped?and?reinforced?through?state?formation?policies?
of?external?actors,?particularly?in?the?conflict?context.?
WHY3:?Change? in? local?behavior? induced?by?Western?policies.?The?study?
argues?that?prior?to?escalations,?local?behavior?changes?to?assertive?policies?
that?directly?or?indirectly?lead?to?escalation.?Change?in?local?behavior?takes?
place?when? specific?Western?policies?bring? into?effect? incentives?of? local?
power? consolidation.? In? this? context,? local? state? actors? react? to?Western?
policies?which?provides?for?shifts?to?assertive?policies?that?drive?the?context?
towards?escalation.?
WHY4:? Recurring? patterns? of? external? policies? prior? to? escalations.?
Dynamics? in? South?Ossetia? exhibit? a? consistent? pattern? of? re?escalations?
ruptured?by?periods?of?low?intensity?violence.?Shifts?in?dynamics?occur?due?
to?shifts? in?policies?and?behavior? induced?by?Western?policies.?Hence,?the?
analysis? attempts? to? single? out? which? external? policies? recur? prior? to?
55?
?








In? order? to? establish? the? analytical? framework? of? this? study,? working?
hypotheses? were? developed? with? the? following? methodological?
considerations.? The? section? starts? out? by? defining? the? here? employed?
understandings?of?agency?in?the?form?of?policies,?causality,?and?the?tools?of?
narrative?analysis?and?social?mechanisms?that?inform?the?empirical?analysis?
of? agency? prior? to? escalations.? Hereafter,? the? section? sums? up? these?
reflections?by?presenting?the?model?of?analysis.?The?section?concludes?with?







context? of? the? conflict? during? periods? prior? to? escalation.? The? analysis?
envisages? policies? that? operate? as? part? of? an? informed? policy? agenda? of?
Western? agency? in? the? local,? national? and? international? arenas? of? the?
conflict.?As? is? generally? assumed,? disaggregating? policies?will? reveal? that?
repetitive? patterns? of? behavior? appear? throughout? the? process.20?
Therefore,?examining? the? influence?Western?policies?bare?on? local?power?
                                                          






consolidation? requires? an? analytical? lens? that? reveals? empirical? reality.?




Therefore,? identifying? policies? is? the? first? analytical? step? to? unveil? causal?
links?that?go?beyond?situational?reasoning.?In?this?respect,?centering?on?re?
escalation? enables? the? study? to?make?more? valid? statements.? Individual?
motivations?and?decision?making?processes?that?may?have? led?to?violence?
are? always? covert? to? the? observer.? In? analyzing? agency? prior? to? a? single?
event,? social? research? can?never?plausibly? sustain?why?an? agent?acted? in?
the?observed?manner.?In?contrast,? if?the?same?mode?of?behavior?recurs?in?
similar? situations,? social? research? can? postulate? patterns? of? behavior? in?






Change? in? local? behavior?making? for? shifts? to? escalation? takes? place? at?
specific?points? in? time?and? signifies? the? temporal? frame? in?which?policies?
that?bring?about?shifts?take?place.?Hence,?the?study?identifies?those?points?
in?the?process?through,?1)? identifying?points? in?time?when?violence? in?the?




identify?phases?of?violence? that? signify?escalations?and,? in?accounting? for?
local?perceptions?through?interviews,?to?plausibly?signify?prior?shifts?in?local?
behavior?in?relation?to?Western?agency.?










The? study? employs? Stathis? Kalyvas’? useful? concept? of? causality? in?multi?
actor?and?multi?locality?settings?of?processes?of?violence?(2000,?2001,?2004,?
2006,? Kalyvas/? Balcell? 2010).? Kalyvas’? inquiry? deals? with? generating? a?
plausible? causal? link? through? explaining? contentious? outcomes? through?
spatially? and? temporally? complex? sets? of? episodes:? “The? direction? of?
causality? (…)?matters?when?deriving?empirical,? theoretical?and?normative?
implications? about? civil?wars”? (Kalyvas?2001:? 104).? This? approach? allows,?
firstly,? to? purport? policies? that? take? place? simultaneously? at? different?
localities?such?as?the? international,?national?or? local?arena?of?the?conflict,?





The? first? consideration? envisages? the? problem? of? timing? and? locality? if?
events? leading? to? the? same? outcome? are? to? happen? simultaneously? in?
different? localities.? Kalyvas’? concept? contends? that? policies? at? different?
localities?and?possibly?taking?place?simultaneously?can?be?part?of?the?same?
causal? structure? generating? the? same? observed? outcome? (Kalyvas? 2006:?
364ff.).? Importantly,? Kalyvas’? approach? sets? itself? apart? from? classical?
definitions? of? causality? that? assume? a? linear? sequence? of? events?
constituting? a? causal? chain? that? brings? about? the? observed? outcome?
(Mayntz? 2005:? 209,?Mahoney? 2000a:? 536).? In? contrast,? Kalyvas? assumes?
events?or,? in? this? case,?policies? in?different?places? at? the? same? time? can?
generate? a? unified? causal? structure? under?which? the? observed? outcome?
comes? about.? In? other? words,? events? or? policies? with? no? obvious?
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connection? can? bare? causal? effects.? This?means,? simultaneous? instances?
might?not?show?and? in?fact?might?not?have?an? inherent?causal?connection?
between? each? other,? but? all? of? the? instances? together? bring? about? the?
outcome.?
In? this? sense,? this? study? assumes? that? the? cause? of? escalation? is? power?
consolidating?behavior?of? local?elites,?whereas?Western?agency?decisively?
triggers?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalation.?This?means,?the?study?
perceives?Western? agency? in? different? arenas? and? possibly? at? the? same?
time?to?exhibit?the?causal?link,?the?chain?of?events?leading?to?escalation.??
?
The? second? consideration? locates? causality? at? the? level? of? policies? of?
domestic?power?consolidation?of?state? leaderships.? In?Kalyvas’? terms,? the?
explanatory?elements?generating?violence?tie?together?at?the?local?and?not?
the?global?level?of?the?conflict?(Kalyvas?2006:?383ff.).?Kalyvas?contends?that?




domestic? level?of?power?politics.?At? the?heart?of?Kalyvas’? theory? lies? the?
proposition?that?escalations?result?from?local?attempts?to?bridge?cleavages?
arising? from? interests? at? different? levels?of? politics? and? through? external?




Kalyvas’?approach?strengthens? this?study,? first,? through?attributing?causal?
significance? to? events? happening? at? locations? other? than? those? where?
violence? takes? place.? Second,? the? approach? suggests? locating? causality?
where?and?when?factors?have?an?effect?on?the?local?power?context.?Hence,?
this?approach?links?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalations?to?external?





capital?politics? in?Georgia? at? the? same? as? investigating? the? international,?
national? or? local? centers? of? agency.? In? the? next? step,? it? is? necessary? to?








are? already? doing? implicitly? in? rhetorical? battles? between? rival? historical?
narratives”? (Capoccia? and? Keleman? 2007:? 362).? The? study? chooses?
narrative? analysis? to? help? to? plausibly? identify? where? the? causal? link?
between?change?in?local?behavior?prior?to?escalation?is?located?and?how?it?
is?brought?into?being.?The?below?discussion?will?clarify?the?analytical?value?




of? structured,? theory?guided? narrative? that? traces? processes? through?
reconstructing? chains? of? social? properties? (Capoccia? and? Keleman? 2007:?
354;?King,?Keohane?and?Verba?1994:?77?80)?and?“can?offer?a?stylized?but?
compelling?reconstruction?of?the?key?decisions?and?choices”?(Capoccia?and?
Keleman? 2007:? 358)? as? it? aggregates? complex? settings? and? empirically?
demonstrates?the?hypothesized?causal?links?at?work?(for?this?approach?see?
the?the?seminal?studies?of?George?and?Bennett?2005,?Elster?2000).??
As? a? result,? Capoccia? and? Keleman? introduce? the? term? of? the? ‘critical?
juncture’? to? grasp? the? very? period? of? time? when? significant? change? is?
possible? and? alters? the? equilibrium? of? the? process? into? a? different? state?
(Capoccia?and?Keleman?2007:?346).?Mahoney?describes? ‘critical? junctures’?






choices? for? key? actors? during? those? junctures? narrows? down,? closes? off?




in? local?behavior? is? identified,?analyses?can?reconstruct?the?trajectory?of?a?
path?through?tracing?events?or?policies?back?to?the? initial?condition?of?the?
sequence.? In? this? respect,? several? scholars? propose? to? use? narrative?
analysis? through? the? ‘sequencing’? of? series? of? relevant? policies? into?
episodes? (Mahoney? 2000a:? 2,? Buethe? 2002:? 482,? Verba? 1971:? 308).?
Sequencing?introduces?a?step?by?step?approach?which?provides?"a?scene?by?
scene?description?of? the?particular?causal?paths"? (Reisch?1991:?17).?Three?
properties? are? proposed? to? describe? a? path?dependent? trajectory:? First,?
tracing?an?outcome?back?to?and?along?a?particular?set?of?historical?events?




This?means,?critical? junctures?are? the?moment? from?which? local?behavior?
changes,? but? not? the? moments? when? outcomes? occur.? Therefore,? this?
study?does?not? focus?on? the? segment?of? the?process?after? local?behavior?
has? changed,? but? focuses? on? the? path? leading? up? to? change? in? local?
behavior?triggered?through?Western?policies.??





conditions? at? the? start? of? a? path?dependent? sequence? do? not? cause? the?
61?
?
outcome? as? the? causal? properties? leading? to? the? outcome? do? not? exist?
then.?Causality?evolves?only?during?the?process,?through?the?gradual,?small?
steps? constituted? through? agency? (on? the? view? of? agency? observable? in?
steps?of?a?process?see?for?example:?Goldstone?1998).?Hence,?these?smaller?
steps?are?the?central?objects?of?analysis?of?this?study.?
Third,? the? last? property? of? a? path?dependent? trajectory? is? assigned? to?
identify? a? meaningful? starting? point? in? a? sequence? of? events,? as? a?
contingent? event? marking? the? initial? condition? of? a? process.? Initial?
conditions? of? a? sequence? pose? a? “surprising? break”? with? theoretical? or?
intuitive?assumptions?about?the?course?of?the?process?(Sewell?1996b:?843).?
Those?expectations?are?in?conflict?with?empirical?reality?when?at?least?two?
separate? trajectories? temporally? intersect? (Mahoney? 2000a:? 527).?More?
precisely,?initial?conditions?are?indeed?held?to?trigger,?shape?and?constitute?
the? process,? but? they? change? during? the? process?when? they? react?with?
other?factors?that?occur?at?later?points?in?the?process.??
Specifically,?Western?agency?by?itself?is?not?sufficient?to?set?off?a?sequence?
of? events.? Western? policies? have? to? interact? with? local? agency? in? a?
significant? context? in?order? to? initiate? a?path,? for?example? in? a?historical?
contingent? instant? of? collision? between? competing? agendas? (Mahoney?




Lastly,? historical? narrative? analysis? particularly? supports? specifying? the?
causal? link? in? an? empirical? context? of? agency.? A? theory?guided? narrative?
“focuses?on? the? aspects? considered? salient?by? the? theory? itself;? (…)? such?
aspects? include? the?main? actors,? their? goals,? preferences,? decisions,? and?
the? events? that?directly? influenced? them.”? (Capoccia? and?Keleman? 2007:?
357,? also? see?Buethe? 2002:? 483).? In? this? respect,? Capoccia? and? Keleman?






meaning? of? narrated? events.? To? identify? meaningful? events,? interviews?
were?conducted?according? to? the?method?of?qualitative?content?analysis,?
allowing? for?narrative?elements? to?be?given?priority?while?conducting? the?
interviews?and? focusing?on? the? specific? issues?of?processes?of?escalation,?
Western? policies,? and? local? state? politics? (for? this? approach? see:?Meuser?
and?Nagel?1991;?Bogner,?Littig?and?Menz?2005;?Geddes?2004;?Ragin?1987?
and?1992;?Oevermann?et?al.?1979).?Specifically,?each?narrative?accounted?
for?within? one? interview? identified? the? initial? condition? of? an? escalation?
cycle?and? the?point?of?change? in? local?behavior? toward?assertive?policies.?
Therefore,? the? interviews? provide? plausible? causal? reasoning? for? the?
processes?of?escalation.?
In? addition,? the? interviews? account? for? local? perceptions? through?
evaluations? and? assessments? of? locally? based? actors.? Theoretical?
assumptions?or?a?chronology?of?events?cannot?unearth?the?individual?logic?
of? local? dynamics.? Without? social? reasoning,? change? in? local? behavior?
toward?assertive?policies?are?not?traceable.?The?interview?process?took?into?
account? local?perceptions? and? local? cultural? contexts? that? influenced? the?
reasoning?behind?the?course?and?causes?of?agency?and?escalation?(on?the?
approach?of? raising? local?perception? in? social? research? see:?Geertz?1991:?
chapter?1,?Salmon?2006:?13,?also?see:?MacPherson,?Brooker?and?Ainsworth?
2000).?This?enabled?an?analysis?of?sequences?of?action?in?order?to?identify?













This? study? seeks? not? only? to? explain? escalations,? but? also? to? explain? the?




that?generally? lead? to?escalation? in? the?South?Ossetia?context?and? in? this?
context? the? study? expects? that? Western? policies? prior? to? each? of? the?
escalations? exhibit? similarities? that? allow? to? deduct? mechanisms.?














Hedstroem? and? Swedberg? state? that? a? social? mechanism? ascribes? an?
instant?of?agency?within?a?causal?chain?of?social?events?connecting?an?initial?
condition? to? an? observed? outcome? (Hedstroem? and? Swedberg? 1998:? 6).?
Schelling’s? definition,? therefore,? captures? the? explanatory? importance? of?
mechanisms?by? stating? that? "[a]? social?mech? is?a?plausible?hypothesis,?or?
set?of?plausible?hypotheses,?that?could?be?the?explanation?of?some?social?




1978:? chapter?2? in?Hestroem? and? Swedberg?1998:?22?23).?The?definition?
puts?forward?three?central?ideas?of?the?theory?of?social?mechanisms:??
First,?the?causal?value?of?mechanisms?links?a?starting?point?to?an?outcome.?
Social? mechanisms? not? only? are? the? ‘social? glue’? that? holds? processes?
together,?but?they?also?explain?how?processes?work?specifically?and?step?by?
step:? Social? mechanisms? reveal? the? meaning? of? individual? instances? of?
events? because? they? establish? them? as? a? part? of? the? process? and? take?
account?of?them?in?practical?relation?to?the?outcome.?Further,?mechanisms?
go? beyond? signifying? a?mere? link,? but? they? also? reveal? how? causality? is?
expressed? in? empirical? reality? and? therefore? they? exhibit? practicality? in?
analytical?contexts.?Therefore,?plausibility?of?this?link?is?a?core?feature?of?its?




step.? These? steps? are? traceable? to? the? extent? in? which? the? narrative?
accounts? for? a? consistent? picture? of? the? sequence.? Schlichte? agrees? that?
mechanisms?can?be?seen?as?sequences?of?practices?leading?to?or?impeding?
escalations? of? violence? (Schlichte? 2009,? first? version? 2007:? 91).? In? this?
respect,? two? aspects? are? noteworthy:? On? the? one? hand,? mechanisms?
encompass? the?micro? level?of?motivations,? the?meta? level?of?agency?and?
the?macro? level?of?a?social?outcome?(Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?1998:?22).?
Especially?‘transformational’?mechanisms?linking?the?meta?and?macro?level,?
and? explaining? how? agency? translates? into? macro?social? outcomes:? “A?
number? of? individuals? interact? with? one? another,? and? the? specific?
mechanism? (which? differs? depending? on? the? nature? of? the? interaction)?
shows? how? these? individual? actions? are? transformed? into? some? kind? of?
outcome,?be?it?intended?or?unintended”?(ibid.:?23).?This?link?is?at?the?center?
of? this?study.?On? the?other?hand,?mechanisms?deal? in?a? flexible?way?with?






mechanisms? that? focus? on? present? interaction,? and? reinforcing?
mechanisms? that? increase? in? intensity?compared? to?earlier?points? in? time?
(Mahoney?2000:?526?ff.).?The?study?will?make?use?of?this?operative,?multi?
facetted?understanding?and?employ?it?in?the?discussion?of?findings.?
In? this? respect,? the? first? two? properties? of?mechanisms? comply?with? the?
causal?understanding?of?historical?analysis?as?presented?earlier.? In?a? third?
and? for? explanatory? purposes? most? far?reaching? property? mechanisms?
enable? generalizing? behavior? in? given? social? contexts? (Hedstroem? and?
Swedberg?1998:?20).?More?precisely,?a?mechanism?may?recur?across?time?
and? cases,? but? the? functions? of? the? same?mechanism? differ? as? they? are?
specific?for?the?empirical?context.?In?this?regard,?Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?
support?Merton’s?early?call?for?mechanisms?to?constitute?a?middle?ground?
between? laws? and? descriptions? (Hedstroem? and? Swedberg? 1998:? 6).? By?
accounting?for?social?processes?in?a?descriptive?way,?mechanisms?lay?open?
components?of?processes?and?enable? their?generalization.?Therefore,? the?
analysis? of? mechanisms? is? an? intrinsic? part? of? tracing? path?dependent?
trajectories?of?social?processes.?
As?mechanisms?grasp?common?features?of?the?logic?of?agency?across?time?
and? cases,? the? general? assumptions? based? on? them? can? be? applied? to?
different?settings?of?analysis.?Therefore,?Hedstroem?and?Swedberg?chiefly?
conclude?that?“a?mechanism?is?a?function?of?a?general?behavior?in?different?





Thus,? the? study?will? identify? specific?mechanisms?of?external? influence?at?
work?prior?to?escalations?and?will?draw?conclusions?and?extensively?discuss?











of?analysis? that? seeks? to?plausibly? frame?when?and?how?a? sequence?or?a?
cycle?of?escalation?is?triggered?by?a?historically?contingent?event,?the?initial?
condition? that? occurs? through?Western? agency? and? enables? local? power?
consolidation?at? the? international,?national?and? local? level,?which? informs?
the? causal? path? to? triggering? the? critical? juncture? of? change? in? local?
behavior?of?Georgian? state? elites? that,? lastly,?provides? for? the? context? to?
shift?and?bring?about?escalation.?




national? or? local? level? of? the? conflict? and? how? this? process? affects? local?
power?consolidation?options?at?the?national? level.?The? intersection?causes?
a?rupture? in?the?process?that?opens?a?path?for?Western?policies?to?trigger?
change? in? local?behavior?of?power?seeking? states?elites.?Western?policies?
can? exhibit? restricting?or? enabling?qualities? in? affecting? local?behavior? as?
they?effectively?limit?options?of?local?power?consolidation?in?the?context?of?
the? conflict? and? enable?power? consolidating? options? as?Western?policies?














politics? in? Georgia.? The? study? will? present? these? links? by? generating? at?
model?of? the?dynamics?of? re?escalations? in?South?Ossetia?on? the?basis?of?
mechanisms?of?external?policies.?These?findings?will?be?discussed?reflecting?








phases? of? violence? the? chapter? gives? a? background? account? of? the?
trajectory?of?politics?and?violence?in?the?South?Ossetia?context?after?1989.?
The? third?part?entails? the?empirical? analysis?of? the? sequences?of?policies?
determined? through? qualitative? interviews? and? presents? narratives? of?





The? explorative? outreach? of? the? study? and? the? utter? lack? of? data? on?
dynamics? of? violence? in? South? Ossetia? made? extensive? use? of? primary?
sources? indispensable.? For? this?purpose,? the? research?undertook? archival?
research? at? the? OSCE? archive? in? Prague? in? January? and? February? 2009.?
Research? at? the? OSCE? archive? provided? a? consistent? body? of? data? for?
















functioned?under? the? auspices?of? the?OSCE? from?1994? to?2008? and? that?
was?served?to?monitor?and?facilitate?the?political?talks?and?the?activities?of?
the? Georgian?Ossetian?Russian? Joint? Peace?Keeping? Forces? (JPKF).? The?
reports?account? for? talks? in? the? fields?of?economic?rehabilitation,?political?
settlement?of?the?de?jure?status?of?South?Ossetia,?and?the?politically?most?
contentious? issue,? the?negotiations? on? return? and? compensations? of? the?
Georgian?IDPs?(Internally?Displaced?Persons).??
As?status? talks?permanently?put? this? format?at? risk? to?be?cancelled,?a?key?
task? of? the? negotiations?was? to? keep? a? platform? of? dialog? alive? and? to?
organize?every?day? life? in? the? conflict?area?under? the?absence?of?de? jure?
state? authorities.? Therefore,?many? reports? reveal? how? local? issues?were?
solved? through? the? cooperation? of? the? sides,? such? as? gas,? water? and?
electricity? supply? issues,? police? cooperation? in? criminal? incidents,? and?
exchange?of?prisoners.?
?
Moreover,? the? reports? give? an? account? of? violence? in? the? designated?
conflict? zone? from? 1992? with? bi?weekly? reports? from? 1994.? The? OSCE?
reports? therefore? provide? ample? raw?material? on? political? decisions.? For?
example,? the? assessment? repeatedly? shows? that? decisions? taken? in? the?
framework? of? the? JCC? were? as? much? informed? by? strong?hand?
interventions? by? the? Russian? representatives? as? by? internal? political?
developments?in?South?Ossetia?–?a?clear?hint?that?events?at?the?local?level?
determined?political?dynamics?at? least?as?much?as? international?decision?




be? noted:? The? reports? classify? casualties? as? criminally?motivated,? ethnic?
strife,?police?or?military? action? (see? annex?2).21? The? reports? suggest? that?
criminally? motivated? casualties? had? high? potential? to? turn? into? ethnic?
tension,? and? also? that? the?members? of? criminal? groups?were? organized?





along? ethnic? lines.? The? reports? do? not? openly? state,? but? give? hints? that?
violence?between?police?or?Peace?Keeping? Forces?often? took?place?along?
ethnic?lines?in?order?to?gain?access?to?infrastructure?and?territory.?
The? monitoring? mission? was? not? able? to? monitor? or? account? for? all?
instances? of? violence,? casualties,? movement? and? actions? of? agents? of?
violence?in?the?conflict?area.?Therefore,?the?figures?are?not?quantifiable,?for?
example?the?reports?do?not? indicate?any?deaths? in?1993?or?1994?and? less?
than? 5? dead? in? 2002,? and? only? from? 1997? do? the? reports? systematically?
report?on?casualties,?but?only? then?give?selective?accounts? (see?annex?1).?




The?analysis?of? the?data? succeeded? in? showing?an? increase?and?decrease?
violence?between?1989?and?2008.?On?this?basis,?an?extensive?chronology?of?
political? events? and? events? of? violence? at? the? local,? the? national? and?
international? level?of? the?conflict?between?1989?and?2008?was?generated?
(see?annex?1).?As?a?result,?the?material?generated?three?phases?of?violence?
in? the? conflict? by? pointing? out? escalations? throughout? the? period? of?
analysis.? Based? on? the? accounts? of? casualties,? the? analysis? identified?
escalations? in?2002,?2004? and?2008.?However,? it? is? important? to? keep? in?














































































The? graphic? depicts? violence? starting?with? civil? uprisings? from? 1989? and?
escalating? into? the? first?Georgian?Ossetian?war? between? 1991? and? 1992?
that?was?followed?by?a?stretch?of?low?level?violence?until?2000.?During?the?
first?phase?of?violence?after?2000,?violence?re?intensified?for?the?first?time?
after? the? war? with? increasing? levels? of? casualties,? also? among? military?
personnel,?but?especially? the?police? in? the?conflict?zone,?and?escalated? in?
2002? due? to? the? start? of? large?scale? anti?crime? operations.? During? the?
second? phase,? the? conflict? remains? at? a? tense? level? after? 2002? and? re?






To? support? the?account?of? these?phases?of? violence?based?on? casualties,?
the?study?additionally? linked?the?decrease?and? increase?of?violence?to?the?
additional?variable?of? the? involvement?of? typologies?of?actors?of?violence?
(see?annexes?1?and?2).?The?analysis?of?the?OSCE?material?showed?the?points?
in?time?when?actors? in?the?typologies?of?civilian,?police?and?military?were?
involved? in? violence.? This? served? two? purposes:? First,? the? numbers? of?
                                                          




deaths? are? highly? flawed? and? cannot? depict? trajectories? prior? to?
escalations.? In? contrast,? typologies? of? actors? can? reflect? the? level? of?
intensity?if?we?understand?that?the?state?related?status?of?actors?signifies?a?
higher? intensity? of? violence? than? perpetrated? by? civilian? actors.? Second,?
typologies?of?actors?support?the?explanatory?aim?of?the?study?as?they?point?
out?violence?carried?out?by?state?actors.??
The?overall? trajectory?of?violence?based?on? the?decrease?and? increase?of?
violence? are?measured? through? involvement? of? typologies? of? actors? and?
can?be?depicted?as?follows:?
?





in? 1991,? state? actors? were? significantly? less? involved? in? the? onset? of?
violence? from?1989.?After? the? intensity?had?decreased? in?1994,? the?curve?
persistently?remains?at?an? intense? level?as?a?result?of?which?the?following?
escalations? in?2004? and?2008?do? show? less? radical? increases.? Even?more?





Therefore,? the?major? differences? between? the? three? escalations? can? be?
summarized?as?a?gradual? shift? from? local? to? international?conflict23,? from?
civilian?actors?of?violence? in?1989? to?gradual? involvement?of?state?actors,?
and?an?overall? increasing?death? toll? from?1992.?Together?with? the?overall?
increasing? involvement?of?state?actors,?this?suggests?that?the?conflict?over?






2004? and? 2008? identified? through? the? analysis? of? the? numbers? of?
casualties.? However,? the? curve? does? not? show? an? escalation? in? 2002,?
although?the?graph?accounts?for?an?increased?level?of?intensity?from?2000.?
Apparently,? the? involvement? of? actors? remains? at? fairly? the? same? level?
between?1994?and?2004,?with?permanent? involvement?of?police,?militias?
and? other? non?state? armed? groups.? Nevertheless,? for? 2002? the? graph?




the? argument? for? the? division? of? three? phases? of? violence? identifying?
escalations?in?2002,?2004?and?2008.?
?
The? following? section? will? use? these? findings? to? frame? the? background?
discussion?of? the?episodes?of?political?events?and?violence?with? the? three?
points?of?escalation? in?2002,?2004?and?2008.? In? this? respect,? the?account?
focuses?on?the?local?context?of?external?and?domestic?policies.?Thereafter,?
the?study?will?continue?with?an?empirical?analysis?of?the?interview?material?
                                                          
23? The? escalation? of? 1989? to? 1991? that? started? the? conflict? does? not? count? as? an?
international?conflict?as?Georgia?was? formally? still?part?of? the?Soviet?Union?and?Russian?








add? to? the? scarce? reference? material? on? the? conflict.? In? addition,? the?
account? is?based?on?the? interviews?held? in?Georgia? in?2009?and?2010?(see?
the? discussion? in? 3.3.? and? annexes? 3? and? 4)? and? on? the? primary? and?
secondary? sources?on?Georgia’s?and? the? conflict’s?political? context?which?
has? been? discussed? in? the? literature? review.? Particularly? the? second?
sequence?of?events?draws?on? the?research?done? in? the? framework?of? the?
M.A.?thesis?(submitted?to?the?board?of?the?Otto?Suhr? Institute?at?the?Free?
University?of?Berlin? in?February?2006,?referenced?as?Sigwart?2006),?which?
centered? on? power? policies? of? the? Saakashvili? leadership? in? the? South?














agency? in? light?of? the?argument?of? the? study.?Therefore,? the? section?will?
show?how?after?1989?Georgia?state?elites?attempted?to?consolidate?power?
in?the?context?of?the?conflict?and?at?how?the?Western?agenda?in?the?conflict?
reacted? to? local? power? claims.? The? background? account? of? key? political?







Episode? 1:? 1989? to? 1994? –? Independence? of?Georgia,? start? of? conflict? in?
South? Ossetia,? and? first? Georgian?Ossetian? war? (Independence?
demonstrations,? March? to? Tskhinvali,? Gamsakhurdia? becomes? first?
president? of?Georgia,?Gorbachev? referendum,?Ousting? of?Gamsakhurdia,?




South? Ossetia,? Shevardnadze?Chibirov? agreement,? Second? war? with?
Chechnya,?Putin?becomes? (acting)?president?of? the?RF,?Baden?Document,?
Re?election? of? Shevardnadze,? Kokoity? replaces? Chibirov? as? de?facto?
president?of?South?Ossetia).?
Episode? 3:? 2002?2006? –? Ousting? of? Shevardnadze,? closure? of? Ergneti,?
Ljubljana?Document,? Sanakoev? administration? (Ousting? of? Shevardnadze,?
Saakashvili?becomes?third?president?of?Georgia,?Closure?of?Ergneti?market,?
Shelling? of? Tskhinvali,? Mamsurov? becomes? president? of? North? Ossetia,?
Ljubljana?Document,?Sanakoev?becomes?head?of?alternative?South?Ossetia?
administration).?










Episode? 1:? 1989? to? 1994? –? Independence? of?Georgia,? start? of? conflict? in?
South?Ossetia?and?first?Georgian?Ossetian?war?
Summary.? Between? 1989? and? 1994,? claims? of? self?determination?
intensified? the? Georgian?Ossetian? conflict.? While? Georgia? declared?
independence? from? the? Soviet? Union,? Russian? leaders? supported? South?
Ossetian? attempts? to? cede? from? Georgia.? The? first? Georgian? president?
Gamsakhurdia?started?the?conflict?and?the?second?president?Shevardnadze?
ended? the? first? war? in? 1992,? both? attempting? to? legitimize? their? rule?
through? gaining? control? over? South? Ossetia.? The? peace? agreement?
mandated?Russia’s?presence?on?the?ground?and?upheld?the?political?status?
quo? of? South? Ossetia.? When? Western? actors? entered? the? conflict? as?
facilitators,? the? Russian,? Georgian? and? South? Ossetian? leaderships? had?
already? secured? their? interests? of? opportunities? for? illicit? gains,? shared?
control? of? territory? and? de?facto? independence,? particularly? with?




in? the? capital? of? Tbilisi? demonstrated? for? independence? from? the? Soviet?
Union? (see? Suny? 1994,? Beissinger? 2002,? Nodia? 1996).? In? March,? the?





demands? of? independence? from? Moscow? rule? (I? 25).? As? the? Georgian?
national?movement?gathered?strength,?claims?of? independence?coincided?
with? demands? of? Russian? withdrawal? from? Georgia’s? regions? under? the?
titular? ethnoterritorial? rule? granted? by? the? Soviet? system.25? Effective?
                                                          
24? Three? interview?partners?who?were? active? in?politics?during? and? after? the? fall?of? the?
Soviet?Union?described?the?events?at?the?time?(I?25,?I?29).?
25?Under? the? Soviet? system,? administration? of? territorial? entities?was? divided? by? ethnic?






The? situation? intensified? when? Zviad? Gamsakhurdia? became? Georgia’s?
national? figurehead? on? the? way? to? the? presidency? of? an? independent?
Georgia.? A? popular? writer,? his? ideas? of? independence? of? the? Georgian?
nation?attracted?his?followers?and?made?him?a?powerful?figure?and?activist?
well?before?he?was?elected?president? in?October?1990.?He?fiercely?pushed?
an? anti?Soviet? agenda?with? a?nationalist? rhetoric? (see?Nodia? 1996,? Jones?


















Almost? one? year? later? on? 20? September? 1990,? South? Ossetia? declared?
independence? from?Georgia?and? full? sovereignty?within? the?Soviet?Union?
amid? ongoing? clashes.? Yet,? once?more,? both? the? Georgian? and? Russian?
leaderships? formally? rejected? recognition.?Ossetians?were?not?part?of? the?
                                                                                                                                                                                     




Georgian? elections? that?on?30?October? 1990? brought?Gamsakhurdia? into?
power,?and?later?made?him?the?first?president?of?Georgia?on?26?May?1991?
(Report?of?the?CSCE?Rapporteur?Mission?to?Georgia?17?22?May?1992,?CSCE?
Communication? No.? 186).26? On? 11? December? 1990,? six?weeks? after? the?
parliamentary?elections?and? in?reaction?to?the?South?Ossetian?declaration?




December,? the? first? casualties? among?Georgian?police?occurred,? and? just?
before? January? 1991? armed? hostilities? among?Georgian? guards,?Ossetian?




















27?Both,?a? former?member?of? the?Gamsakhurdia?government?and?a?co?worker?of? the?EU?
Representative? to? the? South?Caucasus,? emphasized?Gorbachev’s?offer? as? an? event? that?
alienated? the?Georgian?national?movement? from?Russian?politics? and? the?minorities.? In?
addition,?the?offer?alienated?the?South?Ossetian?independence?movement.?
28?Data?on?the?South?Ossetia?conflict?is?not?reliable.?Here?widely?quoted?data?on?the?first?




presidency.? Gamsakhurdia’s? policies? were? met? with? stark? Western?
contempt? (on? European? and?U.S.? reaction? see:?HRW?1992,? English?2008,?
Nodia?1995).?Gamsakhurdia?intended?to?establish?order?with?a?strong?hand?
before? introducing?democracy.?The?West? reacted?by?adamantly? rejecting?
Gamsakhurdia’s?crackdown?on?demonstrations,?media?and?his?nationalist?
rhetoric? against? ethnic? minorities.? As? well,? Gamsakhurdia’s? refusal? to?





The? end? of? Gamsakhurdia’s? rule? came? at? the? hands? of? his? internal?
opponent? when? political? groups? that? were? part? of? Gamsakhurdia’s?
umbrella?coalition?usurped?his?power?(see?Shatirishvili?2003,?Nodia?1996).?
When? Gamsakhurdia? was? ousted,? violence? in? South? Ossetia? continued?
unmitigated.? Shevardnadze? arrived? in? Georgia? to? become? the? second?








Shevardnadze,? as? the? second? president? of? Georgia,? seemed? to? follow? a?
more? moderate? course? than? his? predecessor.? However,? Shevardnadze?
attempted? to?prove?being?a?capable? leader?by?subduing?separatist? forces?
and?regaining?South?Ossetia.?As?a?result?from?January?1992,?Georgian?and?
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Tribune? 1992),? 1,000? (ICG? 2004),?or? "up? to? 2000“? (Le?Monde? 1992),? 3,000? (Svetkovsky?







agreement?was? negotiated? in? June? 1992? that? left? South? Ossetia? lost? to?
central?Georgian?rule?(see?for?example:? ICG?2004,?Cornell?2001?and?2002,?
Milcher?and?Slay?2005,?Barbe?and?Johansson?Nogue?2008).??
In? June? 1992,? President? of? the? Russian? Federation,? Boris? Yeltsin,? and?
Shevardnadze? built? on? their? good? personal? relations? and? negotiated? the?
Sochi?Agreement?which?ended? the?war? (Annex? II?of?CSCE?Communication?
No.?228,?05.08.1992,?Report?of?the?CSCE?Fact?Findinq?Mission?to?the?region?
of?the?Georgian?Ossetian?Conflict,?25.?30.07.1992).?The?agreement?set?up?a?
joint?Peace?Keeping? Force?under? the? auspices?of?CSCE,? from?1995?OSCE,?
and? later? included? the? EU? as? a? participating? member;? however? only?
Georgian,?Russian?and?South?Ossetian?representatives?held?veto?power?(on?
the?CSCE/?OSCE?process?see:?Koenig?2005,?Mayorov?2002,?Olcott?Brill?et?al.?
1999,? Cummings? 2001).? South? Ossetian,? Russian? (constituted?mainly? by?
North? Ossetians)? and? Georgian? troops? were? to? control? the? buffer? zone?
under?Russian?command.?The?Peace?Keeping?Forces?were?the?only?security?
personnel?the?Sochi?Agreement?entitled?to?carry?arms?in?the?conflict?zone.?
Joint? checkpoints? with? members? of? each? battalion? were? established?
throughout? the? area.? Later? from? 2000,? the? peace?keeping? forces? were?
supplemented?by?joint?operations?of?Georgian?and?Ossetian?local?police.??
?
This? arrangement? marked? the? start? of? Western? engagement? in? South?
Ossetia? from? the? end? of? the? first?war? in?mid?1992.? However,?within? six?
weeks? after? the? Sochi? agreement? the?war? in?Abkhazia? started? in?August?
1992? which? proved? to? be? an? ongoing? volatile? situation? also? under?









Summary.? Between? 1994? and? 2002,? low?intensity? violence? persisted? in?
South?Ossetia,?due?to?the?good?relations?between?the?Georgian?and?South?
Ossetian?leaderships?and?intense?support?of?Western?actors.?From?the?very?
start? of? the? 1990s,?Western? support? of? the?Georgian? elites? centered? on?
territorial? integration,? with? a? special? focus? on? anti?corruption? and? anti?
smuggling?measures? in?the?conflict?area?of?South?Ossetia.?Simultaneously,?
Georgian? and? Ossetian? leaders? made? enormous? private? gains? from?
cooperatively? organizing? smuggling? through? South?Ossetia? and? therefore?
kept?the?conflict?from?escalating.?However?from?2000?on,?the?situation?was?
aggravated? due? to? a? hardening? stance? of? Moscow,? cancelling? the?
settlement? negotiations? in? Baden? and? replacing? Chibirov? with? hardline?




staging? anti?corruption?measures? to? the?West? and? the? harshly? criticizing?
civil?society.?
?
From? 1994,?Western? engagement? increasingly? stepped? up? its? activity? in?
Georgia?and?in?the?Georgian?Ossetian?conflict?amid?the?reality?of?the?shaky?
power?sharing? deal? monitored? through? the? Joint? Control? Commission?
(Koenig?2005,?Jawad?2005,?Mayorov?2002).?While?the?deal?was?in?place?and?
Western?actors? sustained? the?process,? the? conflict? remained? in?a?volatile?
state.?Frequent?outbreaks?of?violence?persisted,?but?were?downplayed?as?
local? disputes.? After? Gamsakhurdia? had? been? ousted,? Georgia? went?
through?both,?a?civil?war?between?non?state?groups?and?a?war?with?break?
away?Abkhazia? (on? the? first?Abkhazia?war? see:?Slider?1997,?Hensell?2009,?
Coppieters? 2004,? Coppieters? et? al.? 1998).? Once? those? struggles? of?
competing? elites?were?overcome,?Georgian? capital? politics? settled? into? a?






for?a?drop? in?violence.? In?1993,?at? least?48?casualties? in?sixteen? incidents?
were? reported? and? in? 1994,? the? death? toll? went? down? to? thirteen.?
Casualties?during?this?time?mainly?occurred?because?of?shoot?outs?between?
Ossetian?or?Georgian?local?gangs?or?between?gangs?and?local?authorities?or?
PKFs,? reported? to? be? mostly? related? to? smuggling? activities.? Casualties?
frequently? occurred? during? controls? at? road? posts? and? were? then?
considered? to? be? related? to? criminal? activities.? However,? as?mentioned?
earlier,? the?OSCE?reports?gave?a?detailed?account?on?casualties?only? from?
1997.29?Before?this,?the?casualties?rates?and?indications?of?causes?were?very?
vague.? While? casualties? stayed? at? a? low? level? throughout? the? 1990s,?




In? the? 1990s,? the? balance? in? South? Ossetia? worked? through? active?
cooperation? between? Shevardnadze’s? leadership? and? South? Ossetia’s?
moderate?leader?Chibirov.?Relations?were?supported?by?the?JCC?in?settling?
organizational?and?security? issues? for?the?populations? in?the?conflict?area.?
Amid? the?ongoing?war? in?early?1992,?Torez?Kulumbegov?became? the?de?
facto? president? of? South? Ossetia.? Already? then?Western? actors’? intense?
interest? in?engaging? in? the?conflict?showed.? JCC?negotiations?started?and,?
on? 23? January? 1993,? Kulumbegov? signed? the? memorandum? on? the?
cooperation?between?CSCE? and? the? South?Ossetian? leadership? (OSCE?AR?
12/92).?The?CSCE?presented?a?“CSCE?Plan? for?Georgia”?envisaging?gradual?
reintegration?of?South?Ossetia?into?Georgia?in?July?1993.30??
                                                          














been? too? much? in? favor? of? the? CSCE? plan? (CSCE? ARs? 24.08.,? 28.11.,?
11.10.1993,? CSCE? Supplemental? Report,? 30.09.1993).? After? two? years? of?
half?hearted? negotiations,? from? early? 1996,? Shevardnadze? announced?
“perspectives? for? the? relative? quick? settlement? of? the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict”? and? signed? the? “Initiative? for? a? Peaceful? Caucasus”? (OSCE? ARs?
13.02.?and?03.04.1996).?On?May?16,?Shevardnadze?and?Chibirov?signed?a?






also? enabled? significant? incomes? for? both? sides? through? organized?
smuggling?through?the?region?of?South?Ossetia?to?Georgia.?The?power?basis?
of? the? Shevardnadze? regime? was? rooted? in? a? ‘pyramid? system’? of? re?
distribution?of?revenues?into?the?hands?of?regime?loyal?clients?(Christophe?
2005:?78,?also?see:?Easter?1996,?George?2009,?Holmes?1997).?There?were?
very? few? people? at? the? top? of? the? pyramid? in? the? state? apparatus? that?
entertained? a? large? network? of? corruption? via? police? and? regional? state?
actors.?At?the?bottom?of?this?pyramid,?most?of?the?population?had?to?bribe?
state? employees? for? access? to? virtually? anything,? including? roads,? gas? or?
jobs.?This?system?ensured? the?power?basis?of? the? state?elite?and?granted?
large? incomes? (on?the?role?of?corruption? for?governments?see?the?studies?
of?Banfield?1975,?Charap?and?Harm?1991,?Lapalombara?1994).?
Smuggling?played?a?significant? role? in?allocating? revenues? in? the?hands?of?
capital?loyal? state?actors? in? the? regions,?and?granted?gains? for?everybody?
involved.? Therefore,? Georgian,? North? and? South? Ossetian? and? Russian?






most? active? trans?shipment? center? in? Georgia,? the? hub? of? Georgian?
Ossetian? illegal? and? legal? trade? relations? (on? the? role? and? functioning?of?
Ergneti?market? see:? George? 2009,? Kukhianidze? et? al.? 2006,? Kukhianidze?
2003,?2004?and?2007).?The?market?was? the?biggest? source?of? income? for?
the? leadership? in? Tskhinvali,?many? of? Shevardnadze’s? civil? servants? and?
businessmen?in?North?Ossetia?(ibid.,?Wennmann?2004).?Therefore,?all?sides?
across?the?conflict?boundaries?had?a?vested?interested?in?keeping?the?illicit?
trade? system? alive.? In? order? to? organize? smuggling? activities? along? the?




At? the?same? time,?however,?Chibirov?signed?a? treaty?of?cooperation?with?
North?Ossetia.?The?Chibirov?leadership?openly?stated?the?intention?to?unite?
with?North?Ossetia?and?become?a?member?of?the?Russian?Federation.?From?
the? end? of? the? 1990s,? the? Russian? political? elite? had? undergone? a?
transformation? that,?at? least? for?Georgian?politics,?proved? to?be? fatal? (on?
this? period? see? for? example:? Gower? and? Timmins? 2009,? Haukkala? 2008,?
Sikorski?2009,?Loewenhardt?2005,?Cooley?and?Mitchell?2010a?and?2010b,?
Allison?2008,?Blank?1995).?The?change?from?Yeltsin?to?the?Putin?presidency?
radicalized? Russian? policy? towards? Georgia? very? quickly? (see? Cummings?
2001,?Allison?2008,?Filippov?2009).??
With?almost?immediate?effect,?the?tightening?Russian?stance?was?revealed?
in? the? South?Ossetia? context:? the? so? called? Baden? process? of? the? JCC,? a?
negotiation? format? envisaging? the? settlement? of? the? region’s? political?
status?and?at? least? to?most? international?observers?highly?promising,?was?
halted?(on? international?view?to?the?Baden?process?see:?Koenig?2005;?also?
see:?I?8,?I?14,?I?1?1631).?In?addition,?Chibirov?was?replaced?with?his?politically?





with? the? hawkish? turn? in? the? Georgian? governmental? line,? the? interview? partners?
85?
?
radical?successor?Eduard?Kokoity?who? took?power? in?December?2001? (on?
this? turn? in? the?process? see:? I?8,? I?9,? I?28,? I?29).?The? failure?of? the?Baden?
process? was? the? first? sign? announcing? the? end? of? Chibirov’s? era? under?
whom? the? process? toward? a? peace? settlement? had? been? striving.? The?
replacement? of? Chibirov? proved? to? be? a?major? setback? in? the? otherwise?
successful? Georgian?Ossetian? process? that? had? taken? place? through? the?




held? in?Moscow,?and?Georgian?and?Ossetian? intellectuals?met? for?yet? the?
second?time.??
After? the?South?Ossetian?elections? in?December?2001,? in?one?of?his? very?
first?public? statements?Kokoity? announced?Georgia´s? acknowledgment?of?
the? ‘genocide’? against? the? South?Ossetian? people? during? the? 1990?1992?
war? as? conditional? for? dialog? (OSCE? AR? 18.12.2001).? The? new? South?
Ossetian? course? reiterated? reunification? with? North? Ossetia? and? would?
never? again? come? as? close? to? negotiating? South? Ossetia’s? autonomous?
status? within? Georgia? as? under? Chibirov.? As? relations? deteriorate,?
Shevardnadze? for? the? first? time? openly? criticized? Russia? in? June? 2002,?
saying? that? Russia? “secretly? annexes”? South? Ossetia? and? thus?made? its?
mediating?role?less?credible?(ibid.).?
?
Seconded? by? Georgia’s? mutual? interest? of? integration? into? the? West,?
Western? engagement? gradually? intensified? over? the? 1990s.? Formation?of?
the?Georgian?state?was?a?core?priority,?and?here,?intense?activity?showed?in?
solving? Georgia’s? rule?of?law? problems? by? enhancing? capacities? of? the?
central?state?through?fighting?crime?and?corruption?in?South?Ossetia?where?
statehood?was? contested? through? territorial? conflict.? The?Georgian? state?
elite? responded?with? a? vivid? interest? in? cooperation.? During? the? 1990s,?
Shevardnadze?had?pursued?a?mild?course?toward?Russia?(see?for?example:?





Mark? 1996,? Timmermann? 1992,? English? 2000,? Allison? 2008),? keeping? a?
balance? between? Russian? influence? in? Georgia,? revenues? for? selected?
echelons? of? the? elite? and? political? stability? in? the? territorial? conflicts.?
However,?when?Russia’s?political?system?transferred? from?Yeltsin?to?Putin?
in?2000,?the?ground?of?politically?stable?relations?gradually?eroded.??
As? the? Georgian? elites’? relations?with? Russia? started? to? fall? apart? under?
Shevardnadze,? Georgia’s? turn? to? the? West? was? accomplished? through?
promoting? an? anti?Russian? discourse? and? altogether? opening? a? new,?
modernized? perspective? that? was? boosted? through?Western? pledges? of?
support? for? independence? and? progress? (Christophe? 2001,? Jones? 1993,?
Zuercher?and?Koehler?2004).?Moscow’s?politics,?in?contrast,?weakened?local?




(Proladze? 2001,? Sikharulidze? 2001,?Hanf? and?Nodia? 2000).?As? local? elites?
gradually? experienced? new? power? consolidating? opportunities? through?
relations? with? Western? partners,? their? policies? adopted? a? stern? pro?
Western? course? that,? particularly? from? 2000,? included? meticulous?




anti?crime? activities? and? therefore? intensified? efforts? to? control? the?
situation? in?the?Georgian?South?Ossetian?conflict?zone?and? its?vicinity.?The?
campaign?was? endorsed? by? then? Georgian?Minister? of? Justice? and? later?
president?Mikheil? Saakashvili? and? took? place? in? the? context? of?Western?
demands?to?restore?rule?of?law?in?Georgia’s?peripheral?regions.?Therefore,?
from? 2002,? the? Georgian? leadership? announced? a? large?scale? anti?









at? least? 59? casualties? between? 1994? and? 1999,? the? death? toll? rises? to? a?
minimum?of?29?casualties?only?between?2000?and?2003.?Throughout?2000,?
very?few?casualties?were?reported,?but?on?May?20?a?highly?symbolic?killing?
took?place? in? the?Georgian?village?of?Kheiti?when? five?Georgian? residents?
were?killed? in?a?car?ambush.? It?was? the?commemoration?day?of? the?1992?
killings? of? 36? Ossetian? residents.? The? killings? were? widely? held? to? have?
happened?in?retaliation?(OSCE?AR?10/00,?OSCE?SR?21.05.2000).?In?2001,?the?
reported?death? toll? in? the? conflict? zone? rose? remarkably?up? to?13,?more?
than?doubling?the?2000?rate.32??
?
Particularly,? the? intensification?showed?an? increase? in? the?engagement?of?
police? and? internal? forces? in? the? conflict? area.? In? September?2002,?OSCE?
observers? located? for? the? first? time?heavy?armament? in? the?conflict? zone?
and?Georgian?troops?of? interior?(troops?of?the?Ministry?of? Internal?Affairs)?
increased.?South?Ossetia?leader?Kokoity?announced?a?“partial?mobilization”?





area.? As? a? result,? by?March? 10,? 2003? the? Georgian?Ministry? of? Defense?
(MoD)?unilaterally? subordinated? the?Georgian?battalion?of? the?PKF?under?
its? authority? (OSCE?AR? 06.03.2003),? a?breach?of? the? JCC? agreement? that?
                                                          
32? On? April? 3,? a? gangland? shoot?out? in? Tskhinvali? left? three? Ossetians? dead? (OSCE? AR?
07/01).?On?May?13,?a?gunbattle?between?the?South?Ossetian?police?and?Chechens?caused?
four?casualties?(OSCE?AR?09/01).?It?was?the?first?time?since?1997?that?a? law?enforcement?
member? was? killed.? In? July,? two? were? found? dead? in? Tskhinvali? and? in? the? end? of?




initially? envisaged? the? PKF? troops? under? the? bi?annually? rotating?Russian?
JPKF?command.??
?
The? trend? did? not? reverse? and? violence? annually? increased,? significantly?
involving?increasing?death?tolls?among?Georgian?and?Ossetian?police?forces,?
with?Shevardnadze’s?claim?to?power? left? in? limbo?amid?Western?demands?









Episode? 3:? 2002?2006? –? Ousting? of? Shevardnadze,? closure? of? Ergneti,?
Ljubljana?Document,?Sanakoev?administration?
Summary.? With? Shevardndaze? ousted? in? 2003,? the? new? Saakashvili?
government? tried? to? consolidate? rule?by? fulfilling?Western?demands?of? a?
strengthened,?democratic?statehood.?Introducing?a?sweeping?change?in?the?
stance? on? South?Ossetia,? Saakashvili? closed? down? the? smuggling? hub? of?
Ergneti?market? in?May?2004.?Re?escalation?ensued? in?August? through? the?
shelling? of? Tskhinvali.? Subsequently,? the? government? sought? to? draw?
Western?support?to?further?consolidate?rule?through?promoting?peace?road?
maps?to?reintegrate?South?Ossetia.?The?government?successfully?played?on?
a? two?sided?agenda,? assuring?Western?partners?of?a?democratic? strategy?
while?keeping?open?options?for?a?military?option?on?the?ground.?By?2006,?
all? players? in? the? conflict? had? radicalized,? including? the? Georgian?led?
alternative? South? Ossetian? Sanakoev? administration,? with? new? North?
Ossetian?leader?Mamsurov,?and?due?to?an?erosion?of?the?buffer?institution?





In?2003,? Shevardnadze’s?power?base? finally?broke?away? (Wheatley?2005:?
chapter?7,?also?see:?Mitchell?2004,?Coppieters?and?Legvold?2005).?The?2000?
presidential? elections? already? had? raised? doubts? of? Western? observer?
organizations? and? partners? about? Shevardnadze’s? commitment? to?
democratization? and? the? November? 2003? parliamentary? elections? were?
openly? branded? as? falsified? (OSCE/? ODHIR? reports,? 10.04.2000? and?
23.11.2003).? After? the? elections,? Mikheil? Saakashvili,? Shevardnadze’s?
former?Minister?of?Justice,? led?the?ensuing?protests.?Amid?strong?Western?
support? of? the? protesters,? the? ‘Rose? Revolution’? leaders? ousted?
Shevardnadze?and?Saakashvili?took?office?as?the?third?president?of?Georgia?
in? January? 2004.? Mitchell? observed? in? 2004:? “The? Rose? Revolution?
represented?a?victory?not?only?for?the?Georgian?people?but?for?democracy?
globally.? [It]? ...? demonstrated? that,? by? aggressively? contesting? elections,?
exercising? basic? freedoms? of? speech? and? assembly,? and? applying? smart?
strategic? thinking,? a? democratic? opposition? can? defeat? a? weak,? semi?
democratic?kleptocracy”?(Mitchell?2004:?342).?
?
In? Saakashvili’s? generally? ambitious? reform? agenda? of? rule? of? law? and?
democratization,?territorial? integration?ranked?at?the?top?(Wheatley?2005:?
195ff.,? also? see:? Huber? 2004,? Jawad? 2005).? Saakashvili? continued? the?
course? initiated? under? him? as? Shevardnadze’s? Minister? of? Justice? in?
establishing?rule?of?law?through?addressing?the?conflicts?and?generally,?just?
like?Gamsakhurdia?and?Shevardnadze?before?him,?banked?on?fortifying?his?
rule? through? reintegrating? the? territories.?The?new? impetus? introduced?a?
sweeping?change? in?Georgian?policy?on? the?secessionist?entities? to?a?pro?
active?course? (I?9,? I?1333).?Western?partners?promised? full? support? to? the?
new?government.?Saakashvili’s?first?success?is?the?peaceful?reintegration?of?
the?secessionist?region?of?Adjara? in?Georgia’s?southwest?and?on?the?wave?
of? triumph? the?Saakashvili? leadership? turned? its?attention? to?Tskhinvali? in?
May?2004.?







border?of? South?Ossetia? and?Georgia? (several? interviews? gave? insight? on?
this?event:?I?1,?I?6,?I?8,?I?9).?While?the?Georgian?state?servants?who?gained?
from? the? system? had? been? replaced? due? to? the? regime? change? (for? this?




six? days? after? South? Ossetian? leader? Kokoity? and? new? Georgian? Prime?





Ossetia?escalated? for? the? first? time?since?1992?due? to? the? involvement?of?
the?assertive?armed?action?of?state?actors.34?
?
Already? at? the? end? of? 2003,? the? new?Georgian? government? had? sought?
Western? support? for? their? stance? toward? South?Ossetia? (Wheatley?2005:?
218?219,? also? see:?Milcher? and? Slay? 2005,? Barbe? and? Johansson?Nogue?
2008,?Popescu?2007,? Zuercher?2007,? Sigwart?2006).? Saakashvili? launched?
an?all?encompassing?international?campaign?to?promote?a?peace?road?map?
for? the? settlement? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? as? a? Georgian?
representative? at? the?OSCE?meeting? in? Ljubljana? observed? (Socor? 2005).?
The?peace?road?map?included?the?new?government’s?agenda?in?the?conflict?
and? envisaged? confidence?building? measures,? negotiations,? economic?
rehabilitation,?legalized?trade?relations?and?broad?autonomy.?In?the?course?











audiences? such? as? the?UN?General? Assembly? (UNGA),? the? Parliamentary?
Assembly? of? the? Council? of? Europe? (PACE),? and? the? OSCE? Permanent?
Council.? The?2005?peace? campaign?managed? to?ensure?Western? support?
for?the?new?government.?
?
While? Saakashvili´s? peace? campaign? resounded? in? the? international?
community,? the? signs? of? deterioration? continued.? Moscow? took? away?
influence? from? the?Georgian?official? side? in? South?Ossetia?affairs? step?by?
step.? Georgian? Prime? Minister? Zurab? Zhvania? and? Kokoity? signed? a?
demilitarization? agreement? in? November? 2004? (OSCE? AR? 15/04,? Civil.ge?
06.11.2004).?The?agreement?dictated?that?all?military?personnel?apart?from?
the?Peace?Keeping?deployments?must? leave?the?conflict?zone.?As?a?part?of?
the? deal,? Georgian? troops? withdrew? from? the? Sarabuki? post? in? South?
Ossetia? and? left? it? to? South? Ossetian? Peace?Keepers? (I? 9,? I? 1835).? The?
arrangement?was?lobbied?by?the?Russian?side?and?as?a?result?supported?by?
the?Western?side?as?a?concession?after?the?August?2004?escalation.?While?




but? located? in? the? Abkhazian?controlled? area? of? the? UN?monitored?
boundary?line?(I?14,?I?1?13,?I?2336;?also?see?OSCE?AR?26.04.1994).??






                                                          
35? Two? interview? partners? emphasized? the? importance? of? the? Sarabuki? post? for? the?
Georgian?government’s?policy?toward?South?Ossetia.?
36? Several? interview? partners,? among? them? members? of? an? international? NGO? and?







On? the? international? level?as?well,? relations?between?Russia?and?Georgia?
also? very? clearly? deteriorated? from? 2006.? In? February? 2006,? Georgia?
underlined?its?determination?in?the?conflict?context?and?vetoed?the?Russian?
mandate? of? the? Peace?Keeping? Force? in? South?Ossetia? (OSCE?AR? 02/06).?
After? the? vote,? the? Georgian? parliament? instructed? the? government? to?
revise? the? 1992? Sochi? Agreement? and? replace? the? Russian?led? Peace?
Keeping?Force?(Civil.ge?07.?and?15.02.2006).??
In? addition,? the? Georgian? side? started? to? question? the? JCC? format? from?
October? 2006.? In? November? 2006,? the? Georgian? government? held?
alternative?elections?in?the?Georgian?controlled?parts?of?South?Ossetia?and?
established? an? alternative? South? Ossetia? government? under? Dimitry?
Sanakoev? (OSCE?AR?19/06,?20/06,?22/06).?The?Georgian?government,? in?a?
provocative?move? for? the? JCC? counterparts,? introduced? Sanakoev? as? the?
Ossetian? representative? to? the? JCC.? However,? neither? Russia? nor? the?
Western? representatives?of? the? JCC? reacted? to? the?decision.?As? a? result,?
Russia?did?not?pull?out?its?peace?keepers?until?after?the?war?in?2008.37??
Altogether,?after?the?escalation?in?2004?the?conflict?remained?at?an?intense?
level?due? to?ongoing?militarization?and?operations?of? security? forces.?The?
establishment? of? the? Sanakoev? administration,? the? eroding? of? the? CC?
format?and? increased?unilateralism?of?Russia? through?a? tightening?grip? in?
the? North? Caucasus? and? Georgia’s? Kodori? campaign? in? Abkhazia? also?
aggravated? the? situation? after? the? 2004? escalation.?Western? support? for?
Georgia’s? strategy? further? progressed? at? the? international? level? and?
remained?reluctant,?but?supportive?on?the?ground.??
?
                                                          
37? In? September? 2006,? in? an? unparalleled? move,? Georgian? intelligence? arrested? four?
Russian? officers? on? spying? charges,? initiated? a? big?media? campaign? and? expelled? them?
from?Georgia?to?Russia?(Civil.ge?27.09.2006,?BBC?News?02.10.2006).?In?April?2007,?Georgia?










direct? special? efforts? to? territorial? integration.? At? the? same? time,? the?
recognition?of?Kosovo?and?the?Bucharest?NATO?summit?put?Western?policy?
under?pressure?vis?a?vis?Russia’s?stance?of?maintaining?secessionism?in?the?
Caucasus.?The?aftermath?of? the?August?war? left?Western? influence? in? the?
conflict? diminished,? however,?Western?Georgian? ties? continued? to? exert?
considerable?influence?on?Georgian?elites’?power?base.??
?
Throughout? 2007,? tensions? continued? to? steadily? increase,? with? the?
Georgia?parliament? giving? legal? status? to? the? Sanakoev? administration? in?
May?2007.?Also,?in?July,?a?Russian?missile?hit?close?to?the?convoy?of?an?EU?
delegation? returning? from?a? visit? to?Tskhinvali? (I?14,? I?2038).?At? the? same?
time? tensions? in? Tbilisi? rose? as? the? Saakashvili? regime? grappled?with? its?
opposition? (for? this? period? see:? Lazarus? 2010,?Mitchell? 2009,? Areshidze?
2007,? Tatum? 2009,? Welt? 2009,? Kalanadze? and? Orenstein? 2009).? In?
September,?the?launching?of?the?new?oppositional?party?of?former?Minister?
of?Defense?Okruashvili?was?stalled? through?charges?of?corruption,?money?
laundering? and? abuse? of? office? against? him? (Civil.ge? 27.09.2007).? In?
November,? opposition?led? street? protests? ensued? and?were? subdued? by?
military? police? with? what? international? actors,? including? the? US? and? EU?
fiercely?condemned?as?disproportional?use?of?force?(see?Bigg?and?Sindelar?
2007).? Therefore? prior? to? the? August? war,? the? political? situation? put?
Saakahvili’s?power?base? strongly?at? risk? (Jones?2008:?3,?also? see:?Lanskoy?
2008).? Just?as? the? two? leaderships?before?him,?Saakashvili? resorted? to?an?
                                                          
38?Especially?members?of? international?organizations,?here? the?EU?Delegation?and?OSCE,?







In? February? 2008,? the? recognition? of? the? international? protectorate? of?
Kosovo?shook?the?context?of?the?South?Ossetia?and?Abkhazia?conflicts?(on?
the? effect? of? Kosovo’s? independence? see:? Averre? 2009,? Cerone? 2009).?
Russia? opposed? Kosovo’s? recognition,? but? then? turned? the? situation? by?
claiming? the? same? rights? for? the?South?Caucasus? separatist?entities.?As?a?





Scheffer´s? earlier? remarks? had? boosted? hopes? for? sooner? membership,?
even?without?achieving?territorial? integrity? (Civil.ge?12.02.2007).?Ahead?of?
the? summit,? Russia? fiercely? campaigned? against? a? possible?membership.?
Georgia?saw?this?failure?largely?at?the?hands?of?Russia´s?pressure?on?NATO?
member? states,? particularly? Germany,? with? threatening? to? cut? energy?
supplies.?Although? the?summit?stressed? the?member?states’?will? to?admit?
Georgia? at? a? later? point,? the? rebuff? to? Georgia? testified? Russia´s? strong?
ambitions? and? put? a? preliminary? end? to? Georgia´s? way? into? Western?
structures.? The? same? month,? Russia? started? legal? relations? with? South?
Ossetia?and?Abkhazia?(I?540).?
?
In?early?August?2008,? the? second?war? in?South?Ossetia? took?place?during?
five?days? (on? this?period? see? for?example:?King?2008,?Asmus?2010,? Jones?
2008,? Garthon? 2010,? Allison? 2008,? Cornell? and? Starr? 2009,? Cooley? and?
Mitchell? 2010b,? International? Fact?Finding?Mission? 2009).? Armed? action?
involved? Ossetian?militias,? Georgian? and? Russian? air? forces? and? ground?
                                                          
39?A?member?of?a?local?NGO?and?of?the?opposition?accounted?for?the?Bucharest?summit?as?
a?chronological?milestone?in?the?cycle?of?escalation?leading?to?the?2008?war.?





troops.? Georgian? military? temporarily? invaded? Tskhinvali? engaging? in?
skirmishes?with?South?Ossetian?militias,?but?was?pushed?back?by?Russian?
military.? Russian? troops? subsequently? moved? into? central? Georgian?
territory? and? occupied? strategic? locations? beyond? Abkhazia? and? South?
Ossetia.?The?war? leaves? several?hundred?dead? (HRW?2009:?5).41?The?war?
was? ended?with? an? initiative? of? the? head? of? the? EU? presidency,? French?
president?Nicolas? Sarkozy,?when? a? ceasefire?agreement?was?put? in?place?
between?Georgia?and?Russia?on?12?August?and,?after?inconsistencies?with?a?
new? version,? on? 8? September.? Despite? the? condition? for? troops? to?





Russian? Federation? recognized? the? independence? of? South? Ossetia? and?
Abkhazia.?In?October,?the?EU?and?US?initiated?a?new?format?of?international?
talks? on? the? future? of? the? Abkhazia? and? South? Ossetia? conflicts? to?
periodically?take?place?in?Geneva.?
In?May? 2009,? parliamentary? elections? in? South?Ossetia? and? the? formerly?
Georgian?controlled? region?of?Akhalgori? fortified? the?new?de?facto? status?
(Barry?2009).?The?same?month,?the?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia?closed?down?
as? Russia? vetoed? the? semi?annual? prolongation? the? mandate? had? been?
living?on?since?1993.?The?UN?Mission?to?Abkhazia?was?also?vetoed?by?Russia?
and? ended? in? June? 2009.? In? October? 2009,? as? a? follow?up? international?
monitoring? tool? to? the? OSCE? Mission,? the? European? Union? Monitoring?
Mission? (EUMM)? was? implemented? (Parmentier? 2009,? Simons? 2012).?
However,?the?EUMM?mandate?is?limited?to?monitoring?Georgian?controlled?
territory,?whereas?the?former?OSCE?mission?had?had?access?to?parts?of?the?
South?Ossetian? and?Abkhazian? regions,? and? the? EUMM?does?not? carry? a?
                                                          
41?Accounts?of?the?war?extensively?diverge?with?respect?to?numbers?of?casualties?and?the?
three?sequences?of?events,?particularly?contested?on?the?point?whether?Georgian?troops?




local? negotiation?mechanism? as? the? JCC.? After? the? 2008?war,? control? of?





conflict? intensified?enormously?due? to?Russia’s?opposition? to? the?Kosovo?
recognition?and?consolidation?of?the?Sanakoev?administration.?Both? in?the?
Kosovo? precedence? and? later? at? the? NATO? summit? in? Bucharest,? the?
contentious?politics?between?Russia?and?Western?actors?appeared?and?had?




As? the? background? account? has? attempted? to? show,? assertive? agency?
frames? the? intensifying? situation? before? each? escalation.? However,? the?
sum,?intensity,?or?sheer?number?of?these?actions?does?not?explain?why?the?
conflict?escalated?at?the?points? in?time?observed.?Therefore,?the?empirical?
analysis? explores? sequences? that? circumscribe? a? chain? or? closed? unit? of?
events?prior?to?escalations.?For? this?purpose,?the?analysis? identified?three?
points? of? escalation? in? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008? prior? to? which? a? specific?
sequence?of?events?takes?effect.?The?analysis? is?aimed?to? identify?specific?
policies?of?Western?actors? that? repeatedly?occur?prior? to?escalations?and?
can?be?plausibly? linked?to?triggering?change? in? local?behavior.?This?section?
will?start?by?introducing?the?interview?method?and?analysis?of?the?interview?





Apart? from? the?analysis?of? the?OSCE? reports,?a? second?body?of?data?was?
generated?through?conducting? interviews? in?2009?and?2010? in?Tbilisi,?Gori?
97?
?
and? in? villages? along? the? Administrative? Boundary? Line? (ABL)? in? the?
Georgian?Ossetian? conflict? area.? In? total,? 76? qualitative? interviews?were?
conducted,?of?which?39?were?used?for?the?study?(see?annex?4).?The?purpose?





context? of? the? conflict? prior? to? at? least? one? of? the? escalations.? The?
interviews?were?conducted?with:??
? residents?of?the?area?along?the?internal?border?with?South?Ossetia?








? current? and? former? members? of? all? three? governments? since?
independence? about? governmental? policies,? including?
representatives?of?the?Ministry?of?Internal?Affairs,??
? current? and? former?members? of? the?Ministry? of? Foreign? Affairs?
who?had?been?representatives?to?the?JCC,??
? members?of?parliamentary?commissions,??
? representatives? of? the?Ministry? for? Refugees? on? the? conflict? and?
Western?relations,??
? current? and? former? representatives? of? the? local? district?





? local?and? international?non?governmental?actors? such?as?analysts?




? members? of? international? state? organizations? such? as? the?OSCE,?
the? EUMM? (the? EU? Monitoring? Mission? which? is? the? OSCE?
successor?organization?in?the?conflict)?and?the?UN,?




Based? on? the? prior? experience? of? research? for? the?Master’s? thesis,? the?
respondents?were?expected?to?give?more?information? if?the?conversations?
were?not? taped?and?held?with?prior?agreement? to?being? ‘off? the? record’,?
the? agreement? to?use? the?materials?without?quotations? and?under? strict?
anonymity.?Therefore,? this? study? refrained? from? recording? the? interviews?




At? the? start? of? the? interview,? the? main? research? interest? was? briefly?
introduced?after?which? the? respondents?were?asked? to?generally? recount?
the?events?that?in?their?opinion?led?to?the?respective?points?of?escalation?in?
2002,? 2004? or? 2008.? The? rest? of? the? interviews? alternately? drew? on?
deepening?issues?the?respondents?brought?up?themselves,?by?pointing?the?







For? example,? if? asked? what? are? considered? the?most? important? factors?
related? to?escalation,? the?vast?majority?of? respondents?–? international?or?
local?–?stated?the?contention?of?US?and?Russia?over? influence? in?the?post?
Soviet? space,?with? some? pointing? to? either? Putin’s? or? Saakashvili’s? (from?
2004)? aggressive? politics.? However,? if? asked? to? depict? the?major? events?
prior?to?escalation,?interview?partners?would?account?almost?exclusively?for?
local? events.? This? substantially? supports? the? key? feature? of? the? causal?
argument:?whereas?Western?activity?in?the?conflict?skyrocketed?from?2004?
and? exerted? considerable? influence? on? Georgian? actors’? power? choices,?
Western? agency? showed? little? presence?or? activity? at? the? local? level? and?
therefore?was?hardly?visible?to?take?effect.?Therefore,?the?study?reiterates?
once?again,?the?following?analysis?focuses?on?the?triggering?role?of?Western?




a? discussion? of? this? methodology? see? chapter? 2).? As? each? interview?
accounts? for? an? individual? narrative,? the? interviews? do? not? necessarily?
narrate? a? detailed,? stepwise? or? chronological? sequence? of? events,? but?
highlight? specific? events? as? crucial? and? present? a? reasoning? why? these?
events? led? to?escalation.?Specific?key?elements?of?narratives? recur?across?
interviews?and?hence?enable?the?analysis?to?identify?a?plausible?and?unified?
reading? of? the? policies? which? trigger? the? same? cycle? of? escalation.?
Therefore,?these?narratives?enable?the?below?empirical?account?to?reflect?
this?process? in? light?of? the? influence?of? specific?Western?policies?on? local?
behavior.? In? this? respect,? respondents? provided? similar? assessments? of?
those?events?that?through?the?analysis?of?the?material?occurred?to?be?key?
causal?events?prior?to?change?in?local?behavior,?based?on?accounts?by?local?
and? international? respondents? across? political? boundaries? alike.? This?
means,? respondents?did?not?only?account? for? the? same?events,?but? they?
also?gave?a?similar?reasoning?of?their?impact.?This?is?an?important?outcome?




quality? of? those? events? that? the? analysis? later? identified? as? the? initial?
conditions?and?points?in?change?of?local?behavior?of?the?escalation?cycles.?
?
The? analysis? of? the? OSCE? material? had? identified? intensifying? and?
decreasing? intensity?around?points?of?escalation?of? violence.? In?a? further?
step,?the?interviews?identified?narratives?of?causal?chains?of?events.?In?this?








































Table?2:?Sequences? leading?to?assertive?policies:? Initial?condition,? juncture?and?
event?with?interview?sources?(I?n).?
?
On? this?basis,? the?empirical?analysis?explores? these? three? sequences? that?
circumscribe? specific? trajectories? prior? to? the? 2002,? 2004? and? 2008?




events?when?Western? policies? significantly? and? gradually? influence? local?
power?policies?on?the?local,?national?and?international?level?of?the?conflict?




certain?delay? after? the? change? in?behavior?brings? about? an? escalation?of?
violence.?
?
Here,? the? study? presents? the? trajectory? of? the? sequences? of? escalation?
cycles? in?brief?and?then? in?depth? in?the?below?analysis.?The?first?sequence?
took? its? start?with? the? failure?of? the?OSCE?facilitated?Baden?process? that?
was? to? conclude? in? the? reintegration? agreement? between? South?Ossetia?
and?Georgia?in?2000.?The?prospects?seemed?promising?until?Georgia?denied?
Russia? support? for? the? war? in? Chechnya.? As? a? result,?Moscow? initiated?
South?Ossetia? to?pull?out?of? the?deal?and? the?agreement?was?not?signed.?
The?core?element?of?the?Baden?process?had?been?the?introduction?of?a?tax?
system? for? shipments? from? Russia? through? South? Ossetia? to? Georgia? in?
order?to?diminish?smuggling?activities.?After?Baden?failed,?the?OSCE?and?EU?
continued? to?negotiate?an?agreement? if?not?on? reintegration? then?at? the?
very? least?on? custom? controls.?This?deal?was?not?popular,?neither?within?
the? South? Ossetian? nor? the? Georgian? side? as? it? would? have? cut? illicit?
revenues.? Negotiations,? however,? proceeded? until? 2002,? when? then?
Minister?of?Justice?and?later?president?Mikheil?Saakashvili?spearheaded?the?
anti?corruption?campaign?of?the?Shevardnadze?government,?and?as?a?part?
of? this? conducted? large?scale? anti?crime? operations? in? the? Georgian?
Ossetian?conflict?zone.?Subsequently,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?forces?started?
to?struggle?over?on?the?ground?control?on?an?intense?level.?
The? second? sequence? set? off? with? the? regime? change? in? Georgia? from?
President? Shevardnadze? to? Saakashvili? after? the? Rose? Revolution? of?
November?2003.?The?new?ruling?elite?under?reformer?Saakashvili?came?into?
power?on?a?wave?of?massive?Western?support? from? the?U.S.?and?Europe.?
Western? demands? settled? on? implementing? rule? of? law? by? establishing?
central?rule?through?territorial?integration?and?a?crackdown?on?corruption.?
Both?these?goals?ranked?at?the?top?of?Saakashvili’s?inauguration?agenda.?In?
May?2004,?three?months? into?Saakashvili’s? term,?Georgian? interior?troops?




extent,? the? conflict? however? escalated? with? permanent? skirmishes?
between? the? Ossetian?militia? and? the? Georgian? police.?When? Georgian?
Minister? of? Internal? Affairs? Okruashvili? shelled? Tskhinvali? in? a? brief? and?
unanticipated?operation,?the?conflict?permanently?reached?a?higher?level?of?
violence?than?since?the?first?war?ended?in?1992.??
The? third? sequence? started? in? the? wake? of? intensifying? relations? with?
Western?actors?while?the?Saakashvili?regime?slowly?settled?into?power.?The?
Georgian? government? launched? foreign? policy? efforts? promoting? peace?
road? maps? for? settlement? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict,? successfully?
gathering?support? in? the? international?arena? through? frameworks?such?as?
NATO,? EU,? OSCE? and? UN.? Additionally,? in? the? course? of? 2005?Western?
engagement? intensified? in? the? conflict? zone,? through? implementing? joint?
Georgian?Ossetian? economic? rehabilitation? projects.? However,? the?
Georgian? government? deemed?Western? support? in? territorial? integration?
issues? to?be? too?hesitant.? In? the?end?of?2005,?Tbilisi?hardened? its? stance?
and?installed?the?alternative?Sanakoev?administration?with?authority?in?the?
Georgian?controlled? areas? in? the? conflict? zone,? outraging? Ossetian? JCC?
representatives? and? shifting? the? situation? toward?assertive?policies.?Until?
the? 2008? war,? international? activity? in? all? arenas? thrived? whereas? the?
situation? in? the?conflict?area?deteriorated.?The?recognition?of?Kosovo?and?
Russia’s? commencement?of? legal? relations?with? the? secessionist? Sokhumi?





The? previous? section? has? given? a? background? discussion? of? episodes? of?
political?events? and? violence? framing?on? the?basis?of? the? three?points?of?
escalation?in?2002,?2004?and?2008.?It?should?be?reiterated?that?the?purpose?
of? the? subsequent? account? is? not? to? explain? actions? or? motivations? of?
actors,?but? to?plausibly? frame?why? agency? came? to?exhibit? the?observed?
effects.?Therefore,? the? study?proceeds?with? the?empirical?analysis?of? the?
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interview?material? by? presenting? the? study? with? a? narrative? analysis? of?
sequences?of?the?Western?and?local?policies?in?the?conflict.??
It?should?also?be?reiterated?that?the?interviews?point?out?contingent?events?
as?well?as? their?causal? significance,?but? the? interpretation? follows?on? the?
basis?of?the?previously?discussed?argument?and?related?working?hypothesis?
of? the? study.? Therefore,? in? contrast? to? the? background? account? that?
elaborated? on? the? local? context? of? events,? the? analysis? of? sequences?
emphasizes?Western? effects? on? those? events.? As? discussed? above,? the?
account?will?depict?the?interaction?of?Western?and?local?leadership?policies?
at?specific?points? in? time?and?points?out?which?Western?policies?at?which?




(see? annex? 4).? Each? sequence? is? based? on? interviews? and? the?materials?
from?the?OSCE?archive? (see?annexes?1?and?3).?The?secondary? literature? is?
selectively? quoted? and? draws? on? the? sources? used? in? the? background?
chapter.? It? serves? to? frame? the? account? of? the? interviews.? The? table? of?




Initial?condition:?Failure?of?the?Baden?process? ?Change? in? local?behavior:?
Shevardnadze's? anti?corruption? agenda? ?? Escalation:? anti?crime?
operations?
Summary.?The?first?sequence?began?with?the?failure?of?the?OSCE?facilitated?
Baden? process? that? was? to? conclude? in? the? reintegration? agreement?
between?South?Ossetia?and?Georgia?in?2000?through?introducing?extensive?
measures? to? curb? smuggling.? After? Baden? failed,? the? OSCE? and? EU?
continued? to? negotiate? an? agreement? on? custom? controls.? Negotiations?
proceeded? until,? in? 2002,? then?Minister? of? Justice? and? later? president?
Mikheil? Saakashvili? spearheaded? the? anti?corruption? campaign? of? the?
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Shevardnadze? government,? and? as? a? part? of? this? operation? conducted?
large?scale? anti?crime? operations? in? the?Georgian?Ossetian? conflict? zone.?








the?Western? agenda,? to? promote? democracy? by? establishing? rule? of? law?
and?assisting? in?solving?territorial?conflicts?in?Georgia?(Jawad?2008,?Koenig?
2005).? While? expectations? ran? high? from? the? very? beginning? of? their?
cooperation? and? rhetoric? from? the? Western? and? the? Georgian? sides?
adopted?a?grand?style,? the?OSCE?adopted?a?subdued?manner?and?did?not?
externalize? funds?but?worked?merely?as?a?political? tool?of? facilitation?and?
observation.? On? the? whole,? OSCE’s? ‘soft’? entry? to? Georgia’s? political?
context?at? the?beginning?of?Western? integration? tried? to?ease?post?Soviet?




The?most?ambitious?project? in? this?plan?was?paving? the?way? to?Georgia’s?
territorial? integrity.?Functional? state? structures,? it?was?agreed,? required?a?
predictable? security? setting? for? livelihood? and? prosperity,? and?would? be?
provided? if?Georgia? came? to? guard? its? internationally? recognized?borders?
with?Russia,?in?both?Abkhazia?and?South?Ossetia.?Functional?statehood,?the?
OSCE? agenda?held,?was? to?be?maintained? through? acquiring? revenues? at?
the?hands?of?the?state?to?sustain?a?functional?economy?(Socor?2005).?In?the?
                                                          
42?The?UN?was?active? in? safe?guarding? the?post?conflict? setup? in?Abkhazia,?whereas? the?
OSCE?was?mandated? in? South? Ossetia,? however,? both? operations?were? under? Russian?
command.?Interviews?on?the?activities?of?European?international?organizations?at?the?start?




case? of? Georgia? this? was? a? far?away? reality? at? the? start? of? the? 2000s:?
Smuggling? through?Abkhazia,?but?mainly? through?South?Ossetia?occupied?
up? to?70?per?cent?of? incoming?goods? to?Georgia? that?were?cheaper? than?
locally?produced?ones?and?that?evaded?taxation?(Kukhianidze?2006).??
As?a? result,?Western?partners? in? the?OSCE? framework? recognized?settling?
illicit?trade?in?South?Ossetia?as?the?most?sensitive?and?urgent?issue?in?terms?
of? building? the? Georgian? state.? Therefore,? the? OSCE? attempted? to?
encompass?the?volatile?aspects?of?the?post?war?situation?in?South?Ossetia,?
including? status,? violence,? illicit? trade? and? territorial? issues? as? a? former?
member?of?the?Shevardnadze?government?recalled? in?the? interview?(I?29).?
OSCE? engagement,? thus,? was? an? integral? part? of? Georgia’s? post?Soviet?
politics?since?the?CSCE?had?taken?over? facilitation?of?political?negotiations?










over? smuggling? revenues? and? financial? perks? for? Chibirov? from? Tbilisi?
resulted? in? the?mutual?Georgian?Ossetian? interest?of? low? intensity?of? the?
conflict? throughout? the? 1990s:? The? internal? border? was? kept? open? and?
formal? or? informal? organizational? issues? came? to? be? settled? between?
Georgians?and?Ossetian?either?directly?or?within? the? JCC? framework? (also?










created? a? juncture? in? Western? efforts? in? implementing? territorial?
reintegration? of? South? Ossetia? and? setting? off? a? series? of? events? that?
intensified?the?conflict?until?2002.?The?process?of?the?Baden?talks?envisaged?
framing? the? settlement? of? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? through? gradual?
integration? into?Georgia? (I?8,? I?9,? I?14,?Koenig?2005).?At? the?center?of? the?
agenda,? the? negotiations? envisaged? strengthening? the? capacities? of? the?
central? state?by?ending? illegal? shipments? from?Russia? to?Georgia? through?
introducing?a?free?trade?zone? in?South?Ossetia?(Socor?2005).?This?practical?
approach,? that? initially? did? not? address? South? Ossetia’s? political? status,?
included? introducing? freight? controls? of? shipments? from? the? North?
Caucasus? by? Georgian? personnel? at? the? international? border? between?
Georgian?and?Russia.?This?scheme?was? to?guarantee?a?minimal?degree?of?
Georgian?involvement?in?border?control?at?the?Russian?border?and?revenue?
from? taxing? the? shipments.? However,? the? Georgian? and? Ossetian? sides?
maintained? a? cautious? attitude? toward? finalization? as? the? arrangement?
would?have?deprived? the? leaderships?of? their?smuggling? revenues.?At? the?
same? time,? particularly? the? Georgian? side? had? the? vested? interest? to?
comply? with? Western? demands? at? least? on? the? surface? and? show? the?
commitment? to? fight? smuggling? (I?8,? I?9,? I? 14,?George?2009,?Kukhianidze?
2006).?Therefore,?negotiations?dragged?on.?However,?the?OSCE?pushed?for?
implementation,? and? prepared? for? signing? the? result? of? three? years? of?
negotiations?at?the?big?meeting?in?Baden,?South?Germany?in?July?2000,?with?
Russian,?Georgian,?South?Ossetian,?and?North?Ossetian?representatives.??
However,?Russia’s? second?war? in?Chechnya? in?1999?provided? the?context?
for? Moscow? to? put? an? end? to? the? Baden? process? and? reinforce? the?
strengthening? Georgian?Ossetian? relations.? When? Putin? became? acting?
president? in?December?1999,?he?offered?but?one?chance?to?Shevardnadze?
by?demanding? from?him?to?support?Russia´s?second?war? in?Chechnya?and?
grant?overflight?and?deployment? rights? to?Russian? forces?south?of?Pankisi?
valley? on? Georgian? territory? (Kuzio? 1995,? Proladze? 2001,? Sikharulidze?
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2001).?Only?one?month?before?Putin´s? rise? to?power? in?November?1999,?
Shevardnadze? reiterated? his? commitment? to?Western? structures? at? the?
1999?OSCE?summit? in? Istanbul?(OSCE?AR?20/99,?Van?Santen?2000).?Just?as?
Gamsakhurdia? before? him,? Shevardnadze? refused? to? support? Putin,?with?




the? Georgian? governments? indicated? in? interviews? (I? 8,? I? 29).? Thus,?
Shevardnadze?refused?and?ultimately?disgruntled?Putin.?In?a?direct?reaction?
to?Georgia’s?refusal?to?cooperate?with?Russia?on?the?Chechnya?war,?Russian?
representatives? pulled? out? from? the? Baden? deal? and? urged? their? South?




As? a? result,? the?Western? side? cancelled? the? format.?However,? the?OSCE?
stuck?to?its?approach?of?focusing?on?the?issue?of?freight?control?in?order?to?
curb? smuggling? and? strengthen? central? state? authority.? However,? the?
following? steps? revealed? a? change? in? strategy? as? they? detached? from?
political? issues? such? as? the? status? of? South?Ossetia? even?more? than? the?
Baden? approach? had? envisaged.? Keeping? close?with? practical?more? than?





EU? representatives? giving? credibility? to? the? talks.?Particularly? the?Castelo?
Branco? meeting? celebrated? the? results? on? establishing? joint? Georgian?
Ossetian?customs’?post.?
Meanwhile,?Moscow? followed?up?on? its?blow?to?the?negotiations.?Though?
Russia? had? veto? power? in? the? JCC,? the? Castelo? Branco? and? Bucharest?
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meetings? envisaged? the? joint?Georgian?Ossetian? freight? controls?without?
participation? of?Russia?on? the? territory? of? the? South?Ossetia? region.? The?
implementation? of? this? border? regime? would? have? greatly? diminished?
Russian? influence? on? Georgian? territory.? To? keep? control,? at? the? end? of?
2001,?Moscow?sacked?the?moderate?Chibirov?and?replaced?him?with?hard?
line? leader? Eduard? Kokoity? as? the? de?facto? president? of? South? Ossetia,?
among? others? a? former? senior? member? of? the? Kokoity? administration?
accounts?in?the?interview?(I?8,?I?9,?I?28,?I?29).?
?
Therefore,? in? the? aftermath? of? the? Baden? process? until? 2002,?Western?
policies?aimed?at?building?a?functional?state?in?Georgia?were,?on?a?political?
level,? almost? exclusively? directed? to? recovering? relationships? among? the?
conflicting?parties?and?restoring?border?authority?of?the?Georgian?state.?
In?this?respect,?the?Western?agenda?put?strengthening?the?central?state?in?
Georgia? through? fighting?crime?on? top?of? its?agenda,?over?multiple?other?
measures? of? external? state? building? such? as? enhancing?military? capacity,?
launching? large?scale? investment,? or? integrating? the? state? into? existing?
treaties.?A? local? journalist?suggests? in?the? interview?that?before?2002,?the?
brunt?of?Western?engagement?in?state?building?through?territorial?integrity?
took? place? at? the? local? level? in? the? conflict? zone? (I? 2).?Western? actors?
continued? to? address? stakeholders? in? the? capital,? but? the? very? active,?
intense? part? of?Western? engagement? concentrated? on? bringing? together?
the? conflict? parties,? mostly? in? Tskhinvali? or? Gori,? but? also? in? Tbilisi? or?
Moscow.?Therefore,?the?OSCE?was?locally?involved?in?setting?up?talks,?joint?
projects? such?as? joint?checkpoints?of? the?Russian,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?













such? as? the? IMF,? World? Bank? and? NATO? started? to? show? presence? in?
Georgia.?This? trend?was? genuinely? supported?by? the?Georgian? state?elite?
whose?efforts? to? integrate? into?Western? structures?were?unbridled.?With?







frequently?and?more? stridently?addressed? the?main? state?actors,?uttering?
expectations,?demands?and?conditionalities?more?fiercely?than?in?the?prior?
decade.?Even?before?cooperation?in?defined?frameworks?took?its?start,?this?
stance? had? an? altering? effect? on? central? state? politics.? Envisaging? a?
Western?style? government? in? Georgia,? the? West? took? to? vehemently?
criticizing? corruption? levels? in?Georgia? from? 2000? as? several? then? active?
members?of?advocacy?and? international?organizations? recall? (I?1?7,? I?14,? I?
11).? This? stance? was? accompanied? by? large? amounts? of? funding? for?
Georgian? civil? society? organizations? engaging? in? democratization? and?
opposing? the? Shevardnadze? regime? for? embezzling? the? state?budget? and?
upholding?a?system?of?corruption?that?resulted? in?broad?injustice?(I?14).?In?
2002,? IMF?and?Western?governments?mounted?harsh?criticism?of?the? lack?
of? rule? of? law,? particularly? in? regards? to? corruption? and? crime? levels.?
Georgian? civil? society? groups? at? the? same? time? raised? pressure? on? the?
Georgian?government.?As?a?result,?the?IMF?stalled?loans?to?Georgia?in?2001?




In? order? to? secure?Western? support,? Shevardnadze? announced? a? large?
scale?anti?corruption?campaign?in?2002?(I?7,?I?1?7).?The?campaign?aimed?at?
internally?re?organizing?smuggling?with?even?better?revenues?for?the?state?
elite,?mainly? through?dividing? control? of? smuggling?of? gas? and? cigarettes?
between? the? Ministry? of? Internal? Affairs? and? the? Ministry? of? Justice.?
However,? toward?Western? partners? the? campaign? aimed? at? staging? an?




The? tide? in? the? conflict? turned? toward? escalation?when? then?Minister?of?
Justice? and? later? president?Mikheil? Saakshvili? implemented? a? large?scale?
anti?crime? campaign? in? the?area?bordering?South?Ossetia? (I?7,? I?1?7).?The?
campaign? implemented? part? of? the? anti?corruption? agenda? of? the?
Shevardnadze?regime.?In?February?2002,?the?Georgian?Ministry?of?Defense?
took?command?of?the?Georgian?PKF?battalions?who?were?under?the?peace?
agreement? subordinate? to? the? JPKF? command? and? from? mid?October,?
Georgian?forces?carried?out?a?large?scale?anti?crime?operation?in?the?region?
of? Shida? Kartli? with? subsequent? raids? (OSCE? AR? 16/02,? 17/02,? 18/02,?
21/02).?At? the? same? time? in? February?2002,? representatives?of?Georgian?
and? Ossetian? Law? Enforcement? Bodies? were? named? to? jointly? head? a?
Special? Coordination? Center? for? anti?crime? activities? in? the? conflict? zone?
(OSCE?AR?03/02).?
From?then,?Ossetian?and?Georgian?forces?engaged?in?anti?crime?operations?
struggling? over? access? and? infrastructure? across? the? area.? The? new?
Georgian?policy?overturned?the?local?situation:?A?mutual?spiral?of?assertive?
actions? on? the? Ossetian? and? Georgian? sides? kicked?off? as? actions? were?
reciprocated?by?Ossetian?militias?and?non?regular?actions?by?Peace?keeping?
Forces.?Ossetian?as?well?as?Georgian?forces?acted?under?the?same?banner?








crucial? influence? of? Western? policies,? therefore,? concentrated? in? the?
concerted? Baden? process? involving? the? Russian,? Georgian? and? Ossetian?
sides?to?curb?smuggling?in?South?Ossetia?and?likewise?introduced?a?rupture?
when? the? process? failed.? Thus,? the? state? politics? of? Tbilisi’s? elites?
underwent?an?alteration?at?the?start?of?the?2000s.?Analysts?from?local?civil?
society? organizations? suggested? in? interviews? that,? adapting? to? the? new?
Western?conditionalities,?state?policies?adopted?an?assertive?stance?and,?as?
a? result,?brought?about?an? intensification?of?violence? in?2002? (I?31,? I?32).?
Sustaining? the? argument? of? the? study,?Western? policies? did? not? cause?
escalation,? however,? dynamics? changed? at? the? very? point? in? time?when?
Western?policies?introduced?a?new?stance?to?the?situation.?
?
In? the?aftermath?of? the?Baden? failure,?the? interaction?of?Western?policies?




also?shows? in? increasing?escalative,?unilateral?activities?of? the?PKF?on? the?
one?hand,?while?on?the?other?implementing?a?joint?Coordination?Center.?
Western?partners?proved?satisfied?with?the?Georgian?government’s?efforts,?
among? them?Minister? Saakashvili’s? high?profile? initiative? in? the? conflict?
zone.? Funding? to? the?Georgian? state?was,? as? a? result,? not? stalled? at? any?
point?in?time?(I?7,?I?1?7).?However,?interviews?make?it?seem?this?happened?
when?multilateral?efforts?of?Western?policies?proved?not? to?be?successful?
and?Western? policies?went? on? to? address? responsibility? for?meeting? the?
goals?at?the?level?of?central?state?actors?in?Georgia?–?practically?setting?off?a?
unilateral?development?(I?7,?I?14).?After?the?end?of?the?Baden?process,?the?





Western? agenda?maintained? the? same? focus? of? state?strengthening? anti?
corruption? measures? (Socor? 2005,? Jawad? 2008),? but? at? the? same? time?




on?the?ground? negotiations? to? cooperation? with? central? state? actors.?
Western?Russian? relations?at? the? international? level?of? the?South?Ossetia?
conflict?were?not?developed?as?an?arena?of?agency?of? the?conflict?as?yet.?
Following? the? shift? to? the? national? level,? Western? actors? increasingly?
addressed? demands? of? anti?smuggling? and? anti?corruption? measures? to?






the? one? hand? stressed? democracy?building? policies? through? seeking?
settlement?through?extensive?negotiation?schemes?and?through?enhancing?
the? rule? of? law? by? cutting? down? on? crime? and? corruption.?On? the? other?
hand,?Western? policies? focused? on? state?strengthening? policies? through?
support?of?central? rule?by?stressing? territorial? integrity?as? interviews?with?
former?members?of? the?OSCE?Mission? to?Georgia?and? the?EU?Delegation?
suggested?(I?14,?I?20,?I?4).?
?
Altogether,? the? analysis? of? the? first? sequence? of? actions? finds? three?
characteristics?shaping?dynamics?in?this?period:?1)?Western?agency?sets?off?
and? maintains? the? cycle? of? escalation? by? first,? creating? the? salience? of?
territorial?integration?policies,?second,?cancelling?the?policy?in?reaction?with?
other? stakeholders? and? third,? reinforcing? the? cycle? by? interacting? to? a?







The? discussion,? hence,? is? set? to? further? look? into? whether? these? three?
characteristics? of? Western? policies? might? turn? out? to? be? generalizable?
mechanisms? of? the? dynamics? of? the? conflict.? The? study? seeks? to? further?
sustain? the? argument? of?Western? policies? triggering? dynamics,? although?
domestic?power?policies?or?Russian?influence?hold?a?significant?sway?in?the?
conflict.? As? for? Russia’s? impact,? it? is? crucial? for? the? dynamics? that? the?
Russian?intervention?ended?the?Baden?process,?but?did?not?determine?the?
policies?that?shaped?the?subsequent?path?to?escalation.? Instead,?Georgian?
elites? responded? to? and? complied? with? the? Western? policies? of? state?
centered? anti?smuggling? measures? that? had? laid? the? foundation? of? the?
Baden? process? and? continued? to? head? the? Western? agenda? in? the?





portfolios?within?his? cabinet? so? that? smuggling? revenues? appeared? to?be?




joint? Georgian?Ossetian? activities? in? the? JCC? framework;?with? the? result?
that? the? government? –? though? not? supported? by? the? international?
community? into?a?next? term?–? temporarily?succeeded? in?muting?Western?
criticism?and?gained?support.?
?
However,? while? Western? policies? offered? opportunities? for? power?
consolidation,?they?at?the?same?time?put?restraints?on?options?for?agency?




suggest? that?Western?policies? triggered? the?escalation? cycle?by?decisively?
curbing? local?power?consolidation?opportunities.? In? this?manner,?Western?









settled?on? implementing? rule?of? law?by?establishing? central? rule? through?
territorial?integration?and?crackdown?on?corruption.?In?May?2004,?Georgian?
troops?of? the?Ministry?of? Interior? closed?down? the?major? smuggling?hub?
Ergneti?market?on? the?border?with?South?Ossetia.?When?Georgian? troops?
shelled? Tskhinvali? in? an?overnight?operation? in?August? 2004,? the? conflict?
permanently?escalated?for?the?first?time?since?the?war?ended?in?1992.?
?
From? the?early?2000s,?Georgia’s?Western?partners? started? to?bolster? the?
Georgian?state?as?part?of?a?more?developed?agenda?and?thus?cast?relations?







sea? change? in? Georgia’s? domestic? politics? with? the? turn? from? the?
115?
?
Shevardnadze? to? the? Saakashvili?presidency? (I?1,? I?6,? I?8,? I?9,? I?13,? I?1445,?
Wheatley?2005,?Milcher?and?Slay?2005,?Barbe?and?Johansson?Nogue?2008,?
Mitchell? 2012).? Whereas? the? new? government? came? into? power? on? a?
promise? of? stability,? the? South?Ossetia? conflict? escalated?within?months?
after? the? change? in?power?presidency? (I? 1,? I? 6,? I? 8,? I? 9,? ICG?2004,? Peuch?
2004,? Fuller? 2005,?Mayorov? 2002,? Kolst? and? Blakkisrud? 2008).?Western?






Whereas? the? Shevardnadze? era? had? introduced? close? relations?with? the?
West,?the?regime?turned?out?to?be?superseded?by?the?very?consequences?
of? the? intensified? relations? it? had? initiated? in? the? first? place.? In? the?
parliamentary? elections? of? 2003,?Western? actors,? particularly? European?
states? but? also? the? US,? did? not? support? the? Shevardnadze? model? into?
another? term? (I?1,? I?6,? I?29,?Mitchell?2004,?Coppieters?and?Legvold?2005,?
Wheatley? 2005).? Instead,? Georgia’s?Western? allies? turned? to? newcomer?
and? ardent? democrat? Saakashvili? who? already? under? Shevardnadze? had?
proven?capable?of?implementing?the?Western?agenda.??
From?2000,?Western?organizations?such?as?IMF,?Transparency?International?
and? governments? to? Soros’? Open? Society? Foundation? or? the? National?
Democratic? Institute? had? harshly? criticized? the? Shevardnadze? regime? for?
lack? of? democratic? rule? and? had? supported? civil? society? organizations?
working?for?a?change?in?Georgia.?After?the?post?election?protests?had?taken?
off? in?November?2003,?Western? support?played? a? key? role? in? supporting?




organizations? and? two?members? of? former? governments? now? in? the? opposition.? All? of?
these?persons?had?been? fierce? supporters?of? the?movement? that? Saakashvili?headed? to?





Saakashvili’s? ousting? of? Shevardnadze? (I? 1,? I? 29,? Karumidze? and?Wertsch?
2005,?Mitchell?2004?and?2012).?As?Western?criticism?gathered?pace?in?the?
years? before? the? 2003? parliamentary? elections,? Western? players?




As? after? 2002,? Western? allies? had? lost? trust? in? the? Shevardnadze?
government? to?be? a? reliable?partner? in? strengthening? state? structures? in?
Georgia,?Western?actors?wished?for?a?new?elite?to?spearhead?the?country’s?
reform? process.? Funding,? loans? and? political? support? for?Georgia? soared?
after? Saakashvili? took? power? in? January? 2004.46? Western? agendas? of?
integration? into? NATO? and? European? structures? carved? out? specific?
conditionalities? linked? to? this?support,?specifically?aimed?at?strengthening?
state? structures.? These? structural? changes? included:? military? reform?
through?professional?training,?reliable?chain?of?command?and?equipment;?
economic? reform? generating? sustainable? revenues? for? the? state? through?
privatization,? regulated? import? and? export? flows,? and? raising? the? budget?





In? response? to? Western? incentives,? when? taking? power? Saakashvili?
introduced? not? only? a? new? elite,? but? also? a? new? code? of? conduct? for?
                                                          
46?In?January?2004?during?his?visit?in?Tbilisi,?Powell?reconfirmed?a?payment?of?164?m?USD?
to?Georgia?during?the?2004?fiscal?year,?and?allocating?64?m? in?training?and?equipment?of?
Georgian? troops? (Civil.ge? 26.01.2004).? In? August? 2005,? the? US? State? Department?
announced? the? allocation? of? the? ‘Millenium? Aid? Fund’? of? 130? m? USD? economic?
rehabilitation,?in?addition?to?the?regular?annual?fund?(US?State?Dep?16.08.2005).?EU?funds?
to?Georgia? started? in? 1991.? The? EU? assistance? programme? TACIS? allocated? 131?million?
Euro? to?Georgia? until? the? start?of? the? European?Neighborhood? Policy? Initiative? in? 2006?
which?includes?annual?payments?of?30?40?m?Euro.?Implementing?the?Ljubljana?document?
of?November?2005,? in? June?2006?a?donor?conference? in?Brussels?pledged?10?m?Euro? for?





political? life? in? Georgia.? These? new?ways? of? power? fed? considerably? on?
previously?existent?resources:?Fierce?anti?Russian?rhetoric?and?a?stern?pro?
Western? stance,? even? more? radical? than? under? Shevardnadze,? set? the?
agenda? of? the? new? elite? (Lazarus? 2010,? Wheatley? 2005).? The? new?
government?proved? keen? to? implement?Western? conditionalities? to? their?
full?extent.?Centralized?presidential?power?directed?the?implementation?of?
policies? in? the? capital? and? in? the? regions? and? reshuffled? personnel? and?
posts?in?a?managerial?manner?as?a?senior?member?of?an?oppositional?party?
who?had?been?close?to?Saakashvili’s?allies?at?the?start?of?his?rule?recounts?(I?
6).?The?Saakashvili?elite,? from?December?2003,?almost?built?a? state? from?
scraps.?As? state? structures?were?weak?or?non?existent,? Saakashvili? and? a?




On? these? propositions,? Saakashvili? both? floated? into? power? as? well? as?
brought?those?expectations?into?office.?However,?the?implementation?of?a?
strong,? centralized? state? was? crucially? realized? through? the? support? of?
Western?actors.?The?new?style?politics?concentrated?power?in?the?hands?of?
even? fewer?actors?as?opposed?to?Shevardnadze’s? ‘pyramid?model’? (Stefes?
2008,?Timm?2012,?also?see?Stewart?et?al.?2012,?Sigwart?2006).?This? left?a?
smaller? number? of? people? in? de?facto? decision?making? positions? and?
resulted?in?a?nominal?decrease?of?embezzlement?and?abuse?of?public?office?
which? was? noted? and? well?received? by?Western? partners.? In? the? same?
manner,? more? money? was? spent? on? state?related? issues? such? as?
infrastructure,?military? expenditures? and? institutional? capacities? such? as?
police? than? under? Shevardnadze? (Liklikadze? 2007,? Fuller? and? Giragosian?







Whereas? the? Western? agenda? prior? to? the? 2003? regime? change? had?
focused?on?state?strengthening?measures,?Western?support?of?the?regime?




corruption? and? respect? the? choice? of? the? people.? In? this? scheme,? state?




was? based? on? the? call? for? democracy,? just? as? in? the? years? prior? to? the?
revolution? the? West’s? support? aimed? at? integration? into? Western?
organizational? structures.? The? Western? agenda? was? set? not? only? to?
democratize,?but?essentially? to?gradually?adapt? to?Western? structures?by?
first?establishing?functional?and?capable?state?structures?at?the?hands?of?a?
committed?elite.?Therefore,?Western? support? first?of?all? centered?on? the?
central? tasks? of? the? state,? such? as? collecting? revenues,? guarding?




Against? this? background,? the? Western? support? of? the? regime? change?
introduced?a?shift? in? the?behavior?of? the? local?elites.?Whereas?Saakashvili?
had? already? started? anti?corruption? policies? under? Shevardnadze,? the?
strong?Western?demands?of? rule?of? law?which?had? carried?him? to?power?
reinforced? the? necessity? to? act? appropriately? and? quickly? in? order? to?
maintain? the? support?of?Western?partners.?Accordingly,?when?Saakashvili?
introduced? his? agenda? upon? taking? office? in? January? 2004,? territorial?
integration? of? the? secessionist? regions? of? Georgia? ranked? on? top? of? the?








territorial? reintegration,? just?as? the?previous? two?post?Soviet? leaderships,?
with?Western?support?reinforcing?the?claim.?
??
With? respect? to?Western? engagement? in?Georgia,? the? smuggling? hub? of?
Ergneti?market? interfered?with?efforts?to?establish?central?authority? in?the?
region? (I? 1,? I? 2,? I? 6,? I? 8,? I? 9,? I? 10,? I? 18,? I? 2947,? Kukhianidze? et? al.? 2006,?
Kukhianidze?2004,?Christophe?2005,?Wennmann?2004,?also?see?Episode?2).?
Ergneti? market? continued? to? flourish? also? after? anti?crime? campaigns?
started?in?2002.?The?Georgian?and?Ossetian?sides?had?an?interest?in?gaining?
control?over? the? flow?of?goods,?or,? respectively,? to? stage?commitment? to?
rule? of? law? to? Western? partners,? but? the? mutual? interest? of? keeping?







and? relations? between? the? ethnic? communities? on? the? ground? and?
maintained?movement? of? people? across? the? border.?On? the? other? hand,?
Ergneti?supplied?Georgia’s?economy?with?large?flows?of?untaxed?goods,?and?
thus? supported? corruption,? incentives? for? state? leaders? to? uphold? the?
                                                          
47?Many?of?the? interview?partners?mentioned?the?role?of?Ergneti?market?as?crucial? in?the?
development?of?conflict.?They?ranked?from?senior?police?officers,?regarded?as?among?the?








status?quo?and?averted? state? revenues?and? integration? into? international?
trade?(I?7,?Kukhianidze?2002?and?2004).??
Both?during?Shevardnadze’s?and?Saakashvili’s?rule,?central?actors? in?Tbilisi?
did? not? meddle? in? local? affairs,? ensuring? the? loyalty? of? the? district?
administration? in?Gori? by? providing? opportunities? for? them? to? gain? from?
smuggling,? and? in? turn? enjoying?money? transfers? and? the? assurance? of?
general? order? (Christophe? 2005,? George? 2009,? Stewart? et? al.? 2012,?
Vilanishvili?2004).? It?was?held? that?unregulated? trade?via? the?market?was?




Therefore,? the?Ergneti? scheme? came?down? to? linking? smuggling? to? lower?
levels?of?violence?in?the?conflict?area,?but?simultaneously?keeping?violence?
confined.?As?a?result,?when?the?Saakashvili?elite?took?power?and?closed?the?
market,? the? trajectory? toward? escalation? leapt? forward.? Envisaging? an?
ambitious? process? of? reform? particularly? in? integrating? South?Ossetia,? in?
May? 2004? the?new? elite?decided? to? circumvent? the?dragging? JCC? format?
and?adopt?a?swifter?strategy.?The? internal?debate?was? led?by?Okruashvili’s?





anti?corruption? reforms? (Vilanishvili? 2005,? Papava? 2006),? Tbilisi? installed?
the? so? called? Financial? Police? in? the? Gori? region? to? target? smuggling?
activities?(for?an?account?of?these?activities?see?Sigwart?2006).?Four?months?
after? Saakashvili? had? taken? office,? Georgian? troops? of? the? Ministry? of?







shift? to?assertive?policies? in? the?conflict.?The?previous?discussion?suggests?
that? the? operation? was? the? attempt? to? consolidate? power? in? satisfying?
domestic,? nationalist? claims? and? self?enrichment? prospects? by? way? of?
complying? with? very? specific?Western? demands? with? respect? to? central?






In? the? immediate? aftermath? of? the? Ergneti? closure,? the? imminent?




of? Interior? shelled? Tskhinvali? from? the? surrounding? heights.? The? Russian?
command?of?the?JPKF?threatened?to?call? in?battalions?of?the?Russian?army?
deployed?130?km?north?near?Vladikavkaz?should?Georgian?troops?advance?
any? further.? Okruashvili? ended? the? campaign,? but? the? following? day?




With? the? regime? change? from? the? Shevardnadze? to? the? Saakashvili?
government?after?November?2003,?Georgian?policies?in?reintegrating?South?
Ossetia? changed? to? a? fiercer? stance.? This? change? was? set? off? through?
Western? support? of? the? regime? change? that? linked? political? backing? of?
Saakashvili’s? power? to? the? implementation? of? large?scale? state?
strengthening?reforms.?Western?demands,?therefore,?decisively?framed?the?
change? in? local? behavior? that? showed? itself? in? the? closure? of? Ergneti?




aftermath? escalated? when? Georgian? troops? shelled? Tskhinvali? in? August?
2004.?
?
In? light?of? the?discussion? that?concluded? the?previous? first? sequence,? the?
analysis? of? the? second? sequence? finds? once?more? a? significant? reactive?
instant?of?Western?policy?with? local?dynamics? in? the?context?of? the?2003?




in? the? conflict? prior? to? the? escalation? shifts? from? the? national? to? the?
international? level.? The? Georgian? government? and? Western? partners?
already?had?taken?to?prepare?for?settlement?plans?of?the?conflict,?so?called?
peace? road?maps? that?were? to? be? presented? in? important? international?
frameworks? in? 2004? and? 2005? (in? detail? see? Sequence? 3).? The? focus? of?
Western? actors,? therefore,?was? already? shifting? from? the?national? to? the?
international?level?of?the?conflict,?with?the?West?granting?confidence?to?the?
Saakashvili?leadership?in?resolving?the?conflict?without?use?of?force?(see?the?
interview? references? above,? among? these? I? 1,? I? 8,? I? 14,? I? 24,? I? 32,? I? 33).?
Hence,? after? concentration? of? support? at? the? national? level? during? the?
protest?and?Saakashvili’s?inauguration,?the?US?and?OSCE?support?Georgian?
conflict?politics? at? the? international? level.? Therefore,? this?Western? policy?
performs?stronger?in?2004?than?in?2002?as?it?changes?from?the?national?to?
the? international? level?as?opposed?to? from?the? local?to?the?national? level,?
displaying? the? increasing? internationalization? of? Georgian? politics? with?
Saakashvili?and?showing?a?more?clear?cut?shift?in?spanning?localities.?
Third,? in? 2004? it? for? the? first? time? showed?how? the?paradox?of?Western?
policies?oscillating?between?state?and?democracy?centered?policies?created?
an? instable? context? for? local? agency? in? the? conflict.? The? link? was? also?
evident?prior?to?the?2002?escalation?through?the?fostering?of?negotiations?





Western? policy? intensifies? as? it? emphasizes? on? the? one? hand? formats?





of? Western? policies? trigger? instability? in? the? conflict:? First,? through? a?
paradoxical?focus?on?hard?and?soft?measures?at?the?same?time?and?second,?
through?a? superseding,?persistent? focus?on? strengthening? the? state?elite.?
Significantly? from?2005,? influential?Western? funding?organizations?such?as?
the? Open? Society? Foundation? cut? back? their? fundings? to? civil? society?




However,? the?discussion?pointed?out? that? the?Ergneti? raid?was?motivated?
by? the? re?structuring? of? smuggling? revenues? into? the? hands? of? certain?
members?of?the?new?elite.?Therefore,?a?possible?explanation?could?contend?
that? the? new? leadership? used? the? time?window? of? strong? support? right?
after?the?regime?change?to?as?tacitly?as?possible?re?organize?flows?of?assets?




Nonetheless,? the? re?organization?of? smuggling? for?private?gains?does?not?
sufficiently? explain? the? shift? in? local? behavior.? First,? the? closure? of? the?
Ergneti? market? would? have? fulfilled? this? purpose? without? the? ensuing?
escalation?of?violence.?The?subsequent?engagement?of?the?Georgian?state?
is? a? strong? indicator? that? the? leadership? aimed? at? restoring? territorial?











Therefore,? second,? the? preparation? of? the? Western?Georgian? jointly?
prepared? peace? road? maps? over? the? summer? of? 2004? hinted? to? the?
necessity?to?secure?Western?support? in?the?conflict?and?that?reintegration?
of? South?Ossetia,? therefore,?was? at? least? in? part? a? reaction? to?Western?
demands?(I?4,?I?14).?Western?policies?in?the?conflict,?this?suggests,?were?as?a?
strong?a? factor? for? local?policies? to?move? in? the? conflict? as? locally?based?
demands.?
Third,? in? targeting?smuggling?activities,? the? leadership’s?choice?of?policies?
specifically?complied?with?the?Western?agenda?already?enumerated? in?the?
Baden?document.?Therefore,? the? concrete? choice?of?policies,?as?opposed?
to,?for?example,?closing?the?border?or?striking?an?informal?deal,?also?might?





Altogether,? the? discussion? seems? to?maintain? that?Western? policies? not?
only?significantly?frame?the?point? in?time?when?the?conflict?escalated,?but?
also?shape? local?state?policies? that?shift? the?context? toward?escalation.? In?
this? respect,? the? three? characteristics? of?Western? policies? of? the? 2002?
escalation?performed? in?an?even?more?clearly?shaped?manner,?namely?of?
interaction,?shift?to?a?broader? locality?of?agency?at?the? international? level,?

















international? level? on? NATO? and? European? integration? as? well? as?
cooperation? with? the? new? government? on? internal? Georgian? affairs?
acquired? a? foothold.? With? regard? to? territorial? integration,? Western?
support?continued?to?be?the?focal?point?in?the?Georgian?agenda?it?had?been?
since?the?2004?regime?change.? In?addition,?Western?and?Russian?relations?
intensified? in? the? 2000s,? including? in? the? context? of? the? South? Ossetia?
conflict.? Georgia’s? NATO? process? came? to? be? one? particular? arena? of?




One?month? after? the? shelling?of? Tskhinvali,? Saakashvili?presented? a? road?
map? for? conflict? settlement? at? the? UN? General? Assembly? in? New? York,?
envisaging? confidence?building,? demilitarization? and? intensified? OSCE?
monitoring,?and? the?autonomous?status?of?South?Ossetia? in? the?Georgian?
constitution? (UNGA? 21.09.2004,? Sigwart? 2006).? The? so?called? Peace? Plan?




at? the? Parliamentary?Assembly? of? the? Council? of? Europe?with? deepened?
126?
?
aspects? of? institutional? cooperation? with? South? Ossetia? on? economic?
rehabilitation? and? restitution? (PACE? 24.01.2005).? In? July,? Saakashvili?
launched? an? international? conference? in? Batumi,? receiving? international?
support? for? the? plan,? amongst? others? from? OSCE? Chairman? Rupel.? In?
October? 2005,?Georgian? Prime?Minister? Zurab?Noghaideli? presented? the?





also? see:? Socor? 2005,).? The? Ljubljana? document? envisaged? an? ambitious?
role? of? the? EU,?US? and?OSCE? in? establishing? a? free? trade? zone? in? South?
Ossetia?and?thereby?helping?to?reintegrate?the?region?gradually.?
?
The?peace?road?maps?were?a?key? instrument? in?the?Georgian? leadership’s?
attempt? to?attract?Western? support?by?presenting?an?agenda?devoted? to?
democratic?standards?of?multilateral?cooperation?and?non?use?of? force? in?
territorial? integration.? Meanwhile,? assertive? actions? continued? on? the?
ground,?as?an?attempt?of?Georgian?forces?to?hold?their?current?positions?as?
well? as? to? keep? open? the? option? of? a? military? solution? to? territorial?
integration.? The? Western? partners? continued? to? support? the? Georgian?
strategy? unanimously,? as? reaffirmed? at? a? high?level? international?
conference?on?South?Ossetia? in?Batumi? in? July?2005? (Civil.ge?10.07.2005,?
Fuller?2005,?Sigwart?2006).? In?response?to?the?peace?plan,?the?US?Mission?
to? the? OSCE? criticized? Russia’s? destabilizing? role,? praised? Georgian?





As? part? of? the? agenda? set? in? the? Ljubljana? document,?Western? policies?
increased?measures? to? settle? the? situation? locally? at? the? same? time? as?
127?
?
launching? efforts? at? the? international? level.? Specifically,? the? document?





cooperation?and?economic?prosperity? in? the? region?of?South?Ossetia?and?
the? bordering? Georgian?controlled? territories? and? provide? for? gradual?
integration?of?the?region?into?Georgia?(I?4,?ERP?Final?Assessment?2009).?The?
plan? had? significance? as? it?made? Georgian? and? South? Ossetian? political?









The?Ljubljana?document?of?2005? finally?agreed?on? the? implementation?of?
the? ERP? facilitated? by? the? OSCE? with? funding? not? from? the? local?
stakeholders,?but?from?outside?donors?to?go?through?an?elected?board?with?
representatives? from? all? sides.? The? main? condition? of? the? ERP? was?
cooperation?between?Georgia?and?South?Ossetia?on?the?implementation?of?
these? rehabilitation? projects? in? the? framework? of? the? JCC.? In?November?
2005,?the?Needs?Assessment?Study?for?the?ERP?projects?was?conducted,?in?
May? 2006? the? Ossetian,? Georgian? and? Russian? JCC? representatives?
                                                          
49?The?following?section?is?based?on?interviews?mainly?with?former?members?of?the?OSCE?










approved? of? the? portfolio? and? one? month? later? the? European? donor?
countries?were? informed?of? the? JCC?decision? at? a? conference? in?Brussels?
(OSCE? AR? 10/06,? ERP? Final? Assessment? 2009).? In? December? 2006,? the?
program?started.?The?projects?embraced?a?wide?range?of?sectors,?including?
agriculture,? infrastructure? (such? as? hospitals? and? roads),?micro?economy?





incidents? on? the? territory? of? South? Ossetia,? shoot?outs? in? the? volatile?
border?regions,?import?blockades?for?small?trade?and?sharp?rhetoric?(OSCE?
AR?10/06,?SR?257/06,?SR?297/06).?The?Ossetian? leadership?participated? in?
the? ERP?because? they? could? siphon?off? funds,?while? they? simultaneously?
received?trainings?from?the?Russian?military?to?prepare?for?escalation?(BBC?
10.08.2012).?Disruption?of?gas,?water?and?power?supplies?along?the?lines?of?
ethnically? divided? villages? created? a? continuous? bone? of? contention? and?
displayed? the? arbitrary? attitude? of? all? sides? to? the? process,?most? of? all?
leaving? farmers?without? irrigation? as? several? co?workers? of? international?
donors?and?organizations?observed?at?the?time?(I?14,?I?3,?I?4).?
?
Simultaneously? illustrating? the? tendency? of? Georgian? policies? to? use?
assertive?measures? in? territorial? integration? and?Western? willingness? to?
comply?with? it,?Georgian? police? forces? restored? control? in? the?Georgian?
inhabited?Kodori?Valley? in?Abkhazia? in?July?2006?(I?5,?I?7,?I?9,?I?14,?I?1?13,? I?
23,? I?2950;?also?OSCE?AR?26.04.1994).?The?operation?brought?the?situation?
to?the?verge?of?war?as?Georgian? forces?moved,? in?breach?of?the?UNOMIG?
agreement,? into? Abkhaz?controlled? territory? on? the? other? side? of? the?
                                                          
50?Interview?partners?with?a?very?different?background?raised?the?events?of?the?territorial?











conditions,? the? secure? conditions,? free? from? crime,? that? allow? IDPs? to?
return?[to?Gali?region,?Abkhazia].?And?what? I'm?saying?now? is?there?was?a?






national? level.? Western? actors? relied? on? brittle? on?the?ground?
arrangements? while? hailing? steps? undertaken? by? Saakashvili? in? the?
international? framework,? for? instance? of? UNGA,? two? months? earlier.?
Instead,? Western? actors? pursued? multi?level? engagement? with? their?
attention?and?efforts?mainly?to?the?international?level?as?the?local?situation?
intensified.?Western?engagement?after?2004?in?the?first?place?continued?to?







behavior? in? the? conflict? in? the? second? half? of? 2006.? Amid? the? volatile?
situation?on?the?ground,?Georgian?policies?had?also?been?assertive?prior?to?
2006,?but?had?remained?restrained?after?the?August?shelling? in?2004.?This?
however? changed? when,? subsequently,? the? Georgian? government?
130?
?
intensified? its? initiative? to?gain?control? in? the?conflict?both? in? the?conflict?
area?as?well?as?within?the?JCC.??
?
In? October? 2006,? the? newly? established? ‘Salvation? Union? of? Ossetians’,?
organized? by? ethnic? Ossetians? living? in? Georgia,? announced? alternative?
polls?in?South?Ossetia?(I?1,?I?2,?I?3,?I?4,?I?8,?I?14,?I?2851,?OSCE?AR?19/06,?20/06,?
22/06).? On? 12? November,? in? a? parallel? move? to? the? elections? of? the?
Tskhinvali? leadership,? the?Union? held? presidential? polls? in? the?Georgian?
controlled? regions? of? South? Ossetia? (Civil.ge? 12.11.2004).? In? December,?
Dmitri? Sanakoev?was? announced? alternative? president? of? South?Ossetia,?
whereas?Kokoity?was?re?elected?in?South?Ossetia.?Dmitri?Sanakoev,?former?
South? Ossetian? defense?minister? and? a?military? commander? in? the? first?
Georgian?Ossetian? war,? had? defected? to? the? Georgian? side.? The? Tbilisi?
government? declared? its? willingness? to? formalize? the? self?declared?
alternative? government? (Civil.ge? 01.12.2006).? Sanakoev’s? administration?
was? inaugurated? in? December? 2006,? the? same? month? when? the? ERP?
projects? started.? On? May? 8,? 2007,? the? Georgian? parliament? passed? a?





South? Ossetian? side? to? the? EU? and? OSCE? representatives? of? the? JCC.?
Sanakoev? announced? the? non?violent? resolution? of? the? conflict? and? a?
peaceful? unity? of? Ossetians? and? Georgians? inside? of? Georgia? as? his? top?
priority.? The?Georgian? government? announced? to? leave? the? format? if? he?
was?not?accepted?(I?4,?I?5,?I?8,?I?9,?I?14,?I?34).?Not?only?did?Russian?and?South?
Ossetian?counterparts?boycott?the?new?administration?(Civil.ge?13.11.?and?
05.12.2006),? but? the? introduction? of? Sanakoev? into? the? JCC? format?
                                                          
51?The? alternative? elections?on? the? administration? in?Tskhinvali?was?held? to?be? a?major?
turning? point? in? the? conflict? by? several? interview? partners,? both? with? a? local? and? an?




outraged? the?Ossetian?counterparts.?Western? representatives? feared? that?
the? format?would? lose?Tbilisi? if? they?did?not?comply.?Ultimately,?Western?
partners?accepted? the? institution?of? the?Sanakoev?administration,?on? the?




point? of? the? JCC? format? being? de?facto? cancelled.? In? January? 2008,? the?
Georgian?leadership?fortified?its?assertive?stance?and?replaced?dovish?State?










swerve? a? stagnating? situation? into? one?with? a? perspective? toward? both?
Western? and? territorial? integration:? First,? in? introducing? an? alternative?
administration?in?South?Ossetia,?central?control?in?the?area?was?to?ensue?as?
a?post?factum?reality,?gradually?to?be?transferred? into?formalized?terms?as?
an? oppositional? political? analyst? observed? (I? 9).? Second,? several?
international? and? local? decision?makers? suggested? that? the? formal? JCC?
recognition? of? Georgian?backed? Sanakoev? as? the? South? Ossetian?
representative? practically? coerced?Western? partners? into? support? of? the?
leadership’s?policy?(I?4,?I?5,?I?8,?I?1452).??
?
As?much? as? the?Georgian? side?portrayed?Western? engagement? as? falling?
short? in? supporting? Georgian? interests,? Western? policies? however?





supported? the? shift? to? the? increasingly?assertive?policies?of? the?Georgian?
leadership.?At?the?same?time,?Western?actors?maintained?the?general,?all?
encompassing? conditional? policy? of? territorial? integration? and? central?
authority.?In?this?manner,?Western?demands?were?the?constant?addressees?
of? Georgian? territorial? integration? efforts.? As? a? result,?Western? policies,?
starting?from?the?support?of?the?road?maps?in?2004,?gradually?triggered?the?








base? of? the? Saakashvili? regime? and? harsh?Western? criticism? of? national?
politics.? In? this? regard,? during? 2007? the? internal? power? basis? of? the?
Saakashvili? regime? suffered? from? strong? internal? opposition? when? anti?
government?protests?by?political?groups?and?the?population?that?lasted?for?
months.? The? situation? escalated? on? 7? November? 2007,? with? Georgian?
military?police?cracking?down?on?demonstrators?(Mitchell?2009,?Areshidze?
2007,?Tatum?2009).??
The? incident? sparked? outrage? in? Georgian? society,? and? solicited? sharp?
critique? from?Western? partners? for? disproportionate? use? of? force? (HRW?
2007).?This?temporarily?strained?relations?with?Western?partners?and,?as?a?
senior? member? of? the? EU? Delegation? suggested,? put? pressure? on? the?
Georgian?government?to?restore?trust?in?its?democratic?capacities?(I?14).?
?
However,? after? 2006,? the? Western? focus? on? Georgia’s? integration? into?
Western? structures? concentrated? at? the? international? level? with? strong?






handed? over? the? strategically? important? Georgian?held? Sarabuki?
checkpoint?in?the?conflict?zone?to?Ossetian?forces?(I?9,?OSCE?AR?21/04).?
This? agreement? was? a? result? of? Russia’s? initiative? vis?a?vis? Western?
representatives?that?raised?the?Georgian?assertive?action?of?closing?Ergneti?
market? as? worrisome? evidence? of? Georgian? aggressive? tendencies.?
Therefore,?Russia?demanded?from?OSCE?and?EU?representatives?to?provide?
security? for? the?Ossetian?population?and?demanded? that? they?hand?over?
the?crucial?checkpoint?to?the?Ossetian?PKF.?The?repeated?shifts?of?Georgian?






politics? were? taken? to? the? international? level.? The? intensified? Western?
course?of?Georgia? led?to?Western? interference?with?Russian? interests,?and?
therefore? not? only? Georgia? increasingly? collided? with? Russia? on? an?
international?level,?but?also?the?EU?and?US?who?entered?the?Russian?sphere?
of? interest? over? the?Georgia? row? (I? 29,? I? 1453,? Fischer? 2009,?Nicol? 2008,?
Allison?2008,?Loewenhardt?2005,?Asmus?2010).??
In? February? 2008,? the? declaration? of? independence? of? the? Serbian?
international? protectorate,? Kosovo,? created? a? precedent? for? secessionist?
entities.?Russia?disagreed?with?EU?member? states? supportive?of?Kosovo’s?
independence.?Disgruntled?Russia? threatened?with? consequences? for? the?
situation? in?the?South?Caucasus?conflicts?(I?5,? I?14,? I?16,? I?24,? I?2954,?Aaron?
2008,?Averre?2009,?Cerone?2009,?Aaron?2008).?Russian?officials?particularly?
hinted?to?the?possibility?of?Kosovo?being?a?blueprint?for?the?South?Ossetia?
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arising? conflict?of? European? states? and? the?US?with?Russia?by?way?of? a? close?Western?
Georgian?alliance.?










That? same?month,? the? NATO? summit? in? Bucharest? was? to? decide? over?
further? steps? of? Georgia’s? accession? to? the? transatlantic? treaty.?
Expectations?prior?to?Bucharest?ran?high,?not?only?in?Georgia:?Georgia?was?
the?most?active?NATO?partner? in?Europe’s?neighborhood,?had? fulfilled?all?
requirements? superbly? and? had? received? adequate? approval? through?
assessments?and?NATO?officials?over?the?years?(I?1,?I?5,?I?6,?I?7,?I?9,?I?2955).?








Germany’s?Chancellor?Merkel?strictly?opposed? this? (I?1,? I?29,? I?656,?Asmus?
2010)?as?she?put? forward? that?Georgia?was?not?ready? to? join? the?West? in?
the?near? future?due? to?poor?performance? in?democratic? reform? (see? the?
insightful?study?of?Asmus?2010).?However,?at?the?time?of?Bucharest?summit?
Merkel? already? held? the? opinion? that?Georgia?was? not? ready? to? join? the?
West? in? the?near? future?due? to?poor?performance? in?democratic? reform?
(ibid.).? However,? the?Western? leaders? established? that? Georgian? would?
eventually?become?a?NATO?member?and?left?the?question?of?timing?open.?
Although? Germany? and? France? had? openly? opposed? MAP? prior? to? the?





56? Three? interview? partners,? two? senior? analysts? of? Georgia?bsed? think? tanks? and? an?




summit,? the? drop?out? was? nevertheless? reinforced? by? dynamics? on? the?
ground.?
?






ongoing? internal?protests? and? ensuing?Western? criticism.? The? inability? to?
reintegrate? the? territories? as? initially? promised? to? the? population?
additionally? weakened? Saakashvili’s? power? base.? The? reluctance? of?
Western? partners? provided? grounds? for? Russia? to? be? reassured? in? its?





and?within? four?months?of? the? summit? the? conflict?escalated? into?war? in?
August?2008.?
During? the? first?week? of? August,? the? situation? escalated? into?war?when?













increasingly? assertive? measures? on? the? ground? with? the? simultaneous?
promotion?of?a?peaceful?settlement?in?international?frameworks.?This?cycle?
led? to?Western? policies? triggering? change? in? local? behavior? to? assertive?
policies? in? 2006?when? the?Georgian? state? elite? introduced? the? Sanakoev?
administration?in?the?Georgian?controlled?areas?of?South?Ossetia.?After?the?
installation?of?Sanakoev,?Western?policies? reinforced? local?dynamics?with?
agency? at? the? international? level,? especially? at? the? NATO? summit? in?
Bucharest.?Withdrawal?of?Western? support? in? the?Bucharest? summit,? for?
the? Georgian? elite,? meant? loss? of? the? power?sustaining? prospect? of?
territorial? reintegration? and?helped?push? the? clash?between?Russian? and?
Georgian?military?in?the?escalation?of?the?August?2008?war.?
?
Altogether,? Western? policies? prior? to? the? 2008? escalation? confirm? the?
pattern?of?the?previous?two?escalations?in?2002?and?2004?on?an?even?more?
intense? scale.? In? reaction? to? the? Georgian? foreign? policy? agenda? of?
promoting?the?peace?road?maps?from?2004?with?strong?Western?support,?a?
wide? array? of? interviews? gave? the? impression? that? Western? policies?
interacted?with?policies?of? local?and? international?actors? to? the?extent?of?
setting?off?a?cycle?of?escalation?(for?interview?references?on?this?argument?
see?in?the?analysis?above:?I?1,?I?3,?I?4,?I?8,?I?9,?I?14,?I?17,?I?20).?Thereafter,?the?
interaction? of? Western? policies? with? Georgian,? Ossetian? and? Russian?
stakeholders? gradually? reinforced? local? dynamics? toward? assertive?
measures.??




Bucharest? instances? as? several? interviews? supported? (for? interview?
references?on?this?argument?see?in?the?analysis?above:?I?5,?I?6,?I?7,?I?9,?I?14,?I?





Similar? to? the? previous? escalations,? Western? policies? continuously?
oscillated?between?stressing?democracy??and?state?centered?policies?in?the?
period? between? 2006? and? 2008.? The? paradox? of? democracy?? vs.? state?
centered? demands? addressed? simultaneously? to? the?Georgian? leadership?
by? Western? policies? pertained? to? these? dynamics.? On? the? one? hand,?
Western?policies?promoted?the?non?violent?settlement?of?the?secessionist?
conflicts,? thereby? vigorously? supporting? Saakashvili’s?proposals? for?peace?
road?maps? and? enhancing? the? ERP? format.?On? the? other? hand,?Western?
claims?take?the?form?of?strengthening?central?state?power? in?the?hands?of?
the? government.? Here,?Western? policies,? as? before,? continued? to? voice?
demands? of? crackdown? on? crime? and? corruption? and? economic? growth,?







the? necessary? conditions? for? enabling? these? local? dynamics? at? specific?
points? in? time,? crucially? through? supporting? the? Sanakoev? administration?
and? the? Bucharest? decision.? In? this? fashion,? Western? policies? at? these?
points?in?time?created?a?vacuum?for?domestic?policy?choices?in?the?conflict?
and?put?the?domestic?power?base?in?peril.?Hence,?Western?policies?prior?to?




then? turns? to? the? discussion? of? the? empirical? findings? to? conclude? the?
empirical?analysis.?
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In? the? four?years?after? the?2008?war,? incidents?of?violence? in? the?conflict?




formally? recognized? the? two? entities? of? South? Ossetia? and? Abkhazia? as?
independent? states?and?established? close? ties?with? their?administrations.?
Also,? Russia? vetoed? the? prolongation? of? both? the?OSCE?mandate? in? the?





the? international? framework? of? the? Geneva? talks? to? enhance? security?
measures? in? the?conflict?zone? (Gower?and?Timmins?2009,?Haukkala?2008,?
Fischer?2009).??
?
When? the? EU?mediated? the? cease?fire? agreement? in? 2008? installed? the?
EUMM,?Western?actors?again?assumed?the?role?of?a?facilitator,?but?without?
fixed?guarantees?(NYT?07.11.2008,?IIEECGS?2009).?The?West?stays?involved?
on? the? ground? and? on? the? central? level,? but? international?level? activity?
concerning?Georgia?is?reduced?to?the?Geneva?talks?and?economic?issues?of?
European? integration.?Thus,? just? as?after? the?2002? and?2004?escalations,?
Western?engagement?retreated?from?the?international?to?the?national?level?
of? the? conflict.? Thus,?Western? integration? seems? to? continue,? territorial?
integration?left?aside.?Therefore,?in?an?overall?perspective?compared?to?the?
steady? increase?of?Western?engagement?on? the? international? level?of? the?









backdrop? of?Western? support? in? Georgia.? In?March? 2010,? the? Georgian?
government?reiterated?its?will?to?return?the?secessionist?entities?peacefully?
and?to?start?a?dialog?with?both?leaderships?(Office?of?the?State?Minister?for?
Reintegration? 2010).?Western? actors? continue? to? support? Georgia,? with?
Secretary?of?State?Clinton?speaking?on?July?5,?2010?of?the?“occupation”?of?
Abkhazia? and? South?Ossetia? by? Russian? troops? (U.S.? Senate? 11.12.2010)?
and? a? resolution? of? the? European? Parliament? in? November? 2011?
condemned? that? “Russia? continues? to? occupy? the? Georgian? regions? of?
Abkhazia?and? the?Tskhinvali?region/?South?Ossetia”? (European?Parliament?
resolution? 17.11.2011).? Prior? to? the?Georgian? parliamentary? elections? in?
October?2012,? the?EUMM?uttered?warnings?of? increased?militarization? in?
the?conflict?zone?(RFE/RL?2012).?
?
In? light? of? the? previous? analysis,? therefore,? the? current? situation? shows?
characteristics? of? a? new? escalation? cycle,? particularly? with? respect? to?
Western? characteristic? policies.? This? is? even? more? the? case? as? the?














first,? instances?of?policies?taking?place? in?different?arenas?regarding? levels?
of? agency? (local,? national? or? international)? and? possibly? simultaneously?
and,? second,? Western? democracy?? and? state?centered? policies.? Both?
features? have? been? analyzed? regarding? their? effect? on? local? power?
consolidation.?Therefore,?the?findings?are?summarized?as?follows:?
?
? 2002? 2004 2008
Sequence? End? of? Baden? process? ?>?
Shevardnadze’s? anti?
corruption? agenda? ?>? Anti?
crime? operations? in? conflict?
zone?
Regime? change? ?>? Ergneti?








?W? pushes? taxing? system?
between?SO?and?Geo?






?W? demands? terr? integr? and?
central?power?
?W? intensifies? EU? and? NATO?
cooperation??
?W?starts?ERP?




















state? (democracy? and? state?centered? policies,? first? mentioned? performs?
stronger),?loc?nat?int?(local,?national,?international?level).?





shift? between? levels? of? agency? of? Western? policies? from? the? local? or?
national?level?at?the?start?of?the?cycle?to?the?national?or?international?level?
at?the?end?of?the?cycle.?Second,?the?paradox?of?Western?policies?oscillating?
between?democracy?? and? state?centered?policies,?with? a? clear?priority?of?
state?centered? policies? (territorial? integration,? anti?corruption,? anti?
smuggling,?central?rule,? leadership?capacity),?but? the? tendency? to?employ?
democracy?centered? claims? and? formats? (non?use? of? force? rhetoric? and?
141?
?
conditionality,? negotiations,? confidence?building? measures,? multilateral?
cooperation)?when?attempting?to?raise?the?pressure?on?the?national? level?




Prior? to? the?2002?escalation,? the? analysis? accounts? for? the? failure?of? the?
Baden?process?as?the?starting?point?of?the?escalation?cycle?when?Western?
policies? interacted?with? local?stakeholders?at?the? local? level?by? facilitating?
this? negotiation?based? format.? Subsequently,?Western? policies? shifted? to?
the? national? level? of? governmental?politics? in?Georgia? and? to? addressing?
state?centered?demands?of?anti?smuggling?policies?of?the?Baden?format?to?
be? implemented? by? the? state? elite.? The? framework? of? the? Georgian?
government’s? larger? anti?corruption? campaign? was? identified? as? the?
reaction?of? the?Georgian? leadership? to? this?and? introduced? the?change? in?
local?behavior?that?gave?way?to?an?assertive?stance?in?the?conflict?through?
then?Minister?of?Justice?Saakashvili’s?run?of?anti?crime?operations?in?2002.??
The? analysis? identified? distinctive? Western? policies? addressed? to? the?
Georgian?state?elites? that? took?effect?after? the? failure?of? the?Baden? talks:?
Western? actors? called? significant? irregularities? in? the? 2000?parliamentary?
elections? in? Georgia;?Western? actors? pushed? the? introduction? of? freight?
controls?and?a?taxing?system?between?Georgia?and?South?Ossetia?through?
the?Georgian? side?within? the?OSCE;?Western? institutions?demanded?anti?
corruption?reforms?and?threatened?with?cancellation?of?external?financing;?















of? oscillating? between? democracy?? and? state?centered? claims? with? the?
effect?of?creating?the?pressure?for?Georgian?state?elites?to?comply.?
?
Prior? to? the? 2004? escalation,? the? analysis? identified? the? 2003? regime?
change? to? the? Saakashvili? leadership? as? the?point?when?Western? agency?
interacted? with? Georgian? actors? at? the? national? level? to? the? extent? of?
providing? support? in? the? framework? of? democracy?centered? demands? of?
anti?corruption?policies?at?the?national? level.?Subsequently,?the?closure?of?
Ergneti? market? posed? as? the? point? from? which? local? behavior? of? the?
Georgian?state?elite?changed?with?the?result?of?the?shelling?of?Tskhinvali?in?
August? 2004.? The? empirical? account? identified? the? following? specific?
Western?policies? triggering? this? change? in? local?behavior:?Western?actors?
unanimously? supported? Saakashvili? into? power? on? democracy?based?
demands;?Western? actors? supported? Saakashvili’s? democratic? agenda? of?





Western? policies? 1)? shifted? the? field? of? action? from? the? national? to? the?
international? level? of? the? conflict,? pursuing? territorial? integration? in?
international? frameworks.? 2)? Western? policies? exhibited? a? mix? of?
democracy? and? state?building? policies? focused? on? the? national? level,?
particularly? stressing? enhancing? the? state? capacity? of? the? leadership? in?
order? to? fulfil?democratic? standards?of?eliminating?corruption.?Therefore,?
the? stress? of? democracy?related? issues? during? the? regime? change? period?




stronger? than? in?2002,?as?Western?policies? shift? from? the?national? to? the?
international? level? and? as? the? ‘democracy? versus? state’? paradox? is?more?




the? South? Ossetia? peace? road? map? at? the? international? level? and? the?
implementation? of? the? ERP? at? the? local? level? as? the? democracy?based?
formats? targeting? state?centered? aims.? Subsequently,? the? analysis?
identified?the?start?of?the?Sanakoev?administration?as?the?point?from?which?
local?behavior?of? the?Georgian? state?elite?changed?with? the? result?of? the?
August? 2008?war.? The? analysis? identified? the? following?Western? policies?
taking?effect?on?local?behavior:?Western?actors?supported?Georgian?conflict?
settlement? proposals? und? the? general? reform? agenda;?Western? initiative?
started?the?Economic?Rehabilitation?Programme? in?the?Georgian?Ossetian?
conflict? zone;? Western? actors? supported? the? Sanakoev? administration;?
Western? actors? increased? conditionalities? for? integrating? into? Western?








Hence,? the? two? characteristics?again?performed?more? strongly? compared?
to? the? previous? escalation,? with? a? more? intense? reinforcing? effect? of?
Western?policies?on? local?behavior?prior? to? the?escalation,? the? shift? from?









the? conflict? dynamics? that? lead? to? violence? by? triggering? change? in? local?
behavior?to?assertive?policies?at?specific?points?in?the?process.??
Therefore,? the?conclusion?of? the?empirical?analysis?proposes?a?causal? link?
between?these?properties?of?Western?policies?and?change?in?local?behavior?
with? the? result? of? repeated? escalation.? The? discussion? on? this? basis?
proposes?case?specific?generalizations? in? form?of?mechanisms?of?Western?
policies?in?the?context?of?re?escalation?in?South?Ossetia.?In?this?regard,?the?
study? takes? the? step? to?move? from? specific? empirical? statements? (“The?










to?shift? in? favor?of?escalation,?because?a)? local?state?elites?profit? from/?
are?impeded?by?inconsistent?demands?of?policies?to?be?implemented?at?
the? local? and?national? level,?b)? the? interest?based? agenda?of?Western?
actors? generates? inconsistent? support? for? either? stakeholder? in? the?
conflict? including? the? respective? Georgian? government,? c)? when? a?





3) If? Western? policies? favor? state?building? strategies? over? democracy?
building?strategies,?but?use?of?democracy?centered?claims?to?push?their?




non?violence? demands? that? makes? assertive? local? decision?making? a?
viable?option.?
The? previous? discussion? suggests? general? causal? links? that? enable? re?
escalation?of?violence?in?South?Ossetia.?Based?on?these?statements?on?the?
role? of? agency,? the? discussion? seeks? to? present? an? inherently? coherent,?
plausible?model?of?re?escalation?on?the?basis?of?the?South?Ossetia?case.?The?
key? characteristic?of? recurring? escalation? is? the? inconsistency?of? external?















The? model? describes? how? policies? of? Western? actors? translate? into?
mechanisms?of?Western?influence?that,?according?to?the?study,?repeatedly?
trigger? change? of? behavior? of? Georgian? local? state? elites? prior? to?
escalations.? In?this?respect,?the?model?specifies?the? link?between?Western?
agency? and? local? state? policies? through? three? mechanisms,? Interaction,?
Level?shift?and?Object?shift.?The?mechanisms?take?effect?in?a?stepwise?and?
path?dependent?manner?from?the?start?to?the?end?of?an?escalation?cycle.?In?
addition? to? triggering?change? in? local?behavior,? the?mechanisms?exhibit?a?
reinforcing?effect?on?local?behavior?over?time?prior?to?escalation.58??
                                                          
58?It?should?be?noted?that?the?properties?of?mechanisms?at?the?end?of?the?escalation?cycle?





These? mechanisms? describe? a? recurring? process? prior? to? escalations?
enabling? the?pivotal?angle?between? local?agency?and?violent?outcome:?1)?
The? Interaction? mechanism? embraces? reactive? Western? policies?
progressing?to?reinforcing?policies?during?the?cycle.?The?mechanism?shows?
how?external?policies?induce?a?shift?in?the?context?of?the?conflict?that?starts?
an?escalation? cycle.?Agency? that? starts? the?escalation? cycle? is?of? reactive?




of?creating?another? shift.?Rather,?events? following? the? initial?condition?at?
the? start?of? the?cycle?are?of? reinforcing? character? intensifying? the?course?
toward? escalation,? 2)? the? Level? shift? mechanism? embraces? a? shift? of?
Western? policies? from? the? national? to? the? international? level? during? the?
cycle.? The? mechanism? shows? how? external? policies? at? the? start? of? the?
escalation?cycle?take?strong?effect?at?the?national?level?of?policies?and?shift?
to?the?international?level?of?the?conflict?at?the?end?of?the?escalation?cycle,?
often? after? the? change? in? local? behavior? took? place.? However,? external?
policies? engage? permanently? at? all? levels? of? the? conflict,? but? with? a?
regularity?of? these?varying? intensities,?and?3)? the?Claim? shift?mechanism?
does? not? proceed? in? a? linear? way? and? exhibits? democracy?? and? state?
centered? policies? simultaneously,? however,? with? a? tendency? toward?
democracy?centered? policies? when? exhibiting? increasingly? reinforcing?
effects.?The?mechanism?shows?how?external?policies?generally?emphasize?a?
state?centered? agenda? at? the? start? of? an? escalation? cycle? and? induce?
democracy?centered? policies? to? push? claims? at? certain? points? in? the?
process.? Hence,? both? agendas? are? put? forth? simultaneously,? but? with?
varying?intensity?at?the?start?and?end?of?the?escalation?cycle.?Therefore,?the?
analysis? suggests? a? paradox? of? agency.? However,?what? seems? to? be? an?





paradox? pressures? local? actors? and? creates? instability,? the? policies? are?
carried?out?with? the? intention?of? stabilization.?Therefore,? the?paradox?of?
Western?policies?shows?that?practice?they?prohibit?assertive?action?on?the?
one?hand,?while?on? the?other?hand?demanding?a?quick?settlement?of? the?






exhibit? significant? variation? throughout? the? period.? Western? agency?
repeatedly?shows?the?same?inconsistencies,?whereas?local?actors?pursue?a?
unilateral? agenda? and? utilize? the?makeshift? paradox.? This? suggests? that?
whereas? structural? conditions? throughout? the? period? of? analysis? change?
(such?as?the?locality?of?agency,?the?shift?to?a?state?centered?character,?and?





increasingly? intensifying?manner.? They? stabilize? the? logic?of? sudden? local?
shifts? and?marginalize? potentially? consistency?generating? factors.? Part? of?
this? is? that?Western?actors?do?not?and? cannot?alter? stakeholders’?claims:?
The?general?escalative?tendency?of?the?conflict?is?given?at?any?point?in?time?
after? the? situation? turned? violent? in? 1989? through? persistently? assertive?
policies?of?Russian,?Georgian?and?Ossetian?actors.?The?worsening?reality?of?
external? influence? of?Western? agency? for? the? case? of? the? South?Ossetia?
conflict? lies? in?providing? the? incentive? for? the? situation? to? shift.? In?other?







To? conclude,? the? causal? link? established? at? the? start? of? the? study? is?
supported:?Throughout?the?period?of?analysis,?Western?policies?repeatedly?











in?both? a? theoretical? and? empirical? context.? First,? the?discussion? reflects?







The? literature? review? at? the? beginning? of? the? study? already? stated? two?
important?shortcomings?of? research? in? the?study?of?violence:?On? the?one?
hand,? existing? research? grapples? with? the? phenomena? of? violence? at? a?
theoretical?level?and?often?fails?to?define?a?cogent?explanandum?in?the?face?
of?empirical?reality.?Existing?studies?attempt?to?address?forms?of?violence,?




the? discussion? in? chapter? 2:? Beissinger? 2000,? Cederman? et? al.? 2010),? a?




identify? the? underlying? triggers? of? the? dynamics? of? violence? and? the?






at? the? functioning? of? state? agency? to? span? the? gap? between?meta? and?
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2003)?or?genocide,? terrorist?attacks?or?other? forms?of? collective?violence?
(Lemarchand?2009,?Martin?et?al.?2009,?Collier?and?Sambanis?2003).?These?





aggregated,? repetitive? forms?of?agency? leading? to?violence?are?either?not?
the?subject?of?study?or?are?treated?as?black?boxes,?as?explanatory?instances?
whose? functioning? remains?opaque? (Mayntz? 2005:? 207,? also? see:? Fearon?
2000).?Tarrow? concludes? it? to?be? "ambitious?enough"? to? seek? to? identify?
mechanisms? of? violence? at? the? onset? of? civil? war? and? continues:? "But?
identifying?the?operative?mechanisms?is?even?more?daunting?when?we?turn?








helpful? studies? (see? above? all:? Kalyvas? 2006,? Tarrow? and?McAdam? 2003,?
Levitsky? and? Way? 2010,? and? Mansfield? and? Snyder? 2007)? that? specify?
mechanisms? of? external? agency’s? effect? on? local? power? consolidation? in?
fragile? states,? the? discussion? highlights? the? possibilities? of? enhancement?




the? work? as? one? example? of? research? of? violence? (see? for? example:?
Sambanis?2004,?Levy?and?Thompson?2010).?
?
The?2001? study?of? Tilly? et? al.? is? a? rare? instance?of? rigorous? scrutiny?of? a?
variety?of?mechanisms?of?violence?using?the?methodology?of?case?study.?As?
such,? the? research? highlights? specific? mechanisms? of? social? agency? of?
political? elites? for? different? phases? of? the? escalation? process.? The? study?
grounds?mechanisms?in?the?aggregating?property?of?power?seeking?agency?
and?local?actors’?attempts?to?utilize?the?conflict?context?to?their?ends.??
Therefore,? considering? existing? studies? of? mechanisms? of? violence,? the?
study?of?Tilly?et?al.?poses? in? two?key?aspects?an?exception? to? the?general?




the? role? of? a? pivotal,? if? unintentional? determinant? link? between? actors’?
agendas? and? the? outcome? of? escalation.? In? addition,? the? study? links?
relational? factors? of? interaction? between? actors? to? the? macro? level? to?
explain? violence? and? encompass? agencies? as? environmental? factors? of?
violence.?Hence,?mechanisms?can?identify?categories?of?actions?and?specific?
sequences?of?actions?that?frame?the?path?to?escalations.?Those?studies?that?
use? the? theoretical? gains? of? Tilly? et? al.’s? research? systematically?mainly?
draw?on?the?micro?meta?connection?of?mechanisms?of?beliefs,?values?and?
identities?bringing?about?motivations?of?agency? in?the?context?of?violence?
(for? this? see:? Inglehart?and?Welzel?2005,? Lamont?and?Molnar?2002).?This?
fails? the? theoretical? challenge? to? address? the?meta?macro? level? link? that?
Tilly?et?al.’s?mechanisms?propose.?Moreover,?Tilly?et?al.?acknowledge?that?
violent?outcomes?are?closely?linked?to?leaderships’?attempts?to?consolidate?
their?power? resources.? In? this? respect,?Tilly?et?al.’s?study?can?support? the?
South? Ossetia? findings? in? that?Western? agency? performs? as? a? dynamic,?
interest?based? albeit? structural? property? that? triggers? local? behavior? in?
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?
relation? to? the? violent? outcome.? Second,? the? study? of? Tilly? et? al.?
distinguishes? itself? in?how? it?aggregates?patterns?of?violence?as?part?of?a?
given? process.? The? study? envisages? forms? of? agency? in? relation? to? their?
function? in? the? process,? e.g.?whether? they? puncture,? reinforce? or? show?
reactive? patterns? in? the? trajectory? toward? escalation.? This? favorably?
connects? to? the? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? case? as? generalizing?
mechanisms?across? cases? solidify? reliability,?but?generalizing?mechanisms?
within? the? same? case? facilitates? understanding? if? and? how?mechanisms?
change? over? time.? Lastly,?we? have? to? take? note? that? the? South? Ossetia?
study? focuses?on?mechanisms?of? external?policies? that? initiate? change?of?
local? behavior,? but? the? Tilly? et? al.? study? centers? on? local?mechanisms?of?
violence.??
?
The? study? of? Tilly,?McAdam? and? Tarrow? includes? mechanisms? that? are?
utilized?by? local?elites?during?different?phases?of?the?escalation?processes.?
Out?of? these,?particularly? the?brokerage? and? the?object? shift?mechanism?
take? effect?during? all?phases?of? escalation? and? aggregate?multiple,?more?
fine?tuned?mechanisms.?Therefore,?brokerage?and?object?shift?turn?out?to?
be?key?mechanisms? in?processes?prior? to?escalations?of?violence?and?are?
seen? as? complementing? the? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? case.? The?



























Tilly? et? al.? include? social? appropriation? among? mechanisms? during? the?




opportunity? describes? the? process? of? the? invention? or? importation? and?
subsequent?diffusion?of?a?shared?definition?of?concerning?alterations?in?the?
likely?consequences?of?possible?actions?which,?through?arbitrary?alteration?
of? claims,?performs? similarly? to? the?mechanism? of? object? shift? (92? ff.,? in?
detail?discussed?below).?Falling?last,?in?the?mobilization?phase?is?brokerage,?
the? linking? of? two? sites,? units? or? actors? through? a? broker? (142),? a?
mechanism?through?which?political?organizers?draw?disconnected?factions?








mechanisms?during? the? formation?of?actors’?claims?and? resources? (155),?
Tilly? et? al.? likewise? account? for? brokerage? and,? moreover,? category?
formation? which? performs? through? an? aggregating? function? similar? to?




with? corresponding? shifts? among? repertoires,? rhetoric,? and? categories?
(ibid.).? certification? in? this? phase? of? escalation? which? catalyzes? the?
legitimization? of? actors? taking? shape? centrally,? both? in? international?
response? to? national? regimes? and? domestic? (re)validation? of? national?
actors.? Lastly,? Tilly? et? al.? list? for? mechanisms? during? turning? points? of?
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?
conflicts? (161)? as?well? brokerage,? and? furthermore,? identity? shift,?when?
actors? adopt? changed? group? perceptions? in? reaction? to? the? process? or?
interaction?with?other?actors,? leading? to?altered?motivations?and?actions.?
This? mechanism? supports? the? process? of? object? shift? when? identities?
change? throughout? processes? as? they? are? re?negotiated? and,? ultimately,?
result? in?reshaped?actions?and?policies?and,?consequently,?have?an? impact?
at?policies?at?different? levels?of? the?conflict? (Balcells/?Kalyvas?2010:?427).?
Radicalization,?according?to?Tilly?et?al.,?is?the?during?the?escalation?process?
increasing?contradiction?between?prevailing?claims?across? the?boundaries?
between? two? actors,? and? convergence,? the? ‘radical? flank? effect’? of?




most? effectual? mechanisms? of? escalation.? Altogether,? mechanisms? of?
external? influence? linked? to? escalation? seem? to? chiefly? evolve? around? a)?
locality? of? agency? and? actors’? claims? and? b)? points? in? time?when? taking?
effect.?As?a? consequence,? specific? functions?of? the?brokerage? and?object?
shift? mechanisms? appear? in? the? South? Ossetia? case.? Therefore,? the?
empirical?findings?enhance?these?mechanisms?as?theoretical?concepts?that?
explain?different?phases?of?escalation?processes.??
The? South? Ossetia? findings? point? to? mechanisms? taking? effect? in? two?
different?phases? that? successively?occur?and? shape? the? trajectory? toward?
escalation:? First,? the? (re?)formation? and? implementation? of? the?Western?
agenda? in?the?period?from?the?start?of?the?escalation?cycle?before?change?
in? local? behavior? occurs,? and? second,? what? Tilly? et? al.? describe? as? the?
turning?point? to?escalation,? the?period?between?change? in? local?behavior?






a) Before? change? of? local? behavior:? The? (re?)formation? and?
implementation?of?the?Western?agenda:?
The?study?of?Tilly?et?al.? regards?brokerage?as? the? least?obvious,?but?most?
influential?mechanism? in?several?cases?studied?(Tilly?et?al.?2001:?254).?The?
overarching? function? of? brokerage? is? demonstrated? by? aggregating?
different? forms? of? action? through?which? political? actors? aim? at? unifying?
resources? to? gain? the? means? to? consolidate? power.? Brokerage? can? be?
observed?during?all?phases?of?escalation,?but?in?the?phase?of?(re?)formation?
and? implementation? of? the? Western? agenda,? the? efforts? of? brokering?
advantageous?settings?perform?strongly?and?thus?give?particular?impetus?to?
the?process.?As?such,?brokerage?connects?carriers?of?claims?such?as?agents?





functions? of? Brokerage? take? effect? from? the? start? to? the? end? of? the?
escalation?cycle.?Particularly?prior?to?change?in?behavior?of?Georgian?state?
elites,?Western? policies? exhibit? a? pattern? of? influence? on? local? behavior?
over? an? extended? period? of? time? spanning? months? or? years.? Linkage,?
meaning?close?ties?with?Western?actors,?turns?out?to?draw?stakeholders?of?
the? conflict? at? the? start?of? escalation? cycles? into? cooperation? formats?of?
negotiations? in?2002?and?of?intense?political?and?financial?support? in?2004?
and?2008? through?Western? actors.?After? change? in?behavior? to? assertive?
policies,? linkage?persists?through?close?ties? in?the?course?of?the?escalation?
cycle,?but?subsequent?policies?affect?local?behavior?in?a?reinforcing?manner?
as?opposed? to?changing? the? trajectory.? In?addition,? level?shift?of?Western?
agency?combines?resources?of?influence?on?local?politics?at?different?levels?
between?which?Western?actors?shift.?This?means?that?Brokerage?during?the?
formation? phase? of? Western? agency? prior? to? escalations? can? take? the?
specific? function? of? the? Interaction? and? Level? shift?mechanisms? through?
spanning? extended? periods? of? time,? drawing? local? actors? into? close? ties?
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?
through? cooperation? formats? and? intense?political? and? financial? support,?
determining?a?reinforcing?trajectory?through,?in?a?further?function,?drawing?




2004? and? 2008,? leverage? of?Western? influence? also? appears? to? take? a?
specific? function? of? the? brokerage?mechanism.? The? leverage?mechanism?
holds? that? the? stronger? the? local? regimes’? bargaining? power,? the? lower?
Western? leverage? or,? respectively,? effect? of?Western? influence? on? local?
behavior? (Levitsky? and? Way? 2010:? 28).? After? 2004,? Western? actors?
intensified? conditionalities? which? contributed? to? the? unilateral,? anti?
Western? stance? of? Georgian? state? actors.? This? culminated? in? the?




as?Western? agency? shows? reticence? toward? local? assertive? tendencies.?
Levitsky? and?Way?maintain? that? leverage? rarely? translates? into? effective?
democratizing? pressure? (2010:? 29)? as? Western? powers? usually? allow?
regimes? to?escape?sanction:?“Even? in? sub?Saharan?Africa,?where?Western?
leverage?is?greatest,?scholars?have?found?no?positive?relationship?between?






high? Western? leverage? vis?à?vis? state?centered? policies.? Whereas? the?
unilateral,? strong? bargaining? stance? of? the? Georgians? in? the? case? of?
Sanakoev? demonstrates? low? Western? leverage? regarding? democracy?
centered? policies,? it? simultaneously? proves? high? Western? leverage?
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?
regarding? state?centered? policies,? as? the? Sanakoev? administration? is? the?
larger? response? to?Western? policies? in? the? JCC? framework? to? establish?




Therefore,? leverage? in? the?South?Ossetia? case?proves? to?be?a? function?of?
brokerage,?since?Western?actors?will?employ?democratization?rhetoric?and?
promote?related?policies?even?when?state?centered?aims?are?at?the?center?





Also? prior? to? change? in? local? behavior,? object? shift? exhibits? specific?
functions?in?the?South?Ossetia?case.?Categories?in?forms?of?claims?that?had?
been? introduced? as? main? stakes? in? the? process? at? the? point? of? initial?
condition?generally?do?not?appear?to?change?until?after?the?change?in?local?
behavior? shortly? before? escalation.? Western? actors? will? employ? both?
democracy??and?state?centered?policies?throughout?the?cycle.?However,?in?
their? implementation? they?will? focus?on? strengthening?state?capacity?and?
utilize? democracy?centered? claims,? particularly? non?use? of? force,? when?
exerting? political? pressure? on? local? actors? to? fulfill? demands? of? state?
capacity.? After? change? in? local? behavior,? democracy?centered? demands?
additionally?reinforce?the?escalation?trajectory.?Therefore,?both?categories,?
anti?corruption? as? state?centered? and? non?violence? as? democracy?
centered,? are? employed? from? the? start? of? the? cycle.? In? this? respect,?
categories? such? as? anti?corruption? measures? for? the? purpose? of? state?
strengthening?will?be? stressed? throughout? the?cycle,?but?even?more? they?
will? be? backed? up? by? implementation? of? respective? formats? and?
institutions.? In? contrast,? the? non?use? of? force? demand? banks? more? on?
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behavior? has? occurred.? During? (re?)formation? of? the? Western? agenda,?
brokerage?specifically?serves?bolstering?power?resources?to?take?effect?on?
the? local? level.?When?dynamics? turn? to?escalation,?brokerage?exhausts? its?
aggregating? effect? of? unifying? resources? to? implement? policies.? Instead,?
brokerage? is? still? in? effect,? but?Western? policies? prove? inconsistent? and?
diffusive? by? switching? both? levels? and? claims.? The? phase? of? unifying?





Prominently?within? the? South?Ossetia? study,?before? the?2008? escalation,?
Western?policies?addressed? the?conflict?context?at? the? level?of? the?NATO?
summit? in? Bucharest,? reinforcing? the? escalating? trajectory.? In? 2004? after?
the?closure?of? the?Ergneti?market?and?amid? the?escalating? trajectory,? the?
West?concentrated?on?supporting?President?Saakashvili’s?peace?road?maps?
at?the? international? level.? In?2002,?the?OSCE?scheduled?work?meetings?on?
combating? smuggling? in? Castelo? Branco? and? Bucharest? while? the?
Shevardnadze? government? launched? anti?smuggling? operations? in? the?
conflict? zone.? In? all? these? instances,? Western? policies? disaggregated?
resources?they?had?focused?at?the?national?or?local?level?prior?to?change?in?
local? behavior? and? henceforth? addressed? actors? at? different? levels?
simultaneously,?albeit?mostly?at?the?international?level.?In?this,?brokerage?is?
still? intact? before? escalation? as?Western? agency? spans? sites,? units? and?
actors,? but? in? a? disaggregating,? negative? function.? As? a? result,? ‘negative?
brokerage’?seems? to?be?an?attempt? to?preserve?power? in? reaction? to? the?
changing? context? of? escalation,? a? pro?active? policy? of? raising? Western?
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in? local? behavior? when? actors? gather? resources? prior? to? escalations.?
However? this?study? found? that?object?shift?also?plays?a?prominent?role? in?
shaping? the? process? after? change? of? local? behavior? to? assertive? policies.?
Particularly,?claim?shift?as?a?specific?function?of?object?shift?shows?that?the?
closer? the?shift?of? local?behavior? in? time,? the?more?Western?policies?shift?
their?stress? to?democracy?centered?policies? (while?keeping? their? focus?on?
state?centered?policies),?arguably? to? solidify? their?position? from?which? to?
influence?local?policies?in?the?conflict?context.?Western?agency?alters?claims?
and? rhetoric? through? shifts? between? addressees? at? international? or?
national? levels,? for? instance? addressing? the? NATO? summit? in? Bucharest?
while? enhancing? local? cooperation? in? the? ERP.? Even? more? significantly,?
Western? agency? performs? through? shifts? in? claims? or? forms? of? claims? in?
how? political? actors? change? claims,? how? claims? are? asserted? or? how?
different?actors?are?addressed?by?the?same?claim?at?different?points?in?the?
process.? This? includes? conditionalities,? re?negotiated? stakes,? shifts? in?
categories?or?change?in?rhetoric.?Within?the?same?conflict?process,?Western?





escalations? when? a)? Western? policies? switch? their? focus? back? to? the?
national? level,? b)? tone? down? on? forcing? demands? through? democracy?
centered?claims? (though?they?permanently?play?a?crucial?role)?and?c)?turn?
to?state?centered?policies.?However,?studies?of?dynamics?of?violence? look?
at? the?onset?of? violence,?at?escalations?as? singular?phenomena?or?at? the?




Therefore,? the? mechanisms? of? this? study? 1)? need? to? be? regarded? as?
properties? that? at? least? take? a? crucial? part? in? triggering? re?escalation? of?
violence,? not? only? repeated? escalation? under? similar? conditions,? and? 2)?
introduce?the?post?escalation?period?as?an?additional?phase?of?violence?to?
the?study?of?dynamics?of?violence.?This?period?deserves?special?scrutiny?as?
it?exhibits? specific? functions?of?mechanisms?not?existent? in?other?phases,?
such?as?the?return?to?the?national? level?and?alteration? in?claims,?and?as? it?









compensating? mechanism? of? Western? power? claims? in? response? to?
perceived? risks? to? power? resources.? Prior? to? change? in? local? behavior,?
Western? actors? try? to? achieve? implementation? of? their? agendas? by?
employing? both? tiers? of? democratic? and? state? policies.?Western? policies?
never? lose? focus? of? either? democracy? and? state?centered? claims? and?
policies,? but? take? the? identified? form? as? they? employ? both? claims.?
Oscillation? between? both? strands? (which? creates? the? paradox)? serves? to?
consolidate? the?Western? stance? and? destabilize? the? local? context? during?
the?extended?process?prior?to?escalations.?Therefore,?the?clear?switch?to?a?
stress?of?democracy?centered?claims?before?escalation?and?the?clear?switch?
to?a? stress?of? state?centered?policies?after?escalation? reasonably?explains?
the? significant? role? the? ‘democracy? vs? state?claims? paradox’? plays? for?
consolidating?Western?policies.?
??
Second,? the? South? Ossetia? study? focused? on? mechanisms? of? external?
policies? that? initiate? change? of? local? behavior.? This?makes? an? important?
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?
distinction? to? the? works? of? Tilly? et? al.,? Levitsky? and?Way,? Kalyvas,? and?
Mansfield? and? Snyder? as? these? studies? center? on? local? mechanisms? of?
power? consolidation? in? and? through? violent? contexts.? However,?
mechanisms? of? external? actors? overlap? significantly? with? local? power?
mechanisms.?Western?actors?to?a?large?extent?utilize?the?same?mechanisms?
to? influence? the? local?context?as? local?power?actors?utilize? to?consolidate?
their?power?basis.?The?difference? in?conditions?of?external?agency?can?be?
presumed? to? derive? from? lower? commitment? through? lower? levels? of?
legitimization?pressure?(Schlichte?2009,?first?version?2007:?199ff.,?also?see:?
Toft? 2003),? access? to? different? resources? and? different? use? of? resources?




However,? the? similarities? of? external?Western?mechanisms? of? influence?
with? local? power? mechanisms,? such? as? aggregating? resources,? utilizing?
different?strategies?of?deterrence?or?coalition?building,? identity? formation?
mechanisms? or? employing? rhetoric? and? specific? formats? of? action,? ? are?
striking?and?should?be?taken?into?account.?Like?local?actors,?external?actors?
pursue? interests? through? (however? differently? tuned)? power? policies.?
Domestic? and? external? state? actors? follow? and? are? subjected? to? a? state?
centered?agenda?of?state?formation?in?their?states?of?origin?and?outside?in?
different? arenas.? Additionally,? Western? actors? equally? underlie? re?
negotiation? of? identities,? interests? and? alliances? as? they? are? part? of? the?
same?conflict?process?as?local?actors.??
?
The? findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? study? have? been? generated? through?
tracing? of? plausible? causal? links? prior? to? escalations.? In? generalizing? the?
findings?to?contexts?of?violence?of?other?countries,?the?discussion?therefore?
looks? at? key? decision? points? in? these? conflict? processes.? The? following?
discussion,? though? refraining? from? an? in?depth? study,? examines? the?
contexts?of? the?Sri? Lanka?and?Kashmir? conflicts?and?discusses? the? role?of?
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escalation? since? the? 1970s,?with? strong? incentives? for? domestic? elites? to?
engage?in?violence?(Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?304,?also?see:?Korf?2005,?
Selby? 2008;? for? an? overview? of? the? Sri? Lanka? context? see:? Rösel? 1997,?
Kreuzer?and?Weiberg?2005,?Uyangoda?2008,?Nieto?2008).?Kashmir?has?been?
experiencing? uprisings? for? self?determination? since? the? 1940s? and? is? a?
continuous?hotspot?of?violence?since?the?1965?Indo?Pakistani?War,?with?US?
policies?exerting?a?strong?influence?on?the?Indian?agenda?in?Kashmir?(above?
all? see:?Mohan? 1999,? Habibullah? 2004,? for? an? overview? of? the? Kashmir?
conflict?see:?Mohan?1992,?ICG?2010a,?Wirsing?1994,?Schofield?2003).?Both?
conflicts? are? subject? to? strong? outside? interests,? including? India? and? the?
Indian?state?of?Tamil?Nadu?in?Sri?Lanka?and?India?and?neighboring?Pakistan?
in? Kashmir.?Western? actors? also? pursue? their? stability? agendas? in? these?
territorial?conflicts,?the?US?in?cooperating?with?India,?but?also?with?Pakistan?
on? Kashmir?whereas? in? Sri? Lanka? the?US? and? a?wide? range? of? European?
actors?are?present.?
?
The? contexts? of? the? South? Ossetia,? Sri? Lanka? and? Kashmir? conflicts? are?
similar? in? features? such? as? dynamics? of? re?escalation,? territorial?
disintegration?of? the? central? state? through?and?ethnically? framed? conflict?
and? significant? levels?of?Western?engagement.59? It? is? to?be?expected? that?
                                                          
59? The? selection? of? these? two? conflicts? is? a? result? of? the? author’s? review? of? secondary?
literature?available?on?these?cases.?However,?other?conflict?contexts?would?meet?similar?




similar? features? of? domestic? power? consolidating? behavior? regulate?
dynamics? in? the? conflicts? and? that? external? policies? affect? on? power?
consolidation?opportunities? in? this? context.? The? characteristics?of? the? Sri?
Lanka? and? Kashmir? conflicts,? therefore,? offer? opportunities? to? identify?
patterns? similar? to? the? South? Ossetia? case.? Power?mechanisms? of? local?
state? behavior? can? be? expected? to? be? similar? across? conflicts? which?
provides? a? basis? for? generalizing? the? findings? of? the? South?Ossetia? case?
(Brubaker?and?Laitin?1998:?431).?Similarly,?George?and?Bennett?(2005:?81?
82)? and? Imig? and? Tarrow? (2001)?point? to? the? importance?of? establishing?
comparisons? of? similar? cases? with? different? contexts? or? environmental?





This? discussion,? however,? refrains? from? systematic? comparison,? aiming?
instead? at? identifying? plausible? linkages? across? cases.? On? this? basis,? the?




of? external? and? domestic? policies? that? seem? likely? to? have? significant?
effects? on? local? power? behavior? in? the? contexts? of? the? conflicts.? If? it? is?
possible? to? show? plausible? common? external?domestic? effects? similar? to?
the? South? Ossetia? findings? by? way? of? illustration? in? these? empirical?
contexts,?the?general?scope?of?the?mechanisms?can?be?sustained.?Further,?
the?discussion?expects?the?mechanisms?to?be?presented?in?these?cases,?but?
anticipates? that? they?will?show?variations? in? their? impact.?Similarly,? if? it? is?
possible? to? offer? plausible? reasons? for? why? the? functions? of? these?










Kashmir? contexts:? First,? the? Interaction? mechanism? of? early? reactive?
patterns? of?Western? actors?with? their? counterparts? and? later? reinforcing?
interaction? patterns;? second,? the? Level? shift? mechanism? with? Western?






Western? policies? impact? on? local? power? consolidating? opportunities? in?
specific?ways.?The?following?discussion?accounts?for?possible?similarities?of?
local? power? consolidating? behavior? of? the? Colombo? and? Delhi? elites? in?
reaction?to?Western?policies? in?the?contexts?of?the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?
escalations.?
The? following?discussion?will? consecutively? take?account?of? the? Sri? Lanka?
and?Kashmir?conflicts?and?the?links?between?external?policies?and?repeated?
escalations.? For? each? conflict? the? text? discusses? the? chronologies? of?
violence? by? accounting? for? similarities? of? their? dynamics,? local? power?
setting? and? external? Western? influence? with? the? South? Ossetia? case,?














After?gaining? full? independence? from? the?British?Empire? in?1948,?Ceylon,?
renamed? to? Sri? Lanka? in? 1972,? started? to? develop? a? local? elite? (for? this?
period? in? the?modern? history? of? Sri? Lanka? see:? Roesel? 1997,? Uyangoda?
2008,? Shastri? 2005).?During? colonial? rule,? competences? and? participation?
among?ethnic?groups,?particularly?between?the?majority?Sinhalese?and?the?
Tamils? being? the? second? largest? ethnic? group? of? Sri? Lanka,?was? divided?
along? and? cemented? through? administrative? structures,? legislative?
regulations?and?territorial?divisions.?When?colonial?institutions?broke?open,?
the?new?Sinhalese?ruling?elite?sought?to?consolidate?power?by?establishing?
ethnic?majority? rule,? based? on? Sinhalese?Buddhist? nationalism? (Weiberg?
2005:?9).?
?
As? a? result,? access? to? resources? such? as? property? and? land? became?




cent? in? 2001),?made? Sinhalese? the? official? language? and? Buddhism? the?
official?religion?and,?establsihed?a?centralized?structure? in?1972,?the? latter?
consolidated? in? the?1978? introduction?of? the?presidential? constitution.? In?
addition? to?marginalizing? the? Tamil? and?Muslim?minorities,? these? shifts?
spurred? an? inner?Sinhalese? struggle? (on? the? factors? of? inner?Sinhalese?
conflicts? see:? Smith? 1999).? Both? political? parties,? alternatingly? in? power?
since?independence,?pursued?a?centralized,?elite?oriented?power?structure?
without? distributing? power? to? local? Sinhalese? party? representatives.? In?
1990,? the? central? state? de? facto? lost? control? over? insurgencies? by? the?








Altogether,? the? process? of? violence? in? Sri? Lanka? from? the? late? 1970s?
underwent? four? main? cycles? of? escalation,? punctured? by? extensive?
negotiations?and?by?power?oscillating?between?the?major?Sinhalese?parties?
(above? all? see:? Kreuzer? and? Weiberg? 2005,? ICG? 2010c,? Shastri? 2005).?







in? the?north?of? the?country.?Previously? in?1976,? intensifying?violence?and?
political?tension?had?culminated?in?the?formation?of?the?LTTE.?In?1987,?with?
violence?showing?no?sign?of?abating,?the?Sri?Lankan?government?signed?an?
agreement?with? India? to?deploy?a?peace?keeping? force.?This? resulted? in?a?
further?three?year?engagement?with?the?LTTE?until?Indian?troops?retreated,?
leaving? the? country? in?a?worse? state? than?before.61?The? second?phase?of?
violence?started?in?1990,?when?fighting?between?the?government?and?LTTE?
escalated? again.? Fighting? acquired? a? new? quality:? In? 1991,? the? LTTE?was?
implicated? in? the?assassination?of? Indian?Premier?Ghandi?and? in?1993,?Sri?
Lankan?President?Premadasa?was?killed? in?an?LTTE?bombing.?This?surge?of?
violence? considerably? deepened? the? rift? in? Tamil?Sinhalese? relations.?
Meanwhile,? the? LTTE? continuously? gained?military? and? political? strength?
through? diaspora? and? Tamil? Nadu? support? (on? the? dispora? support? for?
Tamil?Nadu?see:?Zunzer?2004,?ICG?2010b).?The?third?phase?of?violence?as?of?
                                                          








1994? continued?with? the? Sri? Lankan? army? suffering? considerable? losses.?
Later? that?year,?President?Kumaratunga?rose? to?power?on? the?promise?of?
bringing?peace,?vowed?to?end?war?and?opened?peace?talks?with?the?LTTE.?









attempt? at?peace? talks?opened?with? the? government? and? LTTE? signing? a?
Norwegian?mediated?ceasefire?agreement.?Peace?talks?wound?down?when?
the? LTTE?withdrew? from? the? negotiations? in? 2003,?with? the? first? suicide?
bombing? since? 2001? in? Colombo? in? 2004.? In? the? fourth? and? to? date? last?







However,? the? government? utilized? the? judicial? procedure? to? re?allocate?
power? to?Sinhalese?bodies?and?Sinhalese?controlled? territories? (see?Smith?
1999).? In?1996,? the?constitutional? reform?was?voted?down? in?parliament.?
The?plan? failed?because? the?Sri? Lankan?elite?nonetheless?gave?priority? to?
the?military?solution,?the?LTTE?was?not?given?equal?leverage?in?negotiations?





The? plan? played? a? key? role? during? and? immediately? after? the? election?
period? in?1994?as?a?part?of?the?peace?package?that?brought?Kumaratunga?
into? office.? However,? nationalist? Sinhalese? groups? did? not? support?
devolution? (ICG?2006a:?6,?Smith?1999:?26?28).?The? subsequent? refusal?of?
the? devolution? scheme? by? radical? Sinhalese? constituencies? are? credited?
with? bringing? about? the? loss? of? the? incumbent? government? in? the? 2004?
elections?much?more?than?the?government’s?unsuccessful?performance? in?
the? peace? process.? The? plan? came? to? be? refused? once? more? in? 2006.?
(Glasius?and?Kostovicova?2008:?94,?Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?321,?also?
see:?Bastian?2006,?Kelegama?2006).?Ropers?et?al.,?therefore,?maintain?that?
the?core? issue?of?violence? in?Sri?Lanka? is?the? inner?Sinhalese?struggle?over?
power?distribution,?and?the?conflict?with?the?Tamils?in?the?north?is?the?side?
stage?of?this?conflict?where?those?tensions?are?escalating?(Ferdinands?et?al.?
2004:? 14).? Yet,? throughout? 1994? and? 1995? violence? continued?
simultaneously?with?the?constitutional?efforts?and?even? intensified,?giving?
reason?to?assume?that?the?political?solution?was?never?considered?a?serious?
alternative? to? the?military? option? (ICG? 2006a:? 4).? Therefore,? the? inner?
Sinhalese?political?landscape?impeded?non?assertive?policies.??
This?discussion? supports? the?central?argument?brought?out? for? the?South?
Ossetia?case?as?the?domestic?landscape?proves?to?be?the?key?factor?of?state?
elite’s? ability? to?maintain? power? and? leaderships’? policies? in? the? conflict?
build? a?major? part? of? their? power? basis.? The? following? discussion? shows?
how? the? triggering? effect? of?Western? policies? can? be? seen? to? affect? on?
conflict?dynamics?through?their?impact?on?local?power?policies.?
?
This? trajectory? of? local? power? struggle? perpetuated? through? Western?
involvement? when? the? devolution? plan? was? rejected? in? parliament? in?
August? 2000,? again? amid? intensifying? violence? in? the? north.? Until? 2000,?
external?engagement?of?Western?actors?had?remained?at?a? low? level.?The?
new?round?of?talks?took?its?start?on?massive?initiative?of?Western?actors?(on?




Bank,? for? the? first? time? became? directly? engaged? in? the? negotiations?
(Goodhand? et? al.? 2011:? 14).? Starting? from? 2000,?Western? engagement?
aimed? at? taking? influence? on? the? process? of? violence? through?
conditionalities? linked? to? negotiations? and? funding? and? herein,? intensely?
aiming? at? taking? influence? on? the? central? government’s? policies? in? the?
conflict.? From? the? initial? discussions? of? a? constitutional? reform? to?
decentralize?power?in?the?mid?1990s,?Sri?Lankan?elites?started?campaigning?
in?elections?to?settle?the?conflict?through?talks.?A?pattern?of? local?policies?
evolved? that? established? ongoing? military? action? against? the? LTTE? with?
negotiations? simultaneously? taking? place.?Western? actors,? particularly? in?





then? parliamentary? elections? in? October? 2000.? Amid? a? weak? record,?
Kumaratunga? feared? losing? the?vote? (on? the?analysis?of? this?period? in?Sri?
Lankan?domestic?politics? see:?Shastri?2005).?At? this? stage?of? the?process,?
the? continuation? of? violence? had? become? profitable? for? both? sides.?
Particularly,? the? government? sought? to? divert? attention? from? the? poor?
economic? situation? and? allegations?of? fraud? against? Kumaratunga,?which?
could?come?up?into?focus?in?case?of?an?end?of?the?war?(see?Weiberg?2005).?
Instead,? the?government? renewed? the?offer?of?peace? talks? in? the?end?of?
1998,? just? prior? to? elections? while? prolonging? the? military? campaign.?




However,? talks? only? started? from? 2000?when?Western? engagement?was?
solicited?by?the?Sri?Lankan?government?(Weiberg?2005:?40,? ICG?2006a:?5).?
The?peace? initiative?was? led?by?Norway?and? co?chaired?by? Japan,? the?US?
171?
?
and? India.? The? EU? had? a? lesser? coordinating? role,62? but? was? a? main?









time? in? 2002,? the? US? opened? negotiations? with? the? government? on? a?
defense? agreement? to? allow?US?military? access? to? Indian? and? Sri? Lankan?
territories,? simultaneously? stepping? up? pressure? on? the? LTTE.? Analysts?
continued? to? assess? the? government? to? pursue? the? double? strategy? of?
upholding? talks? to? attract? international? funding? and? political? support? for?
regaining? the? north? and? remaining? in? power,? whereas? the? military?
campaign?continued?(Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?311).?Western?policies,?
thus,? had? created? close? ties? with? the? government,? which? enabled? the?
western?agenda?to?table?conditionalities.?
The?pattern? of?Western?policies? further? reinforced? local?dynamics.? From?
2001,?the?Wickremasinghe?government?pursued?the?economization?of?the?
conflict? by? introducing? economic? development? and? making? fighting?
irrelevant?by?transforming?the?north?in?a?flourishing?region?through?and?for?
the?means? of? the? business? entities? that? had? supported? the? government?
during? the? elections? (Goodhand? and? Walton? 2009:? 308).? The? LTTE?
withdrew?from?the?talks?in?April?2004,?citing?exclusion?from?meetings?with?
international?donors? (ICG?2006a).?The? LTTE? leadership?broke? from?peace?
talks? as? their? possible? gains? seemed? minor? in? an? internationally?driven?
process?that? favored?state?actors?over?non?state?actors? (Uyangoda?2009).?
Also? in? 2004,? the? government? decided? that? intense? international?
                                                          
62?EU?engagement?surged? in? the?context?of? the?Tsunami?disaster? in?2004?when? joint?EU?








Rajapakse? government? moved? away? from? seeking? legitimacy? through?
Western? support? and? focused? on? domestic? support? through? nationalist?
goals? and? the? financial? support? of? non?Western? actors.? However,? the?
government? sought? to? avoid?Western? criticism? by? launching? yet? another?
round?of?peace? talks? in?2006?whilst?continuing? the?military?campaign.?By?
2007,? Germany,? the? UK? and? the? US? reacted? by? suspending? particular?
development?related? funds,? but? overall? support? continued.? From? then,?




engagement?during? this?period? as,? first?of? all,?being? too? closely?engaged?
with?the?government?leading?to?de?facto?support?of?assertive?policies?(also?
see:? Lunstaed?2007)? and,? along?with? this,? an?overemphasis?on? structural?





Western? influence? in? Sri? Lanka’s? conflict? context? displays? the? pattern? of?
triggering? shifts? in? local? dynamics? at? decisive? points? in? the? process,?
particularly? in? cooperation?with? the? government? in? 2001? and? 2004.? This?
impact?seems?to?be?possible?to?take?effect,?as?in?the?south?Ossetia?context,?
through? Western? agency’s? intense? sway? over? local? leadership’s? power?
interests.? This? particularly? showed? when? the? Rajapakse? government? in?
2004? took? a? distance? from? Western? support? to? secure? their? domestic?
power? basis.? Goodhand? and? Walton? hold? that? Western? engagement?





various? local? actors? only? see? de?facto? support? for? the? governmental?
military? line? and? the? central? state? (Goodhand? and?Walton? 2009:? 314),? a?
pattern? similar? to? the? South? Ossetia? case? when? local? dynamics? are?
reinforced?through?Western?support?held?to?curb?Russian?interests.?
?
Against? this?backdrop,?Western?engagement? in? Sri? Lanka,? very? similar? to?
South? Ossetia,? proved? “incoherent”? when? actors? linked? aid? to? violence?
(Goodhand? and?Walton? 2009:? 312?314).?Western? donors,? for? lack? of? a?
consistent? strategy,? started? to?work? “around”? conflict,?meaning? partially?
and?temporarily?withdrawing?funds,?but?not?suspending?other?budget?lines?
or? political? support? (Goodhand? 2011),? creating? inconsistencies? similar? to?
the?shifting?policies?of?Western?agency?in?the?South?Ossetia?context.?
?
As? a? result,? the? Sri? Lanka? characteristics? translate? into? similarities? with?
mechanisms? identified? for? the?South?Ossetia?case.?First,?Western?policies?




Sri? Lankan? government.? Furthermore,?Western? actors? opted? for? pushing?
the?central?state?through?substantiating?democracy?related? issues?such?as?
non?use? of? force.? Further,? the? imperative? of? non?use? of? force,? however?





Similarly? in? the? South? Ossetia? process,? the? same? Western? actors? that?
implemented? conditionalities? for? the?post?Soviet?Georgian? leaderships? at?
the? national? level,? implemented? policies? outdoing? those? conditionalities?
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during? negotiations? at? the? international? level.? Third,? the? account? gives?
indications? that? Level? shift? might? have? played? a? role? in? creating?
inconsistencies:?Apparently,?donor?and?political?decisions?are?taken?outside?
the? country? in? Western? capitals,? such? as? at? the? UN? or? World? Bank?
headquarters.?
?




prior?to?escalations.?However,?the?account?suggests?that? Interaction? in? its?




After? the?end?of?British?rule? in?1947,? the?region?of?Kashmir63?accessed? to?
India?and?the?first?war?between?India?and?Pakistan?broke?out?over?control?
of? the? region.? The? Muslim?majority? Kashmir,? from? 1957? by? its? own?
constitution?a?part?of? India,?became? the?most?contentious? issue?between?





the? Indian? constitution? under? article? 370,? erasing? large? parts? of? its?
autonomy? allowing? India? to? ban? laws? or? call? emergency? rule? (Schofield?
2003:?121?126).??
?
                                                          
63?Kashmir?denotes?a? larger?area? that? includes? the? Indian?administered? state?of? Jammu?
and?Kashmir? (the?Kashmir?Valley,? Jammu?and?Ladakh),?the?Pakistani?administered?Gilgit?
Baltistan? and? the? Azad? Kashmir? provinces? (Azad? Jammu? and? Kashmir,? AJK),? and? the?




The? dynamics? in? the? Kashmir? conflict? follow? the? continuous? struggle?
between? India? and? Pakistan? for? control? over? the? region,? with? India?
maintaining? its? nominal? status.? Violence? also? includes? internal? Kashmir?
struggles? of? Muslim? groups? opposing? Indian? rule? or? the? Kashmir?
administration? with? the? aim? of? accession? to? Pakistan? or? independence.?
However,?much?of?the?conflict’s?dynamics?is?shaped?by?the?ongoing?regime?
consolidation? of? India’s? and? Pakistan’s? state? elites? which? overcasts? and?
influences? local? power? struggles? (ICG? 2003a:? 4).? The? unresolved? conflict?
over?Kashmir? is?often? assessed? to?be? the?one?main?obstacle? for? India? to?
consolidate?as?a?state?(Mohan?2006:?20).??






Kashmir?agenda,?and? to?a? lesser?extent?on?Pakistan.?External? influence? in?
the?Kashmir? conflict? takes?place?mainly? through? the?U.S.? and? to? a? lesser?
extent? through?Europe.?Some? ties?of? India?with?France?and? the?UK?exist,?




Lamb?1991,?Ganguly?1997).? The? article? is? the?most? important?means? for?
Delhi? to?maintain? control? in? Kashmiri? affairs.? The? special? constitutional?
status? as? a? measure? of? autonomy? rule? guarantees? local? elections? in?
Kashmir.?Violence?regularly?breaks?out?during?the?pre?election?period?due?
to? the? fueling?of? sentiments? through?Pakistan? and? insurgent?movements?
seeking? to? break? from? Indian? rule,? both? playing? on? ethnic? lines.? Indian?
authorities?are?quick?in?calling?a?state?of?emergency?on?the?basis?of?article?




Kashmir’s? special? status? is? less? a? provision? of? autonomy,? but? more? an?
instrument?of? territorial?control? through? the? Indian?central?state,?utilizing?
lines?of?ethnic? conflict? for? the?purpose?of? central? control.?Therefore,? the?








the? otherwise? ethnically? divided? population;? third,? the? 1999? Kargil? war?
between? India?and?Pakistan? in? the?Kargil?district?of?Kashmir?when? Indian?
troops?between?May?and?July?aimed?at?pushing?back?Pakistani?troops?that?
had?infiltrated?the?Indian?administered?part?of?Jammu?and?Kashmir;?fourth,?
the?2001? terrorist?attack?on? the? Indian?parliament? in?New?Delhi,?bringing?
Pakistan?and?India?to?the?brink?of?an?all?out?war;?and,?fifth,?the?May?2008?
escalation? over? the? transfer? by? Indian? authorities? of? forest? land? in? the?
Kashmir?Valley?to?the?Hindu?Shri?Amarnath?Shrine?Trust.?
?
In? 1984,? the? conflict? in? Kashmir? reached? its? first? escalation? point? after?
India’s? victory? in? the? third?war?with? Pakistan? in? 1971? (ICG? 2003b:? 5?6).?
Following? the?war,? India? had? observed? an? all?control? line? as? opposed? to?
reconciliation.? This? claim? extended? to? internal? politics? in? Kashmir? with?
heavy?rigging?of?the?1972?elections?and?subsequent?Srinagar?governments?
following? a? loyal?pro?Delhi? course.? The? situation? reached? a? tipping? point?
when? in?1984? the?Delhi?critical?Minister? Farooq?Abdullah?was?dismissed.?
Abdullah’s?dismissal?was?widely?held?to?have?sparked?the?beginning?of?the?
Kashmir? insurgency? (ICG? 2002:? 6).? Also? in? 1984,? Indian? troops? took? the?
disputed?Siachen?Glacier?in?a?military?action?that?defeated?Pakistani?troops?
in? the? area? (ICG? 2006:? 4).? The? taking? of? Siachen?Glacier? –? including? the?







and?with? civil? uprisings? against? the? government,?when? in? 1990,? Kashmir?
governor? Jagmohan’s? orders? caused? the? shootings? of? demonstrators?




Throughout? this? tense? trajectory? in? the?1990s,? the?United?States? took?up?
the?pattern?of?distinctly?supporting?the?Indian?line?of?consolidation?through?




and? international? levels? prior? to? escalations.?US? support? for? India,? thus,?
focused? on? state? politics? at? the? Indian? national? level? and? on? non?
proliferation?and?confidence?building?measures? in? the?military? framework?
with? Pakistan.? In? 1998,?Washington? refused? an? active?mediation? role? in?
Kashmir? and? also? refrained? from? supporting? a? referendum? on? Kashmir’s?
status?(Ganguly,?R.?2001:?312?and?318;?Thakur?1992:?165?82).??
Against?this?backdrop,? in?1998,?the?year?prior?to?the?Kargil?escalation,?the?
United? States’? external? engagement? was? continuously? focused? on?
supporting? the? national? level? of? India’s? state? policies? and? on? sending?
dismissive?messages?to?Islamabad,?as?opposed?to?taking?action?on?the?local?
level? of? the? conflict.? The? 1999? Kargil? war? started? when? Indian? troops?
pushed?back?Pakistani?troops?and?Pakistan?backed?militants?infiltrating?the?
Indian?controlled?side?of?the?Line?of?Control? (LoC).?Strong?US?backing?and?
international? support? for? India? continued? and? condemned? Pakistan’s?
actions? during? the? war.? The? border? clash? ended? only? after? intense? US?
mediation? over? fears? of? a? nuclear? conflict? (ICG? 2002:? 10)? and? Pakistan?
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withdrew? its? troops? following? the? personal? intervention? of? President?
Clinton?(Ganguly?2006:?47?48).??
?
During? the? Kargil? dispute,? all? major? parties? in? India,? including? the?
opposition,?agreed? to?point? to?Pakistan’s?backing?of? terrorism? in?order? to?
attract?US?support?for?India?(ICG?2003b:?13).?Similar?to?the?South?Ossetia?or?
Sri?Lanka?contexts,?Western?external?influence?concentrated?policies?at?the?





the?conflict.? In?other?words,?the?side?of? India?or?the?US?did?not? initiate?or?
support?direct? cooperation?with?domestic? actors? in?Kashmir,?but,? rather,?
the? international?level?politics?of? the?Kashmir?conflict?provided? for?use?of?
violence?of?the?Indian?local?state?elites.?
?
The? Kargil? war? ended? after? a? two?month? campaign? in? July? 1999.? Even?
though? the? Kashmir? insurgency? had? already? been? abating? from? 1996,?
overall? violence? in? Kashmir? further? increased,? mainly? due? to? the?
reorganization?of?militant?groups?in?Pakistan?(ICG?2003b:?6).?In?the?wake?of?
Clinton’s?South?Asia?visit?in?2000,?Delhi?attempted?to?solidify?relations?with?
the?United?States?by? taking?action? in?Kashmir.? India? stepped?up?counter?
insurgency? actions? in? Kashmir? in?order? to? convey? a?message?of? counter?
terrorism? strategy?and?at? the? same? time? released? leaders?of? the?Kashmir?
independence?movement? (Ganguly,?R.? ?2001:?324).?Whereas?engaging? in?
local?politics?through?this?moderate?stance?can?be?seen?as?an?inclusive,?pro?
democratic? move,? India? at? the? same? time? intensified? the? counter?
insurgency?and?thus?directly?contributed?to?increased?violence?in?Kashmir.?





Therefore,? India’s? policies,? similar? to? the? South? Ossetia? and? Sri? Lanka?
contexts,? turn?out? to? simultaneously? implement?a?pro?democratic,? liberal?
peace? agenda? and? to? impose? central? rule? through? force.? Whereas? in?
Kashmir,? in?contrast?to?South?Ossetia?and?Sri?Lanka,?external?engagement?
through?Western?agency?and?in?particularly?the?US?was?non?existent?on?the?
local? level,? the?Western?agenda?pervasive? in? the?other?cases?did?have?an?
impact? in? Kashmir.? The? Western? stance,? nevertheless,? appeared? to? be?




The? 2001? escalation? of? the? terrorist? attacks? on? India’s? parliament?were?
considered? to? be? a? result? of? the? prior,?misled? Kashmir? policies? of? both?
Pakistan? and? India? (ICG? 2002:? 5?6).? International? condemnation? of? the?
attacks?put?pressure?on?Pakistan?to?end?its?support?for?terrorist?groups.?In?








the? Kashmir? conflict? persisted,? with? Indian? local? rule? holding? strong? in?
Kashmir? and? escalations? of? violence? both? on? the? local? and? the? national?
level.? In? the? escalation?of?May? 2008,? the? Indian? government? transferred?
Kashmir?territory?to?the?Shri?Amarnath?Shrine?Trust,?a?Hindu?religious?site.?
This? provoked? anger? among? Kashmiri? Muslims,? led? to? violent? street?
protests?extending?over?months,?and?to?a?breakup?of?the?ruling?coalition?in?
Kashmir.?As?a? result,?once?more? so?called? ‘Governor’s? rule’?was? imposed?
with?police?killing? several?protesters? (ICG?2010a:?4).?The? contention?over?
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the? land? row? led? to? the?break?between? the?Valley?on? the?one?hand?and?
Jammu?and?Ladakh?on?the?other,?adding?to?the?internal?divide?of?Kashmir.??
?
Altogether,? the?account? suggests? that?one?major?difference? in? triggers?of?
violence? in? Kashmir? lies? in? the? structure? of? external? influence,? largely?
diverging? in?crucial?aspects? from? the?Sri?Lanka?or?South?Ossetia?contexts.?
This,?together?with?strong?indications?of?the?same?mechanisms?at?work?as?
in? South?Ossetia,? gives? further? insight? into? their? functioning.?On? the?one?
hand,?dynamics? in?Kashmir?are?pinched?between?the?two?great?powers?of?
Pakistan? and? India,? but?without? a? greater? power? pressuring? the? smaller?
central? state? via? its? territorial? divide.? Interestingly,? dynamics? of? violence?
still? seem? to? be? decided? on? the? national? level? of? the? conflict? with?
cooperation? of? the?Delhi? elites?with?US? foreign? policy.? For? instance,? the?
massive?Mumbai?terrorist?attacks?of?November?2008?could?be?seen?as?one?
of? the? arenas? of? the? Kashmir? conflict? that? continuously? mars? relations?
between?India?and?Pakistan.??
?




dynamics?when? influencing?on? local?power?politics?of? Indian? state?elites.?
Importantly,? the?Western? state? formation? agenda? including? its? focus? on?
central?state?support?still?plays?out?on?the?ground.?Even?to?a?greater?extent?
than? in? South? Ossetia? or? Sri? Lanka,? the?Western? agenda? seems? to? be?
adopted?and? translated?by? the? central? state?elites? in? the? conflict? context?
and?to?the?effect?of?triggering?violence?on?the?ground.?Western?influence?in?
this?respect?seems?to?work?through?the?formalized?legislative?setting?of?the?
special? status? and? the? dispute?with? Pakistan? over? territorial? integrity? in?
which? the?Western? anti?terrorist? agenda? interferes.? Furthermore,?on? the?









which? specific? external? policies? induced? escalations? on? the? ground? in?
Kashmir.?Analyses? should? look? not? only? to?US? policies? toward? India,? but?
also? to? the? dynamics? of? India?Pakistan? relations.? In? addition,? in?depth?
analysis?should?reveal?how? Indian? interference? in?Kashmir?affairs? leads? to?
local? escalations,? not? only? focus? on? post?escalation? Indian? intervention?






mechanisms? of? external?Western? policies? in? the? context? of? dynamics? of?
violence? in?South?Ossetia.?The? three?conflicts?are?similarly?set? in? their?re?
escalation? dynamics? of? intra?state? territorial? disputes? linked? to? ethnic?
groups? claiming? self?determination? after? independence.? Moreover,? re?
escalation? can? be? seen? to? be? caused? by? local? state? elites’? power?
consolidation?politics,?being?triggered?by?external?and?domestic?resources?
of? legitimization,?nationalist?mobilization?of?ethnic?groups,? states?agents’?
use? of? force? for? territorial? control,? and? attracting? political? and? financial?
resources? from? external? supporters? of? state? formation.? The? broadened?
perspective?of? the?Sri?Lanka?and?Kashmir?contexts?suggests? that?Western?
policies?of? liberal?peace?building? initiate? local? state?elites? to? comply?with?
demands? of? state? formation,?which? seem? to? be? globally? present.? These?
demands?are?facilitated?through?external?agendas?and?instruments?of?state?






escalation? through? external? influence,? first,? Interaction? of? reactive?
interaction? between? Western? and? other? stakeholders? kicking? off? the?
escalation? cycle? and? subsequent? reinforcing? interaction? until? change? in?
local?behavior,?second,?Level?shift?of?external?agency?switching?localities?of?
agency? prior? to? escalations? and,? third,? Claim? shift?with? external? agency?
switching? between? democracy? and? state?enforcing? policies.? The? South?
Ossetia? findings? revealed? specific? functions? framing? plausible? causal?
explanations?of?the?mechanisms’?effects.?However,? it?has?to?be?reiterated?
that?only?an? in?depth? study?of? the? Sri? Lanka?and?Kashmir? contexts? could?
reveal?functions?of?the?mechanisms.?Nevertheless,?the?three?mechanisms,?
even?in?their?micro?functions,?are?largely?represented?both?in?Sri?Lanka?and?
Kashmir.? The? below? table? accounts? for? the? intensity? of? the? three?
mechanisms? in? Sri? Lanka? and? Kashmir? and? for? differences? in? available?
power? resources? of? local? state? elites? that? might? enable? explanation? of?
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led? to? the? start? of? the? escalation? cycle,? or? merely? reinforced? their?




as? though?a? shift?at? the?national?or? local? level? is? sufficient? to? kick?off?an?
escalation? cycle,? making? the? context? very? vulnerable? to? the? escalating?
effect?of?a?relatively?isolated?event?with?relatively?little?reinforcing?impact,?
or? a? high? level? of? inertia,? in? the? subsequent? trajectory,? specifically? by?
external?actors?at?the?national?level.??
?
The?Level? shift?mechanism?would? require?more? scrutiny?of? the? locality?of?
specific?West?policies?prior?to?escalations?to?make?a?sustained?statement,?
particularly? in? Sri? Lanka.?Western? policies? at? the? international? level? are?








This? strongly? relates? to? the? South? Ossetia? case? where? Russia? is? a?
stakeholder? via? the?West? and? to? Sri? Lanka?where? India? is? a? negotiating?
partner?of?Western?actors.?As?Level?shift?is?less?significant?in?Kashmir,?one?
could,? second,? further? hypothesize? that? the? existence? of? a? territorial?
neighboring?proxy? –? such? as? the? Indian? state? Tamil?Nadu?or? the?Russian?
Federation?republic?North?Ossetia?–?diversifies?activities?to?the? local? level.?
In? case?of? no? such?proxy,? the? national? state? elites? do? not? address? these?
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local? stakeholders? and?Western? activity?might?be? rather? confined? to? the?
national? and? even? more? the? international? level.? Considering? both?
hypotheses,?the?Kashmir?context?shows?equal?tendencies?of?escalation?as?
the?two?other?contexts,?but?Level?shift?occurs?not?involving?the?local?level.?
Therefore,? the? discussion? suggests? that? particularly? shifts? between? the?




be? the?most? important?mechanism? taking?effect?prior? to?escalations.?The?
oscillation? of?Western? policies? between? peace? talks? and? negotiations? on?
the?one?hand?and?support?of?militarizing,?central?state?elites?on?the?other?
hand? seems? a? general? pattern? of? Western? destabilization? of? volatile?
trajectories? of? violence.? As? Goodhand? and?Walton? point? out? for? the? Sri?
Lanka? case,?Western? agency? takes? on? a? double? role,? often? even? on? the?
same? level? of? agency.? This? circumstance? becomes? visible? in? the? case? of?
negotiations? over? conflict? settlement? in? an? international? context? when?
Western?actors?often?assume?a?leading?role,?as?initiators?or?facilitators,?but?
at? the?very? least?pointedly?address? their?expectations?of? the?outcome?of?
negotiations? to? the? central? state? elites? involved? in? them.? In? this? vein,?
Western? actors? often? link? success? in? negotiations? to? funding? or? political?
support.?However,?Western?actors?also?heavily?emphasize?the?process?and?
style? of? negotiations:?Western? partners? establish? issues? on? the? agenda?
(local? elections,? territorial? access? of? groups? of? population,? economic?
rehabilitation? etc.),? direct? small? decisions? along? the?way? of? negotiations?
(deployment?of?a?military?check?point?in?a?specific?area,?ethnic?composition?
of?peace?keeping?forces,?tasks?of?police?forces,?etc.),?or?establish?directives?
of? validation? or? legitimacy? of? the? negotiations? or? of? local? state? agency?
within?the?negotiations?(monitoring?reports?of?observers? in?conflict?areas,?
assumed?signs?of?commitment?by?local?actors,?election?monitoring?reports,?
etc.).? All? these? measures? have? considerable? impact? even? without? a?
formalized? mandate? of? the? involved? Western? agents,? but? more?
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importantly,? none? of? these? policies? is? addressed? or? implemented? to? a?
consistent?extent.? Instead,? international?negotiations?more?often?create?a?
platform? for? the? dual? role? of?Western? actors? in? simultaneously? stressing?
democracy? and? state?centered? demands,? which? fosters? the? ambiguous?






in? Kashmir.? Interaction? and? level? shift? perform? weakly.? However,?
escalations? occur?with? high? effects? of? assertive? policies? of? local? elites? in?
response? to? Western? policies? playing? at? both? democracy? and? state?




These? cross?context? similarities? seem? plausible? even? given? the? context?
specific? divergences,? and? seem? even? more? plausible? in? light? of? those?
differences.?Therefore,?table?5?also?accounts?for?divergences?between?the?
contexts.?Specific?divergences?between?contexts?might?make?for?different?
readings? of? similar? results,? but? more? importantly,? these? differences? in?
functions?of?mechanisms?bring?to?the?surface?the?explanatory?outreach?of?
the? causal? links? they? propose? to? embrace.? The? following? brief? list? of?
structural? differences? in? available? power? resources? for? local? state? shows?
that? even? though? these? differences? exist,? the? underlying?mechanisms? of?
















in?all?three?cases?opposition?parties?support? the?government? line?when? it?




the? JVP?or? radical?Buddhist? groups? (above? all? see:?Rösel?2004,?Piechotta?
2003,?Weiberg? 2009)? in? Sri? Lanka? or? the?Orthodox? church? in?Georgia.?A?
case? in?point?was?when?the?Rajapakse?government? in?Sri?Lanka?turned?to?
an?anti?Western?stance?after?the?successor?government?had?lost?domestic?
support? over? too? close? cooperation?with?Western? agencies.? In? Georgia,?
leaderships? regularly? come? under? pressure? from? conservative? or? radical?
Orthodox? groups,?which? accuse? them? of? selling? out?Georgia? to?Western?
interests,? with? the? Georgian? Orthodox? church? ranking? by? far? the? most?
trusted? institution? in? Georgia? (CRRC? 2012).? When? the? church? outlet?
‘Episkopali’?after? the?2008?war?promoted? the? idea? that?God?had?sent? the?
Russian?troops?to?punish?Georgia?for?its?ties?with?the?West,?this?found?wide?










local? elites? that? gives? way? to? assertive? measures? as? it? alienates? the?
government?from?the?population.?
?
In? a? first? divergence,? the? pattern? of?Western? policies? toward? conflicting?
states?differs?across? contexts.? In? Sri? Lanka,? the?Western?peace?project? is?
much?better?implemented,?structured?and?professionalized?than?in?Georgia?
or?Kashmir.?As? the?discussion? shows,? it?does?not?make? for?differences? in?
effects.?Rather,? in?the?Sri?Lanka?case? it? is?plausible?to?assume,?also?on?the?




conditionalities? reinforce? trajectories? in? how? the? Indian? national? elites?
translate?Western? policies? via? their? democracy?centered? policies? of? local?
elections,? human? and? civil? rights? of? local? party? leaders? and? the? like.? A?
second?difference? in?Western?policies? is? found? in? the?Kashmir?case?where?
the?West? has? a? clear? and? far? more? consistent? line? in? supporting? India?
against? Pakistan? than? supporting? Georgia? against? Russia.? Mohan? even?
claims?this?led?to?a?more?compromising?stance?of?India?in?negotiations?with?
Pakistan? (Mohan? 2006:? 20),?but? effects? remain? unchanged? as? the? toll?of?
violence?has?not?abated.? In?a?general?view,?support?with?a?more?or?a? less?
clear?cut?bias?on?one?side?of?conflict?does?not?seem?to?correlate?with? less?
influence? of? Western? policies? on? the? national/? central? state? level.?
Therefore,? bias? does? neither? seem? to? lead? to? consistency? in? Western?
policies?with?regard?to?levels?and?claims,?nor?does?it?release?the?incentives?
for? local? elites? to? shift? to? escalation.? A? third? difference? is? posed? by? the?
Western? anti?terrorism? agenda? that? is? a? crucial? stake? in?Delhi?Islamabad?
relations?over?Kashmir?and?in?Colombo’s?stance?toward?LTTE.?The?terrorism?
agenda? has? led? to? a? tougher? approach? of? the? West? toward? LTTE? and?
Pakistan,?and?much?so?to?the?use?of?the?central?state?elites?in?Colombo?and?
Delhi?who? secure?Western? support?by? joining? the?anti?terrorism?alliance.?





Dzutsev?2012).?Nonetheless,? reading? the?effects?of? the? terrorism? agenda?
on? the? elites? in? Sri? Lanka? or? India? suggests? the? conclusion? that?Western?
anti?terrorism?policies?are? reinforcing? the?Western?globally?pursued?state?
formation? project.? In? other? words,? the? anti?terrorism? agenda? makes?
Western? actors? concentrate? their? policies? specifically? at? the? level? of? the?
central?state?as?this?organization?shares?the?common? interest?of?subduing?
elements? that? undermine? traditional? features? of? stateness.? This? leads? to?
the? strengthening?of? state? elites? that? generally? tend? to?opt? for? assertive?
measures?in?circumstances?of?territorial?disintegration.?A?fourth?difference?
is?the?trend?of?the?Sri?Lankan?government?to?seek?out?external?support?of?





comparably? considerable? volume? with? China? and? Iran? (Ministry? of?
Commerce? of? the? People’s? Republic? of? China? 12.07.2012,? Xinhua?
05.04.2010;?Kachia?2011).?Rather,?the?trend?of?small?states?with?territorial?
problems?turning?to?non?Western?support?reveals?how? little?commitment?
and?opportunity? to?pursue?non?assertive?measures? in? territorial?disputes?
exists?at?the?level?of?local?state?elites.?Therefore,?attracting?resources?from?




Altogether,? divergences? in? patterns? of? external? policies? to? a? substantial?
extent?account?for?the?same?mechanisms?of?Western?agency?with?respect?
to? inconsistency?of?claims?and?arenas.?As?had?been?mentioned?earlier?as?
part? of? the? theoretical? discussion,? even? though? conditions? such? as?
availability? to? resources? or? agendas? might? differ? between? contexts? or?
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within? the? same? process,? this? exhibits? surprisingly? little? effect? with? the?
same? mechanisms? functioning? prior? to? re?escalation.? Therefore,? the?
findings? of? the? South? Ossetia? research? at? times? come? about? under?
diverging? functions?of?external?agency?by?weighing?differently?on?specific?
policies,? categories? of? actors,? or? level? of? agency,? or? operating? under?
differing?local?mechanisms?of?power?when?elites?are?composed?or?respond?
differently?to?Western?actors.?Generally,?the?causal?link?of?Western?policies?
and? local? elite? behavior? that?was? detected? in? the? South?Ossetia? case? is?
commonly? repeated? to? the? same? effect? of? re?escalation.? Therefore,? it?
seems? plausible? to? assume? that? when?Western? policies? proceed? in? the?
general?way?described,?local?elites?react?in?the?observed?way?to?the?effect?
of? providing? for? the? context? to? shift? toward? escalation.? In? other?words,?





Western? influence? in? contexts? of? violence? follows? a? defined? agenda? of,?
both,? state? formation? and? liberal? peace?building.?Goodhand? and?Walton?
have? already? stated? in? their? Sri? Lanka? study? that? this? agenda? envisages?
implementing?vested?interests?through?a?liberal?vision?of?importing?conflict?
resolution,? liberal? democracy? and?market? economy? and? their? effect? on?
local?elites’?policies?(Goodhand?and?Walton?2009:?304).?
?
The? study? of? Lazarus? (2010)? examines? neo?liberal? state? building? and?
democracy?promotion?specifically?in?the?case?of?Georgia.?Regarding?illiberal?
effects?of?Western?policies?on?domestic? forms?of? rule? in?Georgia,?Lazarus?
comes? to?similar?conclusions?as? this?study? (Lazarus?2010:?2).? Importantly,?
Lazarus?emphasizes?that,?first,?the?self?interest?of?the?agendas?of?all?states?
results?in?support?of?autocratic?regimes?and,?second,?technocratic?needs?of?
external? actors? “produce[s]? a? centralising? rather? than? a? democratic? or?
participatory? bias? in? their? modus? operandi”? (ibid.).? Lazarus,? therefore,?
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criticizes? an? increasing? gap? of? legitimacy? of?Western? engagement? in? the?
field?of?democracy?promotion?(ibid.:?3).?
?
This? study? agrees? with? these? findings? and? found? that? these? illiberal?
outcomes?take?significant?effect?specifically?in?the?context?of?escalations?of?
violence? in? the? South? Ossetia? case.?Moreover,? the? empirical? discussion?
illustrated? important?considerations?for?studies?of?the?Western?project.? In?
the? contexts?of? South?Ossetia,?Sri? Lanka?and?Kashmir,? the?Western? state?
formation/? liberal?agenda? is?a?practical?expression?of?the?Western?pursuit?
of?power?outside? its?domestic?sphere,?generating?mechanisms?of?external?
influence? that? significantly? contribute? to? triggering? local? violence.? The?
discussion? of? the? Kashmir? context? illustrated? that? even? if? Western?
engagement? on? the? local? or? national? level? of? the? conflict? is? limited,? the?
structural?norm?pressure?of? the?Western?agenda?works? through?national?
policies?and?influences?contexts?of?violence.?The?Sri?Lanka?case?provides?a?





The?generalizing?empirical?outreach?of?the? findings?suggests?that? it? is? less?
specific? forms? of? external? policies? that? rule? the? game? and? lead? to?
escalations? (such? as? specific? forms? of? military,? political? or? financial?
support),?but?the?state?formation?and?liberal?peace?agendas?that?local?state?
actors? themselves? locally? interpret? make? for? re?escalating? dynamics? of?
violence.? It? is? surprising? to?what? an? enormous? extent? and? simultaneous?
precision? local? state? elites,? in? their? attempts? to? consolidate? power,? are?
capable? of? transforming? the? state?formation? agenda? through? the? lens?of?
local?politics?on?the?ground?of?their?respective?violent?conflicts.?This?can?be?
observed? in? all? instances? mentioned? above,? such? as? a? more?
professionalized? Western? peace? agenda? at? the? central? state? level,?
consistent?Western? support? for? the? central? state? in? the? conflict,? and? the?
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focus? on? democracy? features? of? non?violence.? In? all? cases,? the?Western?








in? South? Ossetia? has? escalated? recurrently? since? its? start? in? 1989.? After?
careful? discussion? of? the? existing? arguments? in? light? of? the? empirical?
context,? the? study? examines? the? influence? of? Western? policies? in? re?
escalations? in? the? conflict.? Western? policies,? the? argument? maintains,?
influence? the? power? politics? of? Georgian? state? elites? to? the? extent? of?
providing? incentives? for? assertive? policies? toward? South? Ossetia.? This?
interaction,? intersecting? with? the? policies? of? Russian? and? Ossetian?
stakeholders? and? domestic? political? and? private? incentives,? repeatedly?
leads?to?the?escalation?of?violence?in?the?conflict.?
?
The? research? argued? that? studies? on? the? South? Ossetia? conflict? largely?
juxtapose?state?building?and?democratization?and?also,?ethnic?groups?and?
nationalism? as? key? factors? of? the? conflict.? Neither? strand? of? debate?
provides?an?explanation?as? to?why?escalations?occur?at? specific?points? in?
time? and?why? they? recur.? Those? factors?merely? explain? that? the? context?
deteriorated? in?favor?of?escalation,?but?do?not?explain?or?provide?credible?
links?why? and? how? escalations? occurred? at? the? points? in? time? observed.?
Therefore,?these?studies?refrain?from?addressing?the?specific?conditions?of?
the? South? Ossetia? case? and? link? secession? to? exogenous? factors.? The?
research? undertaken? here? is? an? attempt? to? contribute? to? the? debate? a?
systematic? study? on? triggers? of? violence? in? South? Ossetia? as? a?
representative?case?of?a?protracted?armed?conflict.?
?
The? study? traces? the?process?of?Western?policies’? influence?on?Georgian?
leaderships’?options?for?power?consolidation?prior?to?escalations.?The?study?
further? suggests? that? the? patterns? of? Western? agency? that? repeatedly?
occurred?prior?to?three?instances?of?escalation?–?in?2002,?2004?and?2008?–?









points? in? time? of? escalation? (as? opposed? to? the? impetus? of? Georgian,?
Ossetian?or?Russian?agency)?and,?second,?shifts?in?Western?policies?set?off?
escalation? cycles? (in? continuous? interaction? with? other? stakeholders).?
Therefore,?the?study?concludes?that?the? influence?of?Western?actors?such?
as? the? OSCE,? the? EU,? the? US,? NATO? and? EU? member? states? had? and?
continues? to? have? a? direct? and? decisive? impact? on? the? dynamics? of? the?




further?consideration,? relating? to?conclusions?about? the?case,? the?general?
properties? of? the? case? and? resources? for? further? research.? First,? the?
revelation? of? the? Bucharest? fallacy? emphasizes? the? importance? of?
unseating? the? false? perception? of? the? influence? of? Russian?Georgian? or?
Russian?Western? contentious? politics? in? the? context? of? the? conflict.? The?
2008?August?war?altered?the?structure?of?European?Russian?relations?since?
the?Second?World?War?in?a?lasting?manner,?as?it?gave?way?to?the?end?of?the?
European? Security?Charta.?Because?of? this,? it? is?widely?held? that?Russian?




merely?a? reinforcing? instance?of?Western?actors’?passive? support?of? local?
assertive?politics?one? and? a?half? years?earlier.? The? study?points?out?how?
Western? policies,? once? the? escalation? cycle? had? started,? reinforced?
dynamics?through?the?Bucharest?refusal,?but?that?in?fact?Western?policies’?
triggering?effect?took?place?at?the?very? local? level? in? interaction?with?(and?
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?
support? of)? the? local? leadership.?At? least? in? this? important? instance,? the?
much?employed? argument?of? a?Western?Russian? struggle,?occurring?over?





The? prevalence? of?Western? influence? on? the? conflict’s? dynamics? is? also?
apparent? through? the? enormous? impact? of? the? paradigm? of? stateness?
translated?into?policy.?Western?influence?not?only?crucially?determines?the?
choice? of? policies? (anti?smuggling,? anti?crime,? anti?corruption,? territorial?





work? through? the? norm? of? the? state,? not? only? does? the? specific? role? of?
Western? policies? prior? to? escalations? become? apparent? in? facilitating? in?




Therefore,? the?general?prevalence?of? the?paradigm?of? stateness,?working?
through?Western?policies? into? local?choices?and?affecting?the?dynamics?of?
violence,?is?the?most?important?finding?with?general?applicability?for?other?
contexts? of? violence.? In? this? respect,? the? study? sustains? the? paradox? of?
liberal? external? state? building? leading? to? illiberal? outcomes? such? as?









who? then?guide?Western?policies? toward? illiberal?domestic?choices.?More?
precisely,? even? in? their? foreign? policy? agendas,?Western? policies? in? local?





of? free? range?between? levels?of?agency?and?claims,?which,?under?specific?
conditions,?has?a?particularly? intense?reinforcing?effect?on? local?dynamics.?
It?is?possible?that?Western?agents?might?enjoy?a?greater?freedom?of?range?
than? local? elites? in? part? because? they? are? less? accountable? to? their?
constituencies,?who?are?more?removed?from?their?leaders’?actions?abroad?









well,? exhibits? a? pattern? that? specifically? upholds? the? dynamics? of? re?
escalation? over? extended? periods? of? time? and? encompassing? individual?
points? of? escalation.? This? was? revealed? by? the? overall? trajectory? of?
intensification? of? the? conflict,? which? was? discussed? at? the? start? of? the?
empirical?analysis,?showing?that?over?the?re?escalation?process,? increasing?
Western?engagement?coincides?with?an? increasing? focus?on? issues?of? the?
state?and?the? involvement?of?state?actors.?Similarly,?the?study?shows?that?
with? each? escalation? the? paradox? of? democracy? versus? state?centered?








Walton? (2010)? argue? that? the? formation? and? implementation? of? the?
Western?agenda?necessitates?the?existence?of?violence.?It?is?worth?looking?
at?the?preliminary?end?of?the?cycle?of?violence? in?Sri?Lanka?after?the?2009?
war.?During? the?military? campaign,? international? state? actors? reluctantly?
condemned?the?government?for?human?rights?violations.?Punitive?steps?of?
Western?agencies?against? the? Sri? Lankan?government?were? implemented?
with? years? of? delay,? among? them? the? cancellation? of? preferential? trade?
relations?with?the?EU?or?the?refusal?of?the?conditions?linked?to?an?IMF?loan?
(see? ICG? 2010).? Similarly,? when? the? UNHCR? announced? that? it? would?
investigate? human? rights? violations? in? March? 2012,? the? Colombo?
government? refused? the? request? citing? concerns? of? infringement? of?
sovereignty.? It?seems?to?raise? legitimate?questions?about?Western?agency?
that? when? the? Sri? Lankan? government? ceased? seeing? the? necessity? of?
military?violence?as?a?means?of?securing? internal?control?after?the?military?





have? ended.? In? contexts? of? ongoing? violence? such? as? South?Ossetia,? the?
‘non?use? of? force’? demand? by? international? actors? continues? to? direct?
Western?local? relations,? such?as? in? the? framework?of? the?Geneva? talks? in?
which? the?Georgian? government? signaled? goodwill? to?Western? actors? by?
unilaterally? declaring? non?use? of? force? after? the?war? of? 2008.? If? the? link?











of?Western? support.?However,?with? respect? to? local? contexts?of? violence?
facilitated?by?these?regimes,?it?should?be?noted?that?local?violence?is?one?of?
the? outcomes? of? the?Western? agenda.?Vice? versa,? violence? seems? to? be?
among? the? most? powerful? catalyzing? forces,? providing? a? determining?
context? of? agency.? As? this? study? shows,? once? violence? has? started,? the?











that? elicit? change? in? local? behavior? prior? to? escalation.? Research? should?
answer?whether? there?are? specific?mechanisms? that?are?more? likely? than?
others?to?trigger?change?in?behavior,?whether?this?effect?of?mechanisms?of?
external?agency?varies?according? to?points? in? time? (earlier?or? later? in? the?
escalation? cycle),? and? whether? further? research? can? derive? more?
generalized? statements? on? the? characteristics? of? the? mechanisms?
identified,? analyzing? the? effect? of? 1)? claim? or? action?based? properties? of?
state?and?democracy?centered?policies? (e.g.? rhetoric,? formats,? facilitation?
projects,? implementation? of? frameworks,? etc.)? or? 2)? the? effect? of? and?




as? the? international,? national? and? local? level? of? the? conflict,? exhibits?
different?effects?on?the?dynamics?of?re?escalation.?In?this?respect,? it?might?
be? important? to? look?at? the?different?effects?of?state?centered?policies? in?
contrast?to?democracy?centered?policies?in?terms?of?the?level?at?which?they?







In? order? to? expand? the? scope? of? the? findings,? it?would? be? necessary? to?
compare?key?decision?points?prior? to?escalations?by?working?across?cases?
(also? see? Capoccia? and? Keleman? 2007).? In? the? context? of? the? previous?
analysis,?this?would?include?identifying?shifts?in?local?behavior?toward?more?
assertive?policies,?as?well?as?possibly?related?Western?policies?prior?to?the?
turning?points.?As?a? result,? social? research? could?make? statements?about?
when? in?the?escalation?cycle?behavior? is?generally?more? likely?to?shift?and?




the?major?place?of?contention?and?not?Abkhazia,? the? locus?of? the?second?
secessionist? conflict? on? Georgia’s? territory.? Escalations? of? violence? in?
Abkhazia?took?place?regularly?from?the?end?of?the?war? in?1994?until?2008,?
involving? the? UN?mandated? Georgian? and? Abkhaz? police? forces,? regular?
Georgian?troops?on? interior?as?well?as? local?Georgian?and?Abkhaz?militias,?
and,? since? 2008,? Russian? troops? deployed? in? Abkhazia.? Nonetheless,?
escalations?in?Abkhazia?seem?to?exhibit?much?weaker?effects?on?the?power?
basis?of?Georgian?elites?and?draw? less?vociferous?Western? reactions? than?
violence? in? the? South? Ossetia? context? (see? on? the? conflict? in? Abkhazia:?
199?
?
Derluguian? 2000? and? 2007,? Suny? 1994,? Beissinger? 2002,? Coppieters? and?
Legvold?2005,?Hanf?and?Nodia?2000).?Therefore,?the?discussion?would? like?
to? briefly? point? out? parallels? between? the? South? Ossetia? and? Abkhazia?





different?role? from? that? in?South?Ossetia? in? terms?of?power?consolidation?
for? Georgian? leadership.? The? Georgian? nationalist? narrative? usually?
establishes? Abkhazia? as? a? separate? nation? within? the? Georgian? state,?
whereas? this? attitude? does? not? extend? to? South?Ossetia? (Khinchagashvili?
2004,?Shatirishvili?2003).?Second,?separation?after? the?end?of? the?Abkhaz?
Georgian? war? in? 1994? took? the? form? of? a? far? more? formalized? and?
institutionalized? framework?of?de?facto? autonomy? than? in? South?Ossetia,?
with? the? emergence?of? a? local?political? culture,? the? formation?of? foreign?
relations?between?the?Abkhaz?elite?and?Western?agencies,?and?a?de?facto?
visa? regime?with? Georgia? through? the?UN?Mission.? In? post?Soviet? South?
Ossetia,? all? these? features?were? closely? linked? to? and? controlled? by? the?
Russian? Federation.? A? third? indicator? might? be? that? organized? armed?
conflict? in? Abkhazia? at? the? start? of? the? 1990s? was? an? arena? for? local?
Georgian? strongmen? struggling? for? power? in? the? capital? (I? 1,? also? see:?




a? far? lesser?extent?than? in?South?Ossetia.?This?might?have? led?to?different?
dynamics? in? the?Abkhazia? context?and?a?different? link?between?Georgian?








because?of?access? to?Black?Sea?waters? than? in? land?locked?South?Ossetia?
(also?see?Derluguian?2007).?Proponents?argue?that,?therefore,?Abkhazia? is?
in?fact?the?center?of?Russian?Georgian?contention?and?that?when?dynamics?
in?Abkhazia?shift,?the?ramifications?resonate? in?multiplied?form? in?the? less?
stable? South?Ossetia.? This? view? could? be? sustained,? as? just? two?months?
prior?to?the? installment?of?the?Sanakoev?administration? in?2006,?Georgian?
troops? recaptured? Kodori? Gorge? in? Abkhazia.? In? this? context,? a? shift? in?
Abkhazia?could?be?seen?as?having?preceded?and?possibly?being?part?of?the?
same?Georgian? agenda? of? territorial? integration? as? the? shift? to? assertive?
behavior?of?Georgian?elites?in?South?Ossetia.?Similarly,?the?view?holds?that?
the?2008?war?started?not?in?South?Ossetia,?but?with?Russian?troops?quietly?
moving? into? Abkhazia? days? prior? to? the? start? of? armed? action? in? South?
Ossetia.??
?
These? arguments? plausibly? sustain? that? there? is? a? link? between? the?
Abkhazia? and? the? South?Ossetia?dynamics? that? is?not?only? forged?by? the?
common?context,?but?also?shown?in?palpable?trajectories?of?events?on?the?
ground.? However,? the? diminished? scope? of? politicized? Western?
engagement?with?Abkhazia?when?addressing?state?elites?in?Tbilisi?suggests?
a?greater? impact?of?Western?policies?on? local?power?consolidation? in? the?
South?Ossetia? context.? It? seems? as? though? the? differences? between? the?
Abkhazia? and? South?Ossetia? contexts? actually? fortify? the? findings? of? the?
South?Ossetia? study:?They?explicitly? reiterate? that? shifts? in? local?behavior?
bring?about?escalations?in?South?Ossetia,?but?that,?simultaneously,?Western?
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Deployment?of?JPKLFF? ?? ?? ?Joint?Peace?Keeping?and?Law?Enforcement?Forces
Oct? JCC?meetings?come?to?a?
complete?halt?
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Year? Date? Total? JPKF? other?LEBs? Civilians? Unspecified? Oss? Geo? Location? Remarks?
1994? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 16?Oct? ?? 3? ?? ?? 3?Mkhe? 3? 3? ?? ??
1995? ?? none? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
1996? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? first?half? >15? ?? ?? ?? 15? ?? ?? ?? ??




1997? ?? 3? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 30?May? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? east?of?Tskh? refugee?in?Geo?village?
??
first?half?of?
Jul? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ?? head?of?village?by?predecessor?
??
first?half?of?
Aug? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? by?Geo?policeman?
1998? ?? 6? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
??
first?half?of?
Apr? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? Tamarasheni? by?"drunk"?RU?PKF?
?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? maybe? ?? ?? ??
?? 5?Sep? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ?? by?RU?training?missile?
??
first?half?of?
Dec? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? 2? Artsevi? locals?arrested?in?joint?LEB?activity?
1999? ?? 4? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
??
first?half?of?
Feb? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? maybe? ??
Znauri?and?
Java?(Oss)? ??
?? 13?Jul? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? former?IDP?
?? 13?Oct? ?? ?? ?? 1? 1?NO? ?? ??
Falloy?
market? robbery,?suspects?are?local?Oss?
2000? ?? 6? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 12?May? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? Tskh? criminal?
291?
?
?? 20?May? ?? ?? ?? 5? ?? ?? 5? Kheiti?(Geo)?
car?ambush,?commemoration?day?of?
1992?killings?of?Oss?by?geo?
2001? ?? 13? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 3?Apr? ?? ?? ?? 3? ?? 3? ?? Tskh? gangs'?shootout?
?? 13?May? ?? ??
1?police?




?? 8?Jul? ?? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? Tskh? found?dead?
?? end?Nov? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ??
gang?shoots?at?Geo/SO?police?
control?
?? end?Nov? ?? ?? ?? 3? ?? 1? 2? ?? shoot?out?





?? early?Sep? ?? ?? ?? 5? ?? ?? ?? ?? criminal?
2003? ?? 5? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 3?May? ?? ?? ?? 3? ?? ?? 3? Tamarasheni? sons?and?father?
?? 26?Oct? ?? ??
1?police?
(geo)? ?? ?? ?? 1? Khviti? during?operation?
?? end?Dec? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? ?? Archevi? firefight?
2004? ?? >5? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??




?? 8?Apr? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? ?? Ptsa? by?Geo?police?during?control?
?? 13?Aug? ?? ?? ?? ??
both?military?
and?civilian? ?? ?? ??
first?time,?casualties?are?mentioned?
since?May?31?
?? 12?Oct? ?? 2?(Oss)? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? Kirbali? NO?PKF,?ambush?
2005? ?? 6? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??




police)? ?? ?? 4? 1?
Geo?vill?n?of?
Tskh? ??
?? end?Jun? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? ?? 1? ?? body?found,?mine?accident?
292?
?
2006? ?? 12? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?? 28?Jan? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ??
Geo?vill?n?of?
Tskh? found?dead?
?? 9?Jul? ?? ?? 1?(Oss)? ?? ?? 1? ?? Tskh? head?of?SO?NSC?in?bomb?blast?
?? 14?Jul? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? ?? Tskh? explosion?





forces? ?? ?? 3? 1? Tbeti? ??
?? end?Sep? ?? ?? ?? 2? ?? ?? 2? close?to?CZ? gunshot?
?? 23?Oct? ?? ?? ?? 1? ?? 1? ?? ??
in?hospital?after?shooting?on?Oct?9?
between?Geo?and?Oss?locals?















      
So militia starts 
to fight against 
Geo police (I 13) 
from 1993, 
low-level viol, 
only crime (I 
29) 




in Latvia (I 
24)   
          




















25)   
Gorb offers 
Gamsa deal (I 
19)   [Apr/ May] 
      
May             
Jun     Yeltsin elected president
Sochi agreement, 
JCC started (I 29)       
Jul             
Aug       Start of war in Abkh (I 29)       
Sept
SO declares 
indep; RU low key 
when SO 
declares indep
    Chib into power (I 8)   
Oct Elections/ Gamsa into power (I 25)   
Yelt´s last 
warning to Geo 
on Chech 
support (I 19)   




13, 25)   
          
Dec 
Parl abolishes SO 
aut (I 25)  ; 
Violence started 
formally with Geo 
police killed, Tbs 
declared state of 
emerg (I 13)   
Gamsa ousted (I 
19)  ; Shev into 
power (I 29)   









Change in CZ 
perimeters (I 
17)  ; West 
starts to 
demand
changes (I 7)   




Usupa (I 7)  ; 
Intense
NATo policy 
(I 29)   
Snipers killed 
25 police in 
Gori Jan-Sept 
(I 7); Restart 
of SO-Geo 
contacts/ start 
of mil build-up 
(I 23)   
From 2004 in 
general more Geo 
police actions (I 
14)   
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Jan             
Rose Rev policy 
on separatists (I 
9, 13)   
Feb             Constitutionalreform (I 6)   
Mar               
Apr               
May             Ergneti closure (I 1, 6, 8, 9)   
Jun               
Jul     
Baden
Document (I 
8, 14, 01-16)  




(I 8)   
      
Int/ IMF say 
Geo to tackle 
corr or funding 
cut    (I 7) 
"Verge of war" 
through Okrua (I 
18)   





14)   
    Saaka bei UNGA 





14)   
    




"Sarabuki" (I 9, 







power (I 8, 
9, 28, 29)  ; 
Start of RU 
visa regime 
(I 29)   
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?
West cuts funds for 
democracy (I 6); 
Start of negos with 
Abkh (I 12) 
      
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
Jan Saaka bei PACE     Yakobashvili appointed SMR
Feb Semneby appointed EUSRSC   (I 14) 
Kosovo recognition (I 5, 
14)   
Mar         
Apr       
NATO Summit 
Bucharest (I 6, 7)  ; Ru-
SO start legal relations (I 
5)   ; Drone incident in 
Abkh (I 5, 14, 20)   
May 
Shamba visits Tbs/ 
Saaka at mil base (I 
6, 23)   
Geo parl formally sets 
up Sana admin (I 28)   
Negos on doc with Abkh 
(I 12)    
Jun Mamusrov into power       
Jul     
Ru missile hit close to 
EUDel on way back from 
Tskh (I 14, 20)   
Ambush on Sana (I 5. 9)  
Aug Recapture of Kodori (I 9, 14, 23)   
August war (I 7, 8, 13, 
27)   
Sept     Okrua launches party/ is arrested 2 days later   Sarkozy initiative (I 14)   
Oct       OSCE reports published (I2)   
Nov Karkusov break (I 9)   
Okrua steps down (I 
7, 11)  ; SO 
alternative polls   
November
demonstrations   
Dec 
Ljub doc presented 
(I 9)  ; Kok statement 
on Ljub (I 17)   
Sana inaugurated 
(I1, 2, 4, 14, 28)  ; 
Saaka annual 
address (I 6)   
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ANNEX?4:?List?of?interviews??
?
Total?number?of?interviews:?76,?out?of?these?listed?as?references:?39??
Interviews?that?were?conducted?as?part?of?the?research,?but?that??
do?not?appear?as?references?go?without?codes.?
?
Reference?
code? Occupation?at?time?of?interview? Date?and?place?of?interview?
I?1? Senior?analyst?with?international?human?rights?organization?
May?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?2? Journalist,?Tbilisi? May?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?3? Senior?co?worker?of?UNDP,?former?OSCE?project?manager?on?ERP? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?4? Former?senior?co?worker?of?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?5? Senior?member?of?the?Ministry?of?Internal?Affairs? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?6? Senior?member?of?the?Republican?Party?(opposition),?former?MP? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?7? Senior?member?of?local?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?1?7? Senior?member?of?local?NGO? June?2010,?Tbilisi?
I?8,?I?1?8? Senior?member?of?the?Office?of?the?State?Minister?for?Reintegration? July?and?September?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?9? Political?analyst?and?member?of?Republican?Party?(opposition)?
July?2009,?Tbilisi?
Georgian?English?translation?
I?10? Senior?member?of?the?Regional?Police?of?Shida?Kartli,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
I?11? Member?of?the?opposition?in?Gori,?Senior?member?of?the?city?council?in?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
I?12? Senior?member?of?Our?Georgia?–?Free?Democrats?Party?(opposition)? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?13,?I?1?13? Senior?member?of?United?Georgian?Traditionalists?Party;?Former?senior?member?of?Gamsakhurdia?government?
July?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?14? Senior?member?of?the?EU?Delegation?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?15? Lawyer,?former?co?worker?at?local?human?rights?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?16,?I?1?16? Expert?with?opposition?party,?former?senior?member?of?the?Saakashvili?government?
July?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?17? Expert?on?security?issues?with?international?organization,?Gori;?former?co?worker?with?OSCE?on?South?Ossetia? July?2009,?Gori?
I?18? Journalist?with?international?NGO? July?2009,?Gori?
I?20? Former?senior?member?of?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?21? Journalist?with?local?human?rights?NGO,?Gori? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?22? Senior?member?of?the?Ministry?of?Refugees? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?23? Project?manager?with?international?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?24? Co?worker?with?European?Special?Representative?to?the?South?Caucasus?and?the?Crisis?in?Georgia? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
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?
I?25? Two?leading?members?of?the?Social?Democrats’?Party?of?Georgia? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
?
I?26? Former?senior?advisor?to?the?Shevardnadze?government?
August?2009,?Tbilisi??
(two?meetings)?
I?27? Senior?member?of?local?NGO,?former?senior?advisor?to?the?Shevardnadze?government? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?28? Senior?member?of?the?alternative?Administration?of?South?Ossetia? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?29? Senior?member?of?local?think?tank,?former?senior?advisor?to?the?Shevardnadze?government? August?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?31? Senior?member?of?local?think?tank;?former?senior?member?of?the?Shevardnadze?government? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?32? Project?manager?with?local?NGO? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
I?33? Former?senior?member?of?OSCE?Mission?to?Georgia? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
I?34? Journalist?with?public?TV?station,?Tbilisi? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
I?35? Co?worker?with?EU?Delegation?to?Georgia? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
? Senior?member?of?international?research?NGO,?Tbilisi? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Professor?of?history,?formerly?advisor?to?the?Gamsakhurdia?government? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Free?lance?journalist,?Vladikavkaz? June?2009,?Yerevan?
? Senior?Programme?Coordinator?with?international?NGO? June?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Co?worker?with?EUMM,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
? Co?worker?with?EUMM,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
? Senior?co?worker?with?EUMM,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?
? Editor?of?local?newspaper,?Gori? July?2009,?Gori?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Resident?of?Ditsi? July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Resident?of?Ditsi? July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Resident?of?Ditsi? July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? Former?senior?member?of?district?administration?in?Gori,?former?OSCE?co?worker?on?South?Ossetia?
July?2009,?Ditsi?–?Georgian?
English?translation?
? Member?of?alternative?administration?to?South?Ossetia?under?authority?of?the?Government?of?Georgia?
July?2009,?Tbilisi?
Georgian?English?translation?
? Project?manager?at?local?IDP?advocacy?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Co?worker?at?local?IDP?advocacy?NGO? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Senior?member?of?regional?NGO,?Tbilisi? July?2009,?Tbilisi?
? Senior?journalist?with?local?newspaper,?Tbilisi? August?2009,?Tabakhmela?
? Senior?member?of?international?research?NGO,?Tbilisi? July?2010,?Tbilisi?
? 19?interviews?with?IDPs?at?the?Gori?IDP?camp? July?2009,?Gori?–?Georgian?English?translation?
? ?
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